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Statement of Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal inula I HJIII ( ode \ nnuuii d 
§78-2-2(3)(j), w Inch piovidcd the (\:>iirt with appellate jurisdiction over civil judgments of 
tiiv [,\h Ok-trict Courts, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(4), by way of transfer from the Utah Supreme ( unit 
Statement of the Issues 
a Issue: Whether the Court below erred in making findings and conclusions, 
and fashioning a remedy for claims not plead in the Complaint or in any 
pleading, and for which no such remedy was requested h\ the Plaintiff. 
Determinative hn\ • Holmes - In juKliiion. \\w h>U< »w inp maybe authorities 
pertinen • i e review of this issue: 
1. Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to 
Pleadings. 
2. Rule o : en. ij-.i-• J'-.\. .u - i - ..-•, i*r .- -i:ar iing the
 tira.endment 
of pleadings. 
Standard of review: This issue presents a question of law review for 
correctness to which no particular deference should be given to the lower 
court's judgment, law. 
-1-
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b. Issue: Whether the Court below erred in finding and concluding that Slone 
Porter and Tracey Cowley reached an agreement as indicated in the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Determinative law: Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 
733,735 (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,585 P.2d 
724 (1978); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 P.2d 411 
(1977)). 
Standard of review: This issue challenges certain findings of fact of court 
below, and raises issues questions of both fact and law. The findings of fact are reviewed 
to determine sufficiency of the evidence, to which the lower court is afforded appropriate 
deference as the trier of fact. The questions of law are reviewed for correctness for which 
the lower court is afforded no particular deference as to its judgment. 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules 
Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be dispositive of this 
Appeal. There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or ordinances 
applicable in this case. 
Statement of the Case 
a. Nature of the case. 
This case arises from the failure of an eight year business association between Slone 
Porter and Tracy Cowley. In 1993, Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley, together with Bill Berg 
-2-
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formed a Utah Corporation known as Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("AMS"). 
Following a course of events which occurred between June 22, 2002 and Juh 1 {K 2')UJ, 
Tracy Cowley and his wife Ken n ( \nvlcy eonimenced this aelion in (he court below against 
SJum Failcr ami his wife Veralynn Porter. Mrs. Cowley and Mrs. Porter were dismissed as 
parties to the case following trial.1 The Complaint which commenced this case in the Court 
below as asserted by Tracy Cowley, contains only nine (9) paragraphs, ana n ,uu . w 
action. The Complaint was never amende ' s ; \ :• u^l!: r rderfrom 
th, H'
 : i a ui AMS under the Utah Revised Business Corporation 
Act, Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-101 et seq. Mr. Porter denied the allegations in the 
Complaint, and asserted an affirmative defense that AMS was properly dissolved, based upon 
•the parties' oral agreement reached on July \kK -(I<L', "^  lii''l) picvluded imlicuil inVn I.MIIIOII 
as sought in the Complaint ' I 'he terms of that oral agreement, as asserted by Mr. Porter, were 
as set forth in a letter from Porter's Counsel to Cowley's Counsel. (Ex. "" ~ 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
Cowley, upon review of the Answer, filed a Motion foi Judgment on (lie Pleadings, 
basetl upon his Affidavit in w hicii he testified that there was no agreement with Porter 
concerning the dissolution of AMS. That motion was denied. Thereafter, Cowley 
repackaged his motion and filed it as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds. 
1
 The court's order dismissing Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter as parties is the subject 
of a cross-appeal filed by the Appellee, Tracy Cowley which has been consolidated with this case 
for hearing. 
-3-
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In response, Mr. Porter requested additional time to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion, allowing thirty (30) days to 
complete discovery necessary to respond to the motion. Mr. Porter took extensive discovery, 
including the depositions of the Tracy and Kerin Cowley during the thirty day period. 
Mr. Porter then filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which included 
36 exhibits (including Cowley's answers to requests for admissions and deposition testimony 
of Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley) supporting the conclusion that there existed material 
issues of fact concerning whether the parties had an enforceable agreement, thus precluding 
judicial dissolution under the Statute. The motion for summaryjudgment was denied. 
In the trial court's decision denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 
concluded that Cowley and Porter had reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of 
AMS, but that there were two primary issues left for trial. Those issues were: (1) the terms 
of the agreement reached by the parties; and (2) whether sufficient part performance of the 
oral agreement had been completed that would allow the court to enforce the oral agreement 
under the Statute of Frauds. 
Cowley then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Cowley then filed 
a second motion for reconsideration of the denial of the renewed motion for summary 
judgment, which was denied days prior to trial. In the second motion for summaryjudgment 
Cowley raised a new theory of recovery for the first time, for which the there was no 
-4-
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amendment to the Complaint. The case proceeded to trial to the court upon those two issues 
on June 1 and 2, 2004. 
c. Disposition of the trial court. 
In ^ ; is the subject of Mr. Porter's appeal, the Court rejected 
Mr. Porter's assertion that there was an oral agreement as outlined in Ex. "17". The lower 
Court also rejected Cowley's assertion that there was a written agreement as set forth in Ex. 
"5". Instead, the Court concluded that Cowley and Mi, Poller reached a tlilTcrcnt era! 
•agreement upon in HIS. inconsisU'nt u ith either of the two competing exhibits, but including 
the &W, £>$>.$> which the Cowieys admitted was ne^er accepted and was "taken off the 
table", and that the Court's agreement was enforceable under the "substantial part 
performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds. 
The f ourt (iiillier e-eik. hivied (hal Mi, I'm KM had breached the agreement by failing 
to make sufficient payments against the $600,000.00, and awarded damages for breach of 
contract to Cowley, where there was no cause of action plead for breach of contract by 
Cowley and'basedupon a contract different from that asserted by Cowley in response to Mr. 
Porter's afilmiati\ e defense.:;; 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
Defendant Slone Porter hereby incorporates as his Statement of Relevant Facts, the 
Findings of Fact entered by the court below on September 9, 2t)04, except, expressly 
Findings 33 3 ;:id3y. . ( : Defendant is challenging the lower court's 
-5-
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Statement of Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2-2(3)(j), which provided the Court with appellate jurisdiction over civil judgments of 
the Utah District Courts, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(4), by way of transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. 
Statement of the Issues 
a. Issue: Whether the Court below erred in making findings and conclusions, 
and fashioning a remedy for claims not plead in the Complaint or in any 
pleading, and for which no such remedy was requested by the Plaintiff. 
Determinative law: Holmes — In addition, the following may be authorities 
pertinent to the review of this issue: 
1. Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to 
Pleadings. 
2. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the amendment 
of pleadings. 
Standard of review: This issue presents a question of law review for 
correctness to which no particular deference should be given to the lower 
court's judgment, law. 
-1-
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b. Issue: Whether the Court below erred in finding and concluding that Slone 
Porter and Tracey Cowley reached an agreement as indicated in the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Determinative law: Combe v. Warren fs Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 
733,735 (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,585 P.2d 
724 (1978); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 P.2d 411 
(1977)). 
Standard of review: This issue challenges certain findings of fact of court 
below, and raises issues questions of both fact and law. The findings of fact are reviewed 
to determine sufficiency of the evidence, to which the lower court is afforded appropriate 
deference as the trier of fact. The questions of law are reviewed for correctness for which 
the lower court is afforded no particular deference as to its judgment. 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules 
Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may be dispositive of this 
Appeal. There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or ordinances 
applicable in this case. 
Statement of the Case 
a. Nature of the case. 
This case arises from the failure of an eight year business association between Slone 
Porter and Tracy Cowley. In 1993, Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley, together with Bill Berg 
-2-
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formed a Utah Corporation known as Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("AMS"). 
Following a course of events which occurred between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002, 
Tracy Cowley and his wife Kerin Cowley commenced this action in the court below against 
Slone Porter and his wife Veralynn Porter. Mrs. Cowley and Mrs. Porter were dismissed as 
parties to the case following trial.l The Complaint which commenced this case in the Court 
below as asserted by Tracy Cowley, contains only nine (9) paragraphs, and one cause of 
action. The Complaint was never amended. In the Complaint, Cowley sought an order from 
the Court for the judicial dissolution of AMS under the Utah Revised Business Corporation 
Act, Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-101 et seq. Mr. Porter denied the allegations in the 
Complaint, and asserted an affirmative defense that AMS was properly dissolved, based upon 
the parties' oral agreement reached on July 19,2002, which precluded judicial intervention 
as sought in the Complaint. The terms of that oral agreement, as asserted by Mr. Porter, were 
as set forth in a letter from Porter's Counsel to Cowley's Counsel. (Ex. "17) 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
Cowley, upon review of the Answer, filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
based upon his Affidavit in which he testified that there was no agreement with Porter 
concerning the dissolution of AMS. That motion was denied. Thereafter, Cowley 
repackaged his motion and filed it as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds. 
1
 The court's order dismissing Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter as parties is the subject 
of a cross-appeal filed by the Appellee, Tracy Cowley which has been consolidated with this case 
for hearing. 
-3-
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In response, Mr. Porter requested additional time to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion, allowing thirty (30) days to 
complete discovery necessary to respond to the motion. Mr. Porter took extensive discovery, 
including the depositions of the Tracy and Kerin Cowley during the thirty day period. 
Mr. Porter then filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which included 
36 exhibits (including Cowley's answers to requests for admissions and deposition testimony 
of Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley) supporting the conclusion that there existed material 
issues of fact concerning whether the parties had an enforceable agreement, thus precluding 
judicial dissolution under the Statute, The motion for summary judgment was denied. 
In the trial court's decision denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 
concluded that Cowley and Porter had reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of 
AMS, but that there were two primary issues left for trial. Those issues were: (1) the terms 
of the agreement reached by the parties; and (2) whether sufficient part performance of the 
oral agreement had been completed that would allow the court to enforce the oral agreement 
under the Statute of Frauds. 
Cowley then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Cowley then filed 
a second motion for reconsideration of the denial of the renewed motion for summary 
judgment, which was denied days prior to trial. In the second motion for summary judgment 
Cowley raised a new theory of recovery for the first time, for which the there was no 
-4-
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amendment to the Complaint. The case proceeded to trial to the court upon those two issues 
on June 1 and 2, 2004. 
c. Disposition of the trial court. 
In the Court's ruling which is the subject of Mr. Porter's appeal, the Court rejected 
Mr. Porter's assertion that there was an oral agreement as outlined in Ex. "17". The lower 
Court also rejected Cowley's assertion that there was a written agreement as set forth in Ex. 
"5". Instead, the Court concluded that Cowley and Mr. Porter reached a different oral 
agreement upon terms inconsistent with either of the two competing exhibits, but including 
the $600,000.00 which the Cowleys admitted was never accepted and was "taken off the 
table", and that the Court's agreement was enforceable under the "substantial part 
performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds. 
The Court further concluded that Mr. Porter had breached the agreement by failing 
to make sufficient payments against the $600,000.00, and awarded damages for breach of 
contract to Cowley, where there was no cause of action plead for breach of contract by 
Cowley and based upon a contract different from that asserted by Cowley in response to Mr. 
Porter's affirmative defense. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
Defendant Slone Porter hereby incorporates as his Statement of Relevant Facts, the 
Findings of Fact entered by the court below on September 9, 2004, except, expressly 
Findings 33, 36, 37, and 39. . (R. 1651-1660) Defendant is challenging the lower court's 
-5-
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Statement of Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2-2(3)(j), which provided the Court with appellate jurisdiction over civil judgments of 
the Utah District Courts, which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(4), by way of transfer from the Utah Supreme Court. 
Statement of the Issues 
a. Issue: Whether the Court below erred in making findings and conclusions, 
and fashioning a remedy for claims not plead in the Complaint or in any 
pleading, and for which no such remedy was requested by the Plaintiff. 
Determinative law: Holmes — In addition, the following may be authorities 
pertinent to the review of this issue: 
1. Rules 7 through 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to 
Pleadings. 
2. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the amendment 
of pleadings. 
Standard of review: This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness to which no particular deference should be given to the lower 
court's judgment. 
b. Issue: Whether the Court below erred in finding and concluding that Slone 
1 
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Porter and Tracey Cowley reached an agreement as indicated in the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Determinative law: Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 
733,735 (Utah 1984); Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721,585 P.2d 
724 (1978); Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 559 P.2d 411 
(1977)). 
Standard of review: This issue challenges certain findings of fact of court 
below, and raises issues questions of both fact and law. The findings of fact are reviewed 
to determine sufficiency of the evidence, to which the lower court is afforded appropriate 
deference as the trier of fact. The questions of law are reviewed for correctness for which 
the lower court is afforded no particular deference as to its judgment. 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules 
Rules 7 through 12 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure maybe dispositive 
of this Appeal. There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or ordinances 
applicable in this case. 
Statement of the Case 
a. Nature of the case. 
This case arises from the failure of an eight year business association between Slone 
Porter and Tracy Cowley. In 1993, Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley, together with Bill Berg 
formed a Utah Corporation known as Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("AMS"). 
Following a course of events which occurred between June 22, 2002 and July 19, 2002, 
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Tracy Cowley and his wife Kerin Cowley commenced this action in the court below against 
Slone Porter and his wife Veralynn Porter. Mrs. Cowley and Mrs. Porter were dismissed as 
parties to the case following trial.1 The Complaint which commenced this case in the Court 
below as asserted by Tracy Cowley, contains only nine (9) paragraphs, and one cause of 
action. The Complaint was never amended. In the Complaint, Cowley sought an order from 
the Court for the judicial dissolution of AMS under the Utah Revised Business Corporation 
Act, Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-101 et seq. Mr. Porter denied the allegations in the 
Complaint, and asserted an affirmative defense that AMS was properly dissolved based upon 
the parties' oral agreement reached on July 19,2002, which precluded judicial intervention 
as sought in the Complaint. The terms of that oral agreement, as asserted by Mr. Porter, were 
as set forth in a letter from Porter's Counsel to Cowley's Counsel. (Ex. "17)®. 415-420) 
b. Course of Proceedings. 
Cowley, upon review of the Answer, filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
based upon his Affidavit in which he testified that there was no agreement with Porter 
concerning the dissolution of AMS. That motion was denied. Thereafter, Cowley 
repackaged his motion and filed it as a Motion for Summary Judgment on the same grounds. 
In response, Mr. Porter requested additional time to respond under Rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted the motion, allowing thirty (30) days to 
complete discovery necessary to respond to the motion. Mr. Porter took extensive discovery, 
1
 The court's order dismissing Kerin Cowley and Veralynn Porter as parties is the subject 
of a cross-appeal filed by the Appellee, Tracy Cowley which has been consolidated with this case 
for hearing. 
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including the depositions of the Tracy and Kerin Cowley during the thirty day period. 
Mr. Porter then filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment which included 
36 exhibits (including Cowley's answers to requests for admissions and deposition testimony 
of Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley) supporting the conclusion that there existed material 
issues of fact concerning whether the parties had an enforceable agreement, thus precluding 
judicial dissolution under the Statute. The motion for summary judgment was denied. 
In the trial court's decision denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 
concluded that Cowley and Porter had reached an agreement pertaining to the dissolution of 
AMS, but that there were two primary issues left for trial. Those issues were: (1) the terms 
of the agreement reached by the parties; and (2) whether sufficient part performance of the 
oral agreement had been completed that would allow the court to enforce the oral agreement 
under the Statute of Frauds. 
Cowley then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Cowley then filed 
a second motion for motion for summary judgment, which was denied just days prior to trial. 
In the second motion for summary judgment Cowley raised a new theory of recovery for the 
first time, for which the there was no amendment to the Complaint. That motion was denied. 
The case proceeded to trial to the court upon those two issues on June 1 and 2, 2004. 
c. Disposition of the trial court. 
In the Court's ruling which is the subject of Mr. Porter's appeal, the Court rejected 
Mr. Porter's assertion that there was an oral agreement as outlined in Ex. "17". The lower 
Court also rejected Cowley's assertion that there was a written agreement as set forth in Ex. 
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"5". Instead, the Court concluded that Cowley and Mr. Porter reached a different oral 
agreement upon terms inconsistent with either of the two competing exhibits, but including 
the $600,000.00 which the Cowleys admitted was never accepted and was "taken off the 
table", and that the Court's agreement was enforceable under the "substantial part 
performance" exception to the Statute of Frauds. 
The Court further concluded that Mr. Porter had breached the agreement by failing 
to make sufficient payments against the $600,000.00, and awarded damages for breach of 
contract to Cowley, where there was no cause of action plead for breach of contract by 
Cowley and based upon a contract different from that asserted by Cowley in response to Mr. 
Porter's affirmative defense. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
Defendant Slone Porter hereby incorporates as his Statement of Relevant Facts, the 
Findings of Fact entered by the court below on September 9, 2004, except, expressly 
Findings 33, 36, 37, and 39. . ®. 1651-1660) Defendant is challenging the lower court's 
conclusions of law in their entirety. Defendant has also challenged findings 33,36 and 37 
by detailed reference to the record in accordance Rule 29 of the Utah Rules. App. Procedure, 
in part II of the Argument, below. 
Summary of the Argument 
I. The trial Court's judgment for Plaintiff on or about September 10, 2004, should 
be reversed because it is based on claims not asserted in the Complaint, where the Complaint 
was never amended, and where defendant was 4enied any meaningful notice and the 
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opportunity to meet the claim at trial in violation of Rules 8 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
II. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment at Issue on 
Appeal Are Clearly Erroneous and Abuse of the lower court's discretion and and subject to 
reversal as a matter of law. 
Argument 
I. The Judgement of the Court Below Should be Reversed Because of Plaintiff s 
Failure to Plead a Cause of Action in Contract and the Plaintiffs, and the Lower 
Court's Failure to Amend the Pleadings to Include a Claim for the Relief 
Awarded in violation of Rules 8 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The fundamental purpose of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE is to "liberalize 
both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178,1183 (Utah 1993) (citing Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86,91 (Utah 
1963)). The purpose of liberalization, however, is subject to the requirement that a party's 
adversary have "fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general 
indication of the type of litigation involved." Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 
403,406 (Utah 1998). The fair notice requirement is substantive. "If an issue is to be tried 
and a party's rights concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and an 
opportunity to meet it." National Farmers' Union Property & Casualty Co. V. Thompson, 
286 P.2d 249, 253 (1955). Thus, the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE respect both the 
importance of being able to present legitimate concerns in court, as well as the right of the 
opposing party to receive fair notice of any claims and be able to adequately answer claims 
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and issues asserted against it. 
To provide appropriate notice and an opportunity to meet the claim, Rule 8(a) of the 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE requires that a claim for relief by a plaintiff in his 
complaint "shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself 
entitled." UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a). Rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed when determining 
the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint." Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, 
930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 
1986)). Rule 8(f) provides further that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice." UTAH R. Qv. P. 8(f). As a result, recovery will not be barred based on 
"nothing more than a technicality" in the pleadings, but may be precluded due to lack of fair 
notice of the grounds, nature, and basis of the claim. See Consolidated Realty Group at 275-
76 (holding that recovery is not barred when complaint alleged liability based on a lease 
agreement to which the defendant was not a party where the principal of the two corporations 
was the same person, and "it [was] apparent from the defenses raised . . . that [defendant] 
understood precisely what claims were being made and to which agreement they pertained"). 
Thus, where a theory of recovery is "fully tried by the parties," and it "appears that the parties 
understood the evidence was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue," failure of the other to plead 
pursuant to Rule 8 will not bar receipt of evidence on a claim. See e.g., Colman v. Colman, 
742 P.2d 782,785 (Utah App. 1987) (citingMBIMotor Co. v. Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709, 
711 (6th Cir. 1974)); Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). In some instances, where 
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a plaintiffs pleading does not technically fulfill the requirements of Rule 8, but the non-
plead issues are tried by the parties anyway, failure of the court to amend pleadings fully to 
that effect may be non-prejudicial in light of the liberal rules regarding amending pleadings 
under Rule 15(b). U T A H R . Q V . P . 15(b); See e.g. Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 
2003 UT 14, f 23 (citing Seamons v. Anderson, 252 P.2d 209, 212 (1952)). 
Rule 15 allows a liberal approach to pleadings by providing two procedures through 
which pleadings can be amended to conform to the evidence. UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(b). The 
first procedure provides: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if an issue is not fully pleaded, the 
court can base its decision on issues that are "clearly focused" on by the parties, or issues that 
have been "fully tried." Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176; Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 
2001 UT App 44, If 6 n.2. Of course, "the test for determining whether the pleadings should 
be deemed amended under Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) is [always subject to] whether the opposing 
party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it could offer additional evidence if the 
case were retried on a different theory." Colman, 12>A P.2d at 785 (citing R.A. Pohl Const. 
Co. v. Marshall, 640 F.2d 266, 267 (10th Cir. 1981)). 
In contrast to amendment by express or implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) also 
provides: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended 
when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and 
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence 
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would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to 
meet such evidence. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 1 5(B). In order to move for leave to amend under this second procedure, "a 
litigant must file a motion that 'shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.'" Holmes Development, 
LLCv. Cook, 2002 UT 38,157 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)).2 In addition, "[a]ll motions 
. . . shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum." UTAHR. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) (emphasis 
added). Finally, a motion to amend must follow any other applicable pleading requirements 
contained in UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 7, 8, 9, and 10. Holmes, 2002 UT at ^ 31. 
Thus, if the pleadings are not deemed by the court to be automatically amended based on 
express or implied consent of the parties, they may only be amended by motion to the court, 
after complying with the procedures outlined in Rule 7, as well as any other applicable 
pleading requirements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where a pleading is not amended by express 
or implied consent of the parties as per Rule 15(b), amendment by motion must conform with 
Rule 7, as well as other applicable pleading requirements contained in Rules 8, 9, and 10. 
There is no exception to this rule other than amendment by express or implied consent. As 
a result, in Holmes, the court rejected a plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint, where the 
2Note that Rule 7(b)(1) no longer exists as cited by the Supreme Court in Holmes. 
However, Rule 7(b) states, "A motion shall be in writing and state succinctly and with 
particularity the relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought'-virtually identical to the 
former Rule 7(b)(1). UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(b). In any event, it is clear that a motion to amend must 
follow the procedure outlined in Rule 7(b). 
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plaintiff "never filed an actual motion for leave to amend" the complaint, never stated with 
particularity the grounds upon which he based his motions, "never articulated a single reason 
why the trial court should have granted it leave to amend," and "never provided the trial court 
a proposed amended complaint so that the court could determine the changes that [the 
plaintiff] intended to make." Holmes Development, 2002 UT 38, at f 59 (citing Glenn v. 
First Natl Bank in Grand Junction, 868 F.2d 368,370 (10th Cir. 1989)). The court held that 
"[a] plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for recovery 
in a memorandum in opposition to dismiss or for summary judgment." Id. at f 31 (citing 
Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989); McDowell v. Sullivan, 132 
F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D. 111. 1990)) (emphasis added). As a result, "because [plaintiff] failed 
to raise a breach of contract action in its complaint... that was not predicated either upon 
third-party beneficiary liability or upon the title insurance policy, any claim that [the 
defendant] assumed and breached additional contractual duties to [plaintiff] was waived." 
Id. Because the plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint to assert additional contractual 
duties without following the procedures required the Rules 7, 8,9, and 10, the plaintiff "did 
not comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules," and his motions for leave to amend 
his complaint were found to be "insufficient." Id. at \ 59. 
Requiring that parties seeking to amend their pleadings follow the relevant rules 
promotes the policies of "(1) mitigating prejudice to opposing parties by allowing that party 
to respond to the motion for leave to amend, and (2) assuring that a court can be apprised of 
the basis of a motion and rule upon it with a proper understanding of the motion." Id. at ^ 
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58 (citing Calderon v. KansasDep'tofSoc. &Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180,1186 (10thCir. 
1999)). In determining whether a complaint can be amended to include new issues, a court 
must ensure that a party is not "misled nor in any way prej udiced by the introduction of new 
issues," and is given the "benefit of every doubt." Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 
226, 229, 310 P.2d 517 (1957) (emphasis added). A trial court, in determining a party's 
rights in connection with a claim, is restricted to the grounds set forth in the complaint, or 
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Mitchell v. Palmer, 121 Utah 245,240 
P.2d 970 (1952). If a theory of recovery is fully tried by the parties, the court may base its 
decision on that theory and deem the pleadings amended, even if the theory was not 
originally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the pretrial order. However, that the issue 
has, in fact, been tried, and that this procedure has been authorized by the express or implied 
consent of the parties, must be evident from the record. Colman v. Colman, 1A2> P.2d 782 
Utah Ct. App. (1987). In the present case, there were introduced new issues or theories, one 
before and two following trial which were not included in the complaint, and which were not 
tried by consent of the parties. The judgment of the court below which is the subject of this 
appeal, is based upon to those new issues. As is evident from the record, the introduction of 
those new issues severely prejudiced defendant Slone Porter and constitutes reversible error 
by the court below under the circumstances of this case. 
a. Plaintiffs new theory. 
The Complaint in this case contains just nine (9) paragraphs, and only one (1) cause 
of action. (R. 1-17) In the Complaint, Cowley sought only an order of the court tojudicially 
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dissolve AMS under Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-1402, et seq. Nothing more. The 
Complaint has never been amended. In the Complaint, the only reference to any agreement 
is in paragraph 2, in which Plaintiff refers to a written Stock Redemption Agreement to 
support an allegation 
that both Mr. and Mrs. Cowley were shareholders of AMS.3 There is no claim asserted to 
enforce the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
In his answer, Slone Porter denied each of the nine paragraphs of the Complaint, and 
asserted an affirmative defense that Plaintiffs claim was barred because the shareholders of 
AMS had entered into an enforceable oral agreement for the dissolution of AMS which 
terminated the Stock Redemption Agreement by its terms, and which effectively rendered 
Plaintiffs claim for judicial dissolution moot. ®. 18-22) Thus, according the Complaint, 
the nature, grounds and basis for the complaint, and the type of litigation involved concerns 
only the Plaintiffs right to a judicial dissolution of AMS. Nowhere does the Complaint 
suggest a claim by Plaintiff arising under an alleged written agreement to dissolve AMS. 
Almost immediately upon service of the Answer, Plaintiff moved for a judgment on 
the pleadings, asserting: (1) that there had been no agreement of any kind to dissolve AMS; 
and (2) that because Defendant admitted that the parties had been equal shareholders in 
AMS, and had not denied the existence of the Stock Redemption Agreement, the Plaintiff 
was entitled to an order to judicially dissolve AMS as if stock certificates had been issued. 
®. 27-46) The court below found that the motion turned on substantial questions which were 
3
 That Stock Redemption Agreement is attached to the Complaint. It should be noted 
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beyond the pleadings, denied the motion and suggested that Plaintiff re-assert the matter as 
a motion for summary judgment. ®. 98-100) 
Plaintiff quickly repackaged his motion as one for summary judgment.4 Defendant 
responded under Rule 56(f) and requested time for discovery to respond to Plaintiff s motion, 
which was granted. After substantial discovery, including the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. 
Cowley, Defendant responded in a detailed memorandum, including 36 exhibits, with 
overwhelming evidence of the existence of multiple genuine issues of material fact. ®. 415-
420,504)5 In his reply memorandum supporting the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff 
again asserted that there had been no oral or other agreement for the dissolution of AMS, and 
that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. ®. 753-783) 
Plaintiffs first motion for summary judgment was denied. ®. 1013) in the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision to deny the motion for summary judgment, the court stated in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that a verbal buy-out agreement was 
reached, but they disagree as to the materials] sic. terms of the agreement. The Court 
finds that there is a material dispute of fact as to which offer was accepted as the buy-
out agreement between the parties. 
The Court finds that all buy-out offers violate the Statute of Frauds. The 
Statute of Frauds requires that any agreement regarding interests in real estate or 
agreements that cannot be performed within one year to be in writing or they are void. 
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-1,4(1). Both alleged agreement consist of the transfer 
of property and payments to be made over a period of years. These agreement would 
4
 This was to be the first of two motions for summary judgment filed by Cowley prior to 
trial. 
5
 Included in those exhibits were two documents of particular import which were later 
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be void under the Statute of Frauds unless the agreement has been partially 
performed. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742,7'51 (Uath2002). The Court finds that there 
are material issues of fact regarding whether sufficient part-performance has been 
completed that would allow this Court to enforce the oral agreement. 
®. 1013-1014)(emphasis added) 
For those reasons the motion for summaryjudgment was denied. ®. 1014) Thereafter, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration. ®. 1058-1059; 1079-1096) In his supporting 
Memorandum Plaintiff suggested a wholesale change in his legal theory, but did not seek to 
amend the Complaint. Instead of asserting that there had been no oral agreement or any other 
agreement reached to dissolve AMS, Cowley asserted that the parties had entered into a 
written agreement memorialized in a writing signed by Slone Porter but not Tracy Cowley. 
®. 1095) The Motion for reconsideration was denied. In its Ruling the court stated in 
pertinent part: 
This Court has found and still finds that there are genuine disputes as to material facts 
of this case, such as what agreement was reached by the parties, whether the parties 
agreed to dissolve AMS. and whether AMS issued stock. 
®. 1197-1199)(emphasis added) 
The Court thereafter amended its Ruling as to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment to correct mistakes as to dates in the original ruling, but otherwise made no change 
as to the disputed issues of fact remaining for trial. ®. 1197-1201) Thereafter, Plaintiff 
repackaged his motion for reconsideration and filed his second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. ®. 1100-111) The Plaintiffs new claim that the parties had entered into an 
enforceable written agreement appears in detail for the first time in that motion. ®. 1109, 
ff3-8; 1104-1108). A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, because such a amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading requirements. Holmes 
Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002), citing, McDowell v. Sullivan, 132 
F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D. 111. 1990) and Utah R. Civ. P. 7, 8, 9, andlO. Under these 
circumstances, the court below was restricted to the grounds set forth in Cowley's Complaint. 
See also, Mitchell v. Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 251, 240 P.2d 970, 972 (1952). 
Moreover, in opposition to the second motion for summary judgment, Defendants' 
objected to the new claim and the failure of Plaintiffs to amend the Complaint as follows: 
The Court should note at this point that the Plaintiffs have completely 
abandoned the theories underlying the Complaint by which they commenced this 
action. Plaintiffs, in the Complaint claimed that there was no oral or other agreement 
reached between the parties, and based upon the lack of an agreement were seeking 
judicial dissolution of AMS. Now, without any amendment to the Complaint, they 
are wholly relying on the existence of an agreement which is nowhere mentioned in 
the Complaint, and which is based solely upon their spin on the facts established by 
this Court in denying their two prior summary judgment requests. Plaintiffs cannot 
have it both ways, where they simply seem to be adopting a new legal theory of the 
moment as they seem convenient in order to avoid having to bring their claims to trial 
The Plaintiffs' latest attempt at summary judgment lacks credibility because the 
Plaintiffs' cannot even figure out what it is they are claiming or suing for in this case 
at this point, because the record evidence and the court's prior rulings have resulted 
in a finding that there was an agreement, which completely eliminates the Plaintiffs' 
position set forth in the Complaint. Plaintiffs latest spin on its motion for summary 
judgment is merely an inappropriate attempt at damage control where their previous 
theories have wholly filed to cajole Defendants into paying them more money than 
was agreed to on July 19, 2002. 
®. 1273-1274)(emphasis added). 
In their reply, Plaintiffs make a startling observation as follows: 
The matter now devolves into a defense that everything done by the parties 
from and after June 24,2002 was "part performance" under the Statute of Frauds of 
either an oral agreement reached June 24th to pay $ 10,000/month or an oral agreement 
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reached July 19th to pay $4,000/month. ®. 1291) 
Moreover, Plaintiffs filed a Motion in Limine to restrict the evidence at trial to only 
those issues relating to their new claim arising under the alleged writing which they 
contended satisfied the Statute of Frauds, specifically to exclude evidence concerning terms 
of the oral agreement asserted by way of affirmative defense in the Answer. ®. 1409 -1417) 
Both the second motion for summary judgment and the motion in limine were denied. As 
of that time, following the close of discovery and less than one month prior to trial, the 
Plaintiffs' clearly were no longer contending that there was no agreement and they were 
entitled to judicial dissolution, the only claim asserted in the Complaint. They were now 
claiming that they had effectively an enforceable written agreement as of June 24, 2002 
based on a one page document signed only by Slone Porter, and, apparently, were seeking 
a judgment for breach of that written agreement. At trial, Mr. Cowley testified that the newly 
contrived claim of a written contract was not included in the Pleadings. (Day Two, Tr. at 
19) The court below, having been informed of the failure to amend, simply let defendants 
change their claim contrary to the rules governing pleading, notice and opportunity to defend. 
That, without more, constitutes reversible error in this case and warrants the relief prayed for 
by Mr. Porter in this appeal. But there is more. 
b. The Trial Court's New Theory for Plaintiff 
As indicated by the court below, at trial this case was supposed to be about what the 
terms were of agreement between the parties to dissolve AMS, and whether those terms were 
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enforceable. Nothing in the court's rulings indicated there was to be tried any claim for 
breach of contract. At issue, were two competing agreements, "A" and "B". Agreement 
"A" was an oral agreement which Slone Porter asserts was reached on July 19, 2002, and 
contained the terms indicated in Exhibit "17". ( R. 415-420) Agreement "B" was 
essentially a written agreement evidenced by a one page writing signed only by Slone Porter, 
Exhibit "5". ®. 504). However, following the trial, the court rejected both Agreement "A" 
and Agreement "B", and found that the parties had reached an oral agreement, Agreement 
"C", which called for, inter alia, the payment from Porter to Cowley of $ 10,000.00 per month 
over five years, and terms different from those argued by Cowley. ®. 1650-1660) The court 
then went on to find a breach of Agreement "C", and awarded damages based on that breach 
based on a claim which was never plead in its judgment which is the subject of this appeal. 
®. 1650-1660,1690)6 
Generally, '" questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence9" are matters of law, which [a court] reviewfs] for correctness." Fairbourn 
Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, f 6 (citing Zions First 
Natl Bank, N.A. v. Natl Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)). Even when 
questions of the meaning of a contract are unclear, "the goal in interpreting contracts is to 
give effect to the intent of the parties." Uintah Basin Medical Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, 
f 20 n.7. Accordingly, if the contract itself is ambiguous, but the parties agree that it should 
6
 Agreement "C" appears to consist of terms imposed by the court which combines 
elements of both Agreement "A" and Agreement "B". The findings of Agreement "C" are the 
specific subject of part b. of the Argument set forth below. The Court's Findings, Conclusion 
and Judgment appear at the beginning of the Addendum. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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be viewed in a certain way, or be given a certain meaning, a court should "be particularly 
reluctant to reject the parties' stipulations or concessions in [the] case." Id. As a result, 
"[reformation is not available to rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by 
the parties." RHNCorp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 38; see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 
690 P.2d 549,552 ("A court does not have carte blanche to reform any transaction to include 
terms that it believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly bounded. Reformation may be 
appropriate where both parties were mistaken as to a term of the contract, or where one party 
is mistaken and the other party is guilty of inequitable conduct... but it is not available to 
rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated by the parties."). 
In addition, findings at variance with the claims of the parties to a case are "not 
favored and are carefully scrutinized on review." Combe v. Warren *s Family Drive-Inns, 
Inc., 680 P.2d 733,735 (Utah 1984). Thus, "[i]t is error to adjudicate issues not raised before 
or during trial and unsupported by the record." Id. at 736. A judgment must be responsive 
to the pleadings, "and a trial court has no authority to render a decision on issues not 
presented for determination." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, "[a]ny findings rendered 
outside the issues are a nullity." Id. (citing Matter of Estate ofHurlbutt, 36 Or. App. 721, 
585 P.2d 724 (1978)). In sum, the Utah Supreme Court has laid down the rule of law that: 
"A court may not grant judgment for relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor 
within the theory on which the case was tried, whether that theory was expressly stated or 
implied by the proof adduced." Id. (citing Leonard Farms v. Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 
559 P.2d 411 (1977)). ^The limitation to try the issues presented obtains whether the action 
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is one in law or in equity and includes declaratory judgments as well." Id. In applying this 
principle, the court found in Combe that since "[n]either party requested a dissolution of the 
Corporation, let alone a partnership . . . . The Court . . . erred when it adjudicated [those] 
matters." Id. 
There is no allegation of Agreement "C" in any of the pleadings in this case. 
Agreement "C", was not plead or asserted by any of the parties.7 There was no notice, and 
could have been no notice that Defendants were required to defend against Agreement "C". 
There could not have been consent to try the case involving agreement "C", either express 
or implied, under the circumstances of this case. 
Moreover, prior to trial, in chambers and off the record, the court below instructed the 
parties that it would not permit any evidence concerning the then status of QMS, the business 
which Plaintiff alleged was the continuation of AMS, or other evidence concerning the effect 
of Cowley's conduct on the business from which money was to be paid to Cowley for the 
buy-out of AMS. Under these circumstances, Defendant Slone Porter was denied notice and 
an opportunity to meet the claim which the court injected improperly into this case, following 
the close of the evidence. Under these circumstances, defenses such as impossibility of 
performance, the wrongful conduct of the plaintiff, failure to mitigate damages, etc., were 
not even permitted to be litigated based upon some breach of contract theory which, as of the 
first day of trial was not articulated by the Plaintiff. The court's determination in this case 
is patently improper under the pleading rules. 
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What was at issue, according to the court's rulings prior to the trial, was whether 
there was an enforceable agreement to dissolve AMS. Once the court determined that there 
was, that should have been the end of the case, with judgment for Defendant, and an order 
to dismiss the Complaint for judicial dissolution — Plaintiffs only asserted cause of action. 
If Plaintiff wanted to contend that he was entitled to damages for breach of the agreement, 
then he was free to pursue such an action upon appropriate pleadings, and procedure, to 
allow substantive development of the evidence on all defenses concerning that claim. That 
is the relief sought by Mr. Porter in this appeal. That is the justice that so far has been 
denied Mr. Porter in this case. 
This finding by the court below concerning Agreement "C" is even more astonishing, 
given the presentation of the evidence at trial. In fact, Mr. Cowley testified that there was 
no "mention of any other agreement anywhere in the case." 8 (Day Two, Tr. at 68) By 
further example, Tracy Cowley testified at trial concerning the events of June 24, 2002, 
leading to the asserted enforceable written agreement. (Tr. 232-241) However, at his 
deposition, and as acknowledged on cross-examination, Mr. Cowley testified that as of June 
24,2002, no agreement had been reached, at least as to the amount of the payout. (Day Two, 
Tr. pp. 21-70) Mr. Cowley's explanation for the inconsistency was he was changing his 
factual testimony on the advice of his attorney, both by his preceding attorney and by Mr. 
Smay in preparation for trial. (Day two, Tr. at 19,50,57, and 59) Finally, for the first time, 
8
 The transcript of the two-day trial appears in three volumes modified as first half of first 
day, second half of first day, and second day. References are to identify the partial volume of the 
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a potential for finding some agreement other than "A" or "B" was first mentioned by 
Plaintiffs counsel in colloquy with the court below, following the close of the evidence. 
(Day Two, Tr. at 181-182). It is that alternative, which was never raised before or during 
the trial, of which there was no notice, and about which there could have been no consent, 
express or implied, which renders the court's judgment defective and subject to reversal in 
the present case. The court below, having concluded that there was an enforceable 
agreement for the dissolution of AMS, should have simply entered judgment for defendant 
and dismissed the single cause of action in the Complaint, in its entirety, with prejudice. 
n. The Salient Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Judgment at 
Issue on Appeal Are Clearly Erroneous and subject to reversal as a 
matter of law. 
Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. In 
the present case, defendant is challenging all of the lower court's findings on which the court 
relies in concluding that there was some agreement reached between the parties, other than 
the agreement of June 24, 2002, or the agreement of July 19, 2004, which are the only 
agreements asserted by the parties in this case. 
In the lower court's ruling, there are 48 findings of fact. ®. 1649-1660) Defendant 
is challenging findings 33, 36 and 37. 
a. Evidence supporting the challenged Findings of Fact 
Evidence tending to support this finding is as follows: 
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The terms of the alleged agreement of June 24, 2002, are contained in Exhibit "5." 
Concerning the performance of the parties under the terms of the buy-out alleged by Plaintiff, 
Mr. Cowley testified as follows: 
As of June 24,2002, Mr. Cowley was willing to accept the buy-out offer previously 
made by Mr. Porter, with some additional terms. (Day One, Part I, Tr* 234-235) Those 
terms, including the changes were written by hand on a piece of paper in discussion with the 
Porters, and later were typed by Mrs. Porter. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 234-238, Ex. "3", Ex. 
"7") Mrs. Cowley was not present at the meeting of June 24,2002. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 
235) The writing indicated the date of July 1, 2002, which signified that date on which 
performance was to be completed. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 236) Mr. Cowley chose to receive 
the Midway property to be distributed from Listo, LLC. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 237) Mrs. 
Porter printed out two copies of the proposed terms, one for signature by Mr. Cowley, and 
one for signature by Mr. Porter. Mr. Porter signed his copy. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 238) 
Mr. Cowley did not want to sign the agreement without Mrs. Cowley being present. 
(Day One, Part I, Tr. 239) After discussing the agreement with Mrs. Cowley and requested 
changes, Mr. Cowely made notes regarding change items and a request to Mrs. Porter to call 
him, signed his initials and left his copy of the Agreement on the table at the office. (Day 
One, Part I, Tr. 239-241) The Cowleys met with the Porters on the evening of June 27, 
2004, following separate meetings between 7-Eleven, Inc. and Mr. Cowley, and the Porters. 
(Day One, Part I, Tr. 249) At that meeting, the Porters did not suggest that the meetings 
with 7-Eleven, Inc. had any effect on the arrangement they had reached on June 24, 2002, 
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or that the Porters were altering any of that in any way. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 249-250) On 
June 27,2002, Cowley received a check for $25,000 which represented one half of the cash 
on hand from the accounts of AMS. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 250) On June 27, 2002, the 
parties discussed preparing an inventory of hard assets. (Day One, Part I, Tr, 255) The buy-
out agreement of June 24, 2002, states that all hard assets are to remain the property of the 
Porters. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 255-256) The purpose of the inventory was not to make some 
determination of what Porters would pay to Cowley for his share of AMS because Cowley 
believed they already had an agreement. (Day One, Part I, Tr. 257) As of the day Mr. 
Cowley left the AMS offices on or about June 25, 2002, nobody had ever mentioned any 
other price for Mr. Cowley's interest in AMS other than $10,000 per month over five years 
for a total of $600,000.00. (Day Two, Tr. 2-3) The next meeting between Cowley and 
Porter occurred on July 19,2002. (Day Two, Tr. 4) The purpose of that meeting was to tie 
everything up in a nice neat bow. (Day Two, Tr. 4-5) At the meeting the parties discussed 
the inventory, but they were not attempting to determine a precise evaluation. (Day Two, 
Tr. 5-6) At that meeting, Mrs. Porter told Mr. Cowley that he would only get one-half of the 
$208,000 inventory amount as his buy-out of the assets. Mr. Cowley got angry. There was 
a discussion of the debt of AMS with which Mr. Cowley did not agree. The parties disagreed 
concerning the debt and the asset amount completely. At that meeting the parties discussed 
Porter only paying $4,000 per month. (Day Two, Tr. 6-7) The $4,000.00 amount was a 
number Porters made up from the top of their head. Mr. Cowley had no reason to believe 
that $4,0000 was the number that Porters could afford to pay. Porters suggested that the 
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amount of $4,000 was the amount they could pay until they got the contracts back from 7-
Eleven, Inc. which was not likely to happen until the fall of 2002. (Day Two, Tr. 7-9) At 
that point, Mr. And Mrs. Cowley left the meeting. (Day Two, Tr. 9) Later that evening of 
July 19,2002, Mr. Cowley telephoned Mr. Porter to tell Mr. Porter that Mr. Cowley would 
accept payments of $4,000 per month until the contracts were reinstated sometime in the fall. 
(Day Two, Tr. 9) Following the meeting on July 19,2002, Mr. Cowley did not request Mrs. 
Porter to draft an agreement. (Day Two, Tr. 11) The parties' next meeting occurred at the 
request of Mr. Cowley in October 2002. At that meeting Mr. Cowley told the Porters that 
he needed them to raise the payments up to the $10,000 amount which had been previously 
agreed to. Porter's indicated that they had sought legal counsel and that they had a verbal 
agreement relating to the $4,000 per month, and that Porter refused to pay the $10,000.00. 
At that point, Mr. Cowley had no documents signed by either of the parties in his possession. 
Mr. Cowley only had the handwritten notes made between he and Mrs. Porter on June 24, 
2002. (Day Two, Tr. 11-15) As of the second day trial, Mr. Cowley never doubted that he 
had reached an agreement with the Porters to pay $600,000.00 in $10,000 monthly 
instalments for five years. (Day Two, Tr. 19-20) On July 29 and 31,2002, Cowley received 
additional payments of $ 16,500 and $ 11,000 respectively for relating to the split up of AMS, 
and payout of the accounts receivable. (Day Two, Tr. 58). The agreement of June 24,2002, 
was silent as pay outs of money because that had just been a given. (Day Two, Tr. 62) At 
the meeting on July 19, 2002, Mr. Cowley stated to Mrs. Porter that the agreement was for 
$600,000.00. (Day Two, Tr. 66) Cowley's agreement required payment of $10,000 per 
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month whether the contracts were ever reinstated or not. (Day Two, Tr. 68-69) Of the items 
listed in the June 24, 2002, buy out agreement, Items 2, 5, and 7, together with the 
confidentiality agreement and no-non compete have been accomplished. (Day One, Part 
H, Tr. 186-188) 
a. Evidence contradicting the challenged Findings of Fact. 
In contrast, all other items of the June 24, 2002 purported agreement were not 
performed. (Day Two, Tr. 186-188) As of the July 19, 2002 meeting, the Cowleys were 
"kicking themselves" for not having accepted the $600,000.00 offer. (Day Two, Tr. 166) 
The Cowley's believed the Porters offer of $600,000 was ludicrous. (Day Two, Tr. 
164) Mrs. Cowley, and hence Mr. Cowley never agreed to the $600,000 terms, because Mrs. 
Cowley was out of town and she would never have agreed to those terms. (Day Two, Tr. 
164-168) Between June 27,2002 and July 19,2002 the parties were still negotiating over 
the terms of an agreement. (Day Two, Tr. 168-170) The court found that Mr. Cowley's 
signature did not appear on the document. (Day Two, Tr. 171) As of June 24,2002, the total 
buy out price was never agreed upon. (Day Two, Tr. 171-172) All of the provisions of the 
agreement asserted by Slone Porter were performed, including the $4,000 per month 
payments. (Day one, Part II, Tr. 188-191) 
In deposition, Mr. Cowley denied that there was ever any agreement about $4,000 per 
month based on the advice of his attorney. (Day Two, Tr. 25) As of June 24, 2002, Mr. 
Cowley believed the value of AMS to exceed the $600,000 amount. (Day Two, Tr. 26) 
The document of June 24, 2002, does not include any payment For distribution of cash on 
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hand. The June 24,2002, was instead of what the Porters had originally offered. (Day Two, 
Tr. 29) On June 27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters 
substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. 
(Day Two, Tr. 39-40) Contrary to his testimony of direct examination, as of June 24,2002, 
Cowley was still reserving terms of agreement. On June 27, 2002, following the meetings 
with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July 
as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 40-43) As of June 27,2002, Mr. Cowley was 
still negotiating with the Porters and expected to reach an agreement as of the end of the 
month. On June 27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters 
substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. 
(Day Two, Tr. 43-47) Prior to June 19,2002, there had been no agreement as to the payout 
amount for AMS. On June 27,2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters 
substantially altered the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. 
(Day Two, Tr. 50) The inventory of equipment, prepared after June 24,2002, had to do with 
the price Porters wanted to pay for the buyout of AMS. On June 27, 2002, following the 
meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered the terms previously proposed, 
not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 51-52) All of the terms of 
agreement between the parties had not been agreed to or fulfilled by June 24,2002. On June 
27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered the 
terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 52-54) 
At his deposition Cowley testified that the payments of June 27, 2002, June 29, 2002 and 
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June 31, 2002, were merely normal partnership distributions because there had been no 
agreement to dissolve AMS. At trial, Mr. Cowley testified that the payments were made as 
part of the split up and dissolution of AMS according to the lately asserted agreement. On 
June 27, 2002, following the meetings with 7-Eleven, Inc. the Porters substantially altered 
the terms previously proposed, not in July as asserted by Tracy Cowley. (Day Two, Tr. 55-
60) All of comes directly from the testimony of Mr. And Mrs. Cowley at trial. They then, 
with the advice of their attorney, changed their testimony, with apparent impunity from the 
court below, to suit there new legal theory which was never pled. It was clear error from this 
record to conclude that (1) there was an agreement reached on June 24,2002, and that terms 
of that agreement were being performed beginning on or after June 27, 2002, as stated in 
finding 33 of the Court's Findings of Fact. Without that finding, the Court cannot support 
its judgment as to the terms of agreement between the parties, and the subsequent finding of 
a breach. The same is true for the trial court's Findings of Fact 35, 36 and 37. The court 
below cannot properly sustain its findings and conclusions of law that the parties ever 
reached an agreement including the requirement of paying $600,000 on this record, given the 
admissions of the Plaintiffs to the contrary. The only agreement alleged in the pleadings of 
this case, for which there is substantial and real proof of adequate partial performance is that 
asserted by Slone Porter. Under the circumstances, the court should reverse the judgment 
of the court below, with instructions to enter judgment for Defendant and dismiss the 
Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice. 
Conclusion 
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In view of the facts and arguments set forth above, Appellant Slone D. Porter requests 
this Court to reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the case to the trial court 
with instructions to enter judgment for Defendant Slone D. Porter and against Plaintiff Tracy 
Cowley and to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, with prejudice, and together with all 
further relief the Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances. 
// 
// 
i*a DATED this 2^^-^clay of March, 2005. 
BOSTWICK & PRI 
Attorneys for Appellant Slone D. Porter. 
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Addendum 
a. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the Court below. 
b. The Record 
c. The Transcript 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 2fc'H r "o , n 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030500244 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
SEP iiao* 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and hte court being 
fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff forthwith the sum of $24,000 ($6,000/month for 
August, September, October and November, 2002) due November 1, 2002, plus $6,000/month 
for December 2002 through July 2004, together with interest thereon at the legal rate since due; 
plus $10,000/month hereafter until there shall have been paid $600,000 of principle without 
interest. 
2, The Plaintiffs are awarded their costs, but not attorneys fees. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTitf -r~ ; 0 f„; c: KO 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 030500244 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the court on June 1st and 2nd, 2004. The Court 
having heard and considered the evidence and the submission of the parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact and conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant, Slone Porter, was employed by 7-Eleven Inc. ("7-Eleven") from 
February 1981 until November, 1995, when he was laid off. 
2. Tracy Cowley was employed by 7-Eleven as the Area Facilities Manager in the 
maintenance department, with responsibility for overseeing maintenance work at the stores and 
for approving outside maintenance contracts for all 7-Eleven stores in Utah. 
3. 7-Eleven published a code of Business Conduct ("CBC"), Exhibit 9, that 
expressly prohibited employees from engaging in conduct which constituted a conflict of interest 
by solicitation of gifts, entertainment and travel by a supplier, business relationship with outside 
companies doing business with 7-Eleven and doing business with former employees of 7-Eleven 
for a certain period of time. 
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4. Tracy Cowley, Slone Porter and Bill Berg created a company known as Advanced 
Maintenance Services ("AMS") in December 1994 for the purpose of entering into contracts with 
7-Eleven for general maintenance of its stores. 
5. At the time of the formation of AMS, both Mr. Cowley and Mr. Porter were 
prohibited under the CBC from contracting with 7-Eleven, because of their past and current 
employment with 7-Eleven. Mr. Berg served as the face and front for the company because he 
was already doing work for 7-Eleven as a landscape contractor. 
6. On December 6,1994, AMS was incorporated in the State of Utah. 
7. Mr. Cowley, Mr. Porter and Mr. Berg held equal ownership interests in AMS, 
although AMS never issued stock certificates nor any written document of any kind relating to 
stock or stock ownership was ever created while Mr. Berg was involved with AMS. 
8. Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS was concealed from 
7-Eleven. 
9. In June of 1997, following arbitration between the three owners of AMS, Mr. 
Berg departed as an owner of AMS, in consideration of payment of cash, the landscaping 
contracts with 7-Eleven and two vehicles, thereafter, Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley became equal 
owners of AMS. 
10. At the time Mr. Berg left AMS, Slone Porter, now representing AMS with 7-Eleven, 
requested and received permission from Jim Craig, the division facilities manager and Mr. 
Cowley's boss at 7-Eleven to own and operate AMS as a contractor with 7-Eleven, even though 
the CBC mandated time period had not passed from the time Mr. Porter had left 7-Eleven. Mr. 
Cowley's ownership interest in AMS was again not disclosed. 
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11. During 1997, AMS acquired a company called Straight Line Striping ("SLS"), 
which was a corporation in the business of pavement marking. 
12. In May, 1998, at the recommendation of AMS's accountant, AMS acquired 
certain life insurance policies, pertaining to Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley. As part of the 
requirement for obtaining the life insurance policies, AMS and its two owners executed a written 
Stock Redemption Agreement. Mr. Porter and Mr. Cowley executed the Stock Redemption 
Agreement as shareholders, and Mrs. Porter signed the agreement as President of AMS. 
13. The Stock Redemption Agreement stated that it would terminate upon the 
dissolution of AMS. The agreement is silent concerning the process or procedure or details 
relating to one owner buying the interest of another while both are still living. There is no 
evidence at trial that AMS actually ever did issue stock. 
14. In 2000, the Porter's and Cowley's formed a new corporation called Listo, Inc. 
("Listo"). Listo was used as a holding company for certain real estate purchased using AMS 
money. Specifically, there were two rental properties; one located in Midway, Utah and the other 
located in St. George, Utah. 
15. From the creation of AMS until March 31, 2001, Tracy Cowley continued his 
employment with 7-Eleven, and did no work directly for AMS. Mr. Cowley, at some point, 
began receiving compensation from AMS in an amount which would make the compensation 
equal for both he and Slone Porter, taking into account Mr. Cowley's salary at 7-Eleven. 
16. Mr. Johan de Besche ("Mr. de Besche") replaced Jim Craig as Mr. Cowley's boss 
at 7-Eleven during 1999. At some point in time, he became concerned about Mr. Cowley's job 
performance and his cost reports. He began to scrutinize the billings of AMS. During February, 
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2001, Mr. de Besche became aware that the Cowleys and the Porters had gone on a vacation to 
Hawaii together. He wanted to know from Mr. Cowley whether AMS had paid for his vacation 
to Hawaii. 
17. Mr. Cowley resigned his position with 7-Eleven effective March 31, 2001. 
18. After leaving 7-Eleven, Mr. Cowley started working with AMS and drawing 
compensation equal to that of Mr. Porter. 7-Eleven was aware that Mr. Cowley was an employee 
of AMS, but did not know of his ownership interest. 
19. Ann Atkin ("Atkin") replaced Mr. Cowley as area facilities manager for 7-Eleven. 
She became concerned about the billing practice of AMS. She began to scrutinize and critically 
analyze each bill and payment for compliance with the contracts. She expressed her concerns to 
Mr. Porter. 
20. The Porters became concerned about the pressures put on them by 7-eleven and 
their relationship with the Cowleys. Slone Porter and his wife, Veralynn Porter requested a 
meeting with Tracy Cowley and his wife, Kerin on June 22, 2002, at the AMS office in Midway, 
Utah. At the meeting, the Porters indicated they wanted to buy out Tracy Cowley's interest in 
AMS. They offered to pay $600,000 in cash in monthly installments of $10,000/month paid over 
five years without interest, to transfer 100% of SLS to the Cowleys and to give Tracy Cowley his 
choice of the Listo properties with in Midway or the one in St. George, the Cowleys were given 
twenty-four hours to respond to the offer. Slone Porter said he formulated the offer as one he 
would accept. The Porters taped the meeting. 
21. The Cowleys were stunned with the meeting. On the evening of June 22,2002, 
Mr. Cowley called MR. Porter and suggested that if the offer was one that he would accept, he 
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should accept it, and the Cowleys would retain AMS. Mr. Porter refused the counter-offer, 
suggesting to Cowley that if Cowley acquired AMS, 7-Eleven would discover that Cowley had 
been an owner of AMS while working for 7-Eleven, then 7-Eleven would refuse to contract with 
AMS and Cowley would not be able to pay Porter the required $600,000. Cowley expressed his 
confidence that this would not happen. 
22. Veralynn Porter on June 22, 2002, without the knowledge of the Cowleys, 
contacted Atkin of 7-Eleven and informed her of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS 
throughout the length of AMS's contracts with 7-Eleven. She also alleged that Cowley had 
threatened a hostile takeover of AMS which would adversely affect the work of AMS for 7-
Eleven. Atkin requested the Porters to come to her home in Utah county, the next day on June 
23, 2002. 
23. At the meeting with Atkin on June 23,2002, the Porters reviewed the total history 
of AMS with her, and Mr. Cowley's involvement. Atkin informed the Porters that she did not 
know what would happen between AMS and 7-Eleven, but that she would have to contact Mr. de 
Besche and 7-Eleven's legal department to inform them of the AMS situation. 
24. On the evening of June 23, 2002, the Cowleys again met with the Porters at the 
AMS office. The Porters peremptorily informed the Cowleys of their conversation with Atkin 
and their disclosure of her of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS. This disclosure rendered 
moot Mr. Cowley's suggestion that the Porters sell AMS to the Cowleys. The meeting was again 
tape recorded by the Porters. 
25. During the evening of June 23, the Cowleys agreed among themselves that they 
would accept the buy-out terms submitted by the Porters, with certain changes that Mr. Cowley 
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would submit to the Porters on June 24th. Mrs. Cowley was then committed to accompany a 
church youth group on a trip out-of-state early on June 24th. 
26. On the morning of June 24, 2002, Tracy Cowley came to the AMS office and met 
with Slone and Veralynn Porter. During that meeting, MR. Cowley enumerated certain 
additional terms which he would accept in selling his portion of AMS to Slone Porter, which 
items were handwritten on a paper by Mrs. Porter. This meeting was also tape recorded by the 
Porters. 
27. These handwritten notes were then typed on a computer by Mrs. Porter. This 
document was entitled "Partnership Buy-Out" of which, two copies were printed. Mr. Porter 
signed one and placed it back on the desk. Mr. Cowley said that the terms were agreeable to him, 
but he wanted to read them to his wife before signing. He attempted to call her but couldn't get a 
clear connection on his cell phone. The Porters left him for approximately one hour, taking Mr. 
Porter's copy of the agreement with them. Upon returning, they found Cowley's copy left behind 
with a note, "Vera - Call me. T.C.". The Porters kept possession of both copies of the 
agreement. 
28. Mr. Porter called Mr. Cowley that evening. They discussed a "no non-compete" 
clause previously sought by Cowley, and determined not to change it. 
29. On the afternoon of June 24, 2002, Mr. Cowley called Atkin to verify the Porter's 
assertion that SLS could continue to do stripping work for 7-Eleven. Atkin informed him that 7-
Eleven would not do business with any company associated with Mr. Cowley. Mr. Cowley later 
informed Porter of this conversation with Atkin. 
30. Pursuant to instructions from Atkin, the Porters took steps to form Quality 
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Maintenance Systems ("QMS"), which the Porters incorporated o June 25, 2002 as owners to 
continue the maintenance work for 7-Eleven formerly done by AMS. 
31. On June 27,2002, Tracy Cowley met with Mr. de Besche of 7-Eleven in a meeting 
also attended by Atkin. Later that day, the Porters also met with Mr. de Besche and Atkin. Both 
Cowley and the Porters informed Mr. de Besche that Cowely had agreed to sell out to the Porters 
and would leave AMS. Notes of the meetings kept by Atkins indicate that the Porters showed 
Mr. de Besche the buy-out agreement signed by Slone Porter June 24, 2002, because there were 
references to specific provisions contained therein. 
32. Mr. de Besche agreed for 7-Eleven that the newly created QMS, without Mr. 
Cowley being involved in the ownership could continue to provide the same services to 7-Eleven 
on a time and material basis. 
33. After June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform the terms of the written buy-out 
agreement of June 24th. Mr. Cowley vacated the AMS offices in Midway, delivering the previous 
AMS employees, equipment, stock account, books and premises to the Porters. They divided the 
$50,000 cash funds of an AMS investment account. There was a further division of accounts 
receivable and transfer of the rental properties held by Listo, transfer of SLS and its equipment to 
the Cowleys and changing of the logos on the premises and equipment from AMS to QMS. 
There was also a transfer of some vehicles to the Cowleys. 
34. The Cowleys asked for copies of the tape recordings of the earlier meeting. The 
Porters always indicated they would provide them with copies of said tapes. 
35. The parties met together on July 19,2002 to discuss an inventory of equipment 
and supplies belonging to AMS and SLS. This meeting was not tape recorded as has been the 
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pattern in the past. At this meeting, the Porters asked the Cowelys to accept half the value of the 
inventory of equipment and supplies decreased by half the debt attached to the equipment being 
retained by the Porters. This was not acceptable to the Cowleys. 
36. The Porters then indicated at the July 19th meeting, that because AMS was 
temporarily on a "time and material basis" pending re-bidding of the 7-Eleven contracts in the 
fall, QMS could only afford to pay the Cowleys $4,000/month and not the $10,000/month they 
had previously offered and which the Cowleys had ultimately accepted. The $4,000 figure was a 
unilaterally derived figure submitted by the Porters. At this meeting, the Cowleys again asked 
for copies of the tape recordings of the previous meetings. Mrs. Porter replied that she had 
destroyed them. 
37. Slone Porter testified at trial that Tracy Cowely called him on the evening of July 
19, 2002 and accepted $4,000/month for five years as a final agreement to purchase Cowleys 
share of AMS. The Cowleys testified they agreed to accept $4,000/month to help the Porters out 
until the contracts were rebid to see if QMS was awarded the 7-Eleven contracts, as they were 
currently only being paid on a "time and material" basis and once QMS secured the 7-Eleven 
contracts, the $10,000/month for sixty months provision would be restored. 
38. On July 21, 2002 the Porters filed Articles of Dissolution for AMS signed by 
Slone Porter. This document purports that no agreement of shareholders was necessary as AMS 
had no shareholders. 
39.1n October, 2002,the Cowleys learned that QMS had successfully obtained 7-Eleven 
contracts. Although not exactly the same contracts as held by AMS, they were substantially the 
same, and they had a similar monetary value. 
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40. Prior to June 27, 2002, both the Porters and Cowleys were receiving between 
$10,000 and $14,000 per month in compensation for their ownership interest in AMS. 
41. On October 21,2002 the Cowleys demanded that the Porters bring the payments 
for the buy-out of AMS up to the $10,000/month level because they had successfully re-obtained 
the 7-Eleven contracts. The Porters said they would consider starting to make the $10,000/month 
payments and get back to them. 
42. After being re-contacted by the Cowleys concerning the $ 10,000/month payments 
the Porters responded that their attorney had advised them that the $4,000/month discussion on 
July 19th constituted an enforceable oral agreement to purchase Cowley's half of AMS for 
$4,000/month for five years. 
43. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000/month from August, 2002 through the 
time of trial. 
44. The Cowleys subsequently filed this action against the Porters on May 15,2003 
wherein the Complaint and in a subsequent Motion for Summary judgment they took the position 
that AMS was improperly dissolved and asked this court to judicially dissolve AMS dividing the 
value of AMS between the plaintiff and the defendant. Mr. Cowley subsequently changed his 
position and asked the Court to enforce the buy-out agreement set forth in Exhibit 5. In 
pleadings filed since the trial herein, the plaintiff has changed his position again, and again asks 
the Court to judicially dissolve AMD and set its value as of June 22, 2002 prior to the Porters 
telling 7-Eleven management of Mr. Cowley's ownership interest in AMS. 
45. After ruling upon motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment and 
in response to the defendant's Answer wherein it was alleged that an agreement for buy out had 
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been reached between the parties, the Court ordered the trial to be bifurcated. The first trial 
being to decide if there was a contract to dissolve AMS and thus rendering a second trial to 
determine the value of AMS and the need to judicially dissolve it unnecessary if the Court found 
an enforceable contract to exist. 
46. Both the plaintiff and the defendant testified at trial differently than sworn 
statements they gave in affidavits they filed with the Court at various staged of the litigation in 
this case. The credibility of both the Cowleys and the Porters is difficult to ascertain by the 
Court. 
47. Veralynn Porter testified at trial that she destroyed the tape recordings of the June 
meetings by throwing them into the Jordanelle Reservoir on a July 24, 2002 outing, which act 
made them unavailable for use at the trial and was contrary to her representation that she had 
destroyed them prior to the July 19th meeting of the parties. 
48. Both parties were involved in a scheme to deceive 7-Eleven as to the actual 
ownership of AMS over many years. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There is no need to judicially dissolve AMS because the parties entered into 
an enforceable contract wherein Mr. Porter agreed to buy-out Mr. Cowley's interest in AMS for, 
among other things, $10,000/month for five years, until $600,000 had been paid. The remainder 
of the terms agreed upon, including distribution of accounts, properties and equipment, has been 
performed. 
2. The agreement signed by Slone Porter June 24,2002 does not meet the 
requirements of the Statute of frauds, U.C.A. 25-2-1 et seq. (1953), however, the agreement 
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shown by the document has been sufficiently performed to be fully enforceable. The terms of the 
agreement are clear and definite; the acts done in performance are clear and definite and the 
extensive acts shown would not have been performed absent the agreement. See Spears v. Warr, 
44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). 
3. The Cowleys agreed to accept reduced payments of $4,000/month from August 
2002 through October 2002, as an accommodation to the Porters. The Parties, however, agreed 
that payments of $10,000/month would commence as soon as 7-Eleven renewed maintenance 
contracts with QMS and continue until $600,000 had been paid. The 7-Eleven contracts were 
renewed in October 2002. 
4. The parties never agreed to reduce the total amount due from Porter to Cowley to 
$240,000; the agreement has always been to pay $600,000. 
5. Defendant Porter has been in breach of the agreement with Cowley since October 
2002 in the amount of $6,000/month through the present. Porter has an obligation to pay 
$10,000/month hereafter until the full $600,000 is paid. 
6. The unilateral acts of the Porters in their interaction with representative of 
7-Eleven from June 23,2002 through June 27,2002 were coercive of the Cowleys to sell their 
half interest in AMS. The Porters breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing contained 
within their duty of loyalty to their corporation and their co-owners. See Nicholson v. Evans 642 
P.2d 727, 730 (1982) and Brown v. Richards 840 P.2d 143, 153 (1992). 
DATED this <£ 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this day of 
"7 
, 20, 
Deputy Court dlerk 
Paap 1 f1a=!t-] 
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Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 0J r «A I I b A,1 3 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Slone and Veralyn PORTER. 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Case Number: f)9)!)^) ^fUf 
Plaintiffs, Tracy and Kerin Cowley, complain of defendants Slone and Veralyn Porter, now 
doing business as Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc., and in support of said Complaint allege: 
1. Plaintiffs and defendants are residents of Wasatch County, Utah. 
2. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, are the owners of fifty percent (50%) of the stock of 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah corporation, as shown by the Stock Redemption 
Agreement attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A". 
3. Defendants, Slone and Veralyn Porter, husband and wife, are owners of fifty percent 
(50%) of the stock of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
4. On or about July 22, 2002, without authority so to do, and without consent of plaintiffs, 
defendants filed with the Commerce Department of the State of Utah Articles of Dissolution for 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
5. Thereupon, defendants incorporated a Utah corporation, Quality Maintenance Systems, 
Inc., purporting to be wholly owned by defendants, and transferred to it the business of Advanced 
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Maintenance Services, Inc. 
6. Exhibit "B" hereto is false and ineffective to dissolve Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. 
Defendants are estopped to deny the issuance of stock in Quality Maintenance Services, Inc., or to 
unilaterally seek dissolution of the corporation. 
7. Thereafter, defendants have paid to plaintiffs a small part of plaintiffs' regular income from 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., but have otherwise refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership 
in the corporation and have prevented plaintiffs' participation in the business of the corporation. 
8. Plaintiffs have at all times protested the attempt of defendants to dissolve Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc., and to operate its business under another name. Such protests have been 
unavailing. 
9. Defendants, over the protest of plaintiffs, continue to operate the business of Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc., under the name Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc., utilizing and 
disposing of the assets thereof, incurring liabilities therefor, and collecting and disposing of the 
income thereof, all without authority and in violation of the law. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the Court promptly issue its Order to defendants 
commanding them forthwith to: 
a. cease operation of the business of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., under any other 
name; 
b. fully account for all business done following the purported dissolution of Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc., with or for any customer of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., 
including, without limitation, any disposition of any asset thereof, following its purported dissolution; 
c. fully account for all receipts and disbursements in connection with the business of 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., following its purported dissolution; 
d. take no further step in the conduct of the business of Advanced Maintenance Services, 
Inc., without consultation with and approval of plaintiffs; 
2 
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e. sequester all income derived from the business of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., 
subject, in the absence of express written agreement of plaintiffs, to further order of the court; 
f promptly pay plaintiffs income from the operation of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., 
since its purported dissolution, in the same amounts as paid during the year prior to such purported 
dissolution, less any payments actually made; 
g. initiate forthwith proceedings for the statutory dissolution of Advanced Maintenance 
Services, Inc., pursuant to § 16-10a-1402 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953); 
h. pay to plaintiffs their fees and costs of this action, to be shown by appropriate affidavit of 
counsel. 
Plaintiffs pray for such other and further relief as the Court deems just in the premises. 
I 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this (1/ day of May, 2003. 
E. Craig Sma 
Attorney for fMaintiffs\ 
b 
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Attack iRebemptioxx Agr? exxxexxi 
(Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.) 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this j££'day of May, 1998, by and between 
Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley (hereinafter referred to as "share-
holders") and Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., an S-Corporation (herein-
after referred to as the "company") created and existing under the laws of the 
Sate of Utah. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley are the primary 
shareholders of the company, Slone Dee Porter owning fifty percent (50%) of 
the stock thereof, and Tracy J. Cowley owning fifty percent (50%); and 
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement believe that it is to their mutual 
best interest to provide for continuity and harmony in management and the 
policies of the company; and 
WHEREAS, the purposes of this agreement are (1) to provide for the 
purchase by the corporation of shares of an shareholder in the event of his 
death, (2) to provide for the purchase of shares of a shareholder who during his 
lifetime desires to dispose of any of his stock, and (3) to provide the funds 
necessary to carry out such purchases; 
1 
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NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and 
covenants contained herein and for other valuable consideration, receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, it is mutually agreed and covenanted by and 
between the parties to this agreement as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
DISPOSAL OF STOCK DURING LIFETIME 
During his lifetime no shareholder shall transfer, encumber or dispose of 
any portion of his stock interest in the company except that if a shareholder 
should desire to dispose of his stock in the company during his lifetime, he shall 
first offer such stock to the company at a price determined in accordance with 
the provisions of Article II. Any shares not purchased by the company within 
thirty (30) days after receipt of such offer in writing shall be offered at the 
same price to other shareholders, each of whom shall have the right to 
purchase such portion of the remaining stock offered for sale as the number of 
shares owned by all other shareholders excluding the selling shareholder. 
Provided however that if any shareholder does not purchase his full propor-
tionate share of stock, the balance of the stock may be purchased by other 
shareholders equally. If the stock is not purchased by the remaining share-
holders within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the offer to them, the share-
holder desiring to sell may sell it to any other person but shall not sell it without 
giving the company and the remaining shareholders the right to purchase such 
remaining stock at the price and on the terms offered to such other persons. 
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ARTICLE II 
VALUATION OF SHARES 
Unless changed as hereinafter provided, the value of each share of stock 
of the company held by each shareholder shall be one dollar ($1.00) per share. 
The price has been agreed upon by the shareholders of the company as 
representing the fair market value of the interest of each shareholder, including 
his interest in the goodwill of the corporation. 
The respective shareholders hereby mutually agree to sell the stock 
standing in their names and, subject to this agreement, at the value herein 
stipulated, or at the value stipulated in any proper amendment to this agree-
ment. The shareholders and the company agree to redetermine the value of 
the company and their respective interests within sixty (60) days following the 
end of each fiscal year. The value so agreed upon shall be endorsed on 
Schedule "A", attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement. If 
the shareholders and the company fail to make a redetermination of valuation 
for a particular year, the last previously stipulated value shall control, except 
that if the shareholders and the company have not so redetermined the value 
within twenty-four (24) months immediately preceding the death of a 
shareholder, then the value of a shareholder's interest shall be agreed upon by 
the representative of the deceased shareholder and the company through its 
surviving shareholders. If they do not agree upon a valuation within one 
hundred and twenty (120) days after the death of the shareholder, the value of 
the deceased shareholder's interest shall be determined by arbitration as 
follows: 
3 
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The company, through the supervising shareholders and the personal 
representatives of the estate of the deceased shareholder shall each name one 
arbitrator. If two arbitrators cannot agree upon a value within thirty (30) days, 
they shall appoint a third arbitrator and the decision of the majority shall be 
binding upon all parties. In any determination of value made after the death 
of a shareholder, the value of the insurance proceeds in excess of the policy's 
cash surrender value at the time of the decedent's death must not be taken into 
account. 
ARTICLE III 
DISPOSITION OF STOCK UPON DEATH OF A SHAREHOLDER 
Upon the death of any shareholder, the company shall purchase and the 
estate of the decedent shall sell all of the decedent's stock in the company now 
owned or hereafter acquired. The purchase price of such stock shall be 
computed in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement. 
If the purchase price exceeds the proceeds of the life insurance, the 
balance of the purchase price shall be paid in five (5) consecutive annual 
payments beginning three (3) months after the date of the shareholder's death. 
Such unpaid balance of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a series of 
negotiable promissory notes executed by the company to the order of the 
deceased's estate with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum. Such notes 
shall provide for the acceleration of the due date on all unpaid notes in the 
series upon default in the payment of principal or interest. All such notes shall 
4 
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become due and payable immediately upon default and shall give the company 
the option of prepayment in whole or in part at any time, provided however, 
that the personal representative of the decedent shareholder's estate shall have 
the option to demand in cash, an amount at least equal to thirty percent (30%) 
of the agreed purchase price. Upon failure of the surviving shareholder(s) to 
comply with such demand, this agreement may be terminated at the option of 
the personal representative. 
ARTICLE IV 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
The company has procured insurance on the lives of shareholders in order 
to fund its obligations under this agreement and made it subject hereto. 
A. Slone Dee Porter is insured under Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, policy number BL2013210 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof. 
B. Tracy J. Cowley is insured under Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, policy number BL2013196 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof. 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. agrees to pay the premiums on the 
insurance policies taken out pursuant to this agreement and shall give proof of 
payment of premiums to the shareholders whenever any one of them shall 
request such proof. If the premium is not paid within fifteen (15) days after 
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its due date, the insured shall have the right to pay such premium and be 
promptly reimbursed therefore by the company. 
The company shall have the right to purchase additional insurance on the 
lives of any or all of its shareholders. All insurance policies shall be listed in 
Schedule "B" , attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement, 
along with any substitution or withdrawal of life insurance policies subject to 
this agreement. In the event that the company decides to purchase additional 
life insurance on %he life of any shareholder, each shareholder hereby agrees to 
cooperate fully by performing all the requirements of the life insurer which are 
necessary conditions to the issuance of life insurance policies. The company 
shall be the sole owner of the policies issued to it and it may apply any 
dividends to the payment of premiums. 
Upon the joint agreement of the shareholders, other policies may be 
substituted for any policies made subject to this agreement or any policies made 
subject hereto may be withdrawn. If there should be no insurance subject to 
this agreement on the life of any shareholder, or if such insurance made subject 
to this agreement is impaired in value so that it would not provide proceeds 
equal to at least fifty percent (50%) of the face amount of such insurance, such 
shareholder may elect to declare this agreement terminated by giving written 
notice of termination to the other shareholder(s). Any addition, substitution or 
withdrawal of policies shall be endorsed on Schedule "B" attached hereto and 
signed by the shareholders. 
6 
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ARTICLE V 
PURCHASE OF NONMATURED POLICIES BY THE INSURED 
If any shareholder withdraws from the company during his lifetime, or if 
this agreement terminates before the death of a shareholder, such shareholder 
shall have the right to purchase the policy or policies on his life owned by the 
company by paying an amount equal to the cash surrender value as of the date 
of transfer, less any existing indebtedness charged against the policy or 
policies. This right shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days after such 
withdrawal or termination. 
ARTICLE VI 
ENDORSEMENT OF STOCK CERTIFICATES 
The shareholders agree to endorse the certificates of stock as follows: 
The shares of stock represented by this certificate may not be so/d, 
transferred or assigned except as provided in the corporation's cer-
tificate of incorporation, its by-lawsf or agreement among the 
shareholders and any amendments thereto. 
ARTICLE VII 
EXECUTION OF AGREEMENT 
A duly authorized officer of the company and the personal representative 
of the deceased shareholder's estate shall make, execute and deliver any 
documents necessary to carry out this agreement. This agreement shall be 
binding upon the company and the shareholders, their heirs, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns. 
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ARTICLE V!!l 
AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT 
This agreement may be altered, amended or terminated by an instrument 
in writing signed by the company and all shareholders. 
ARTICLE IX 
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
This agreement shall terminate on the occurance of any of the following: 
A. The written agreement of the shareholders to that effect. 
B. The exercise of a shareholders election to terminate this agreement 
pursuant to Article IV or the exercise of a similar option by the 
personal representative pursuant to Article III. 
C. Bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the company. 
D. Death of two or more shareholders simultaneously or within a 
period of thirty (30) days. 
E. When there remains only one shareholder, a party to the 
agreement. 
ARTICLE X 
LIABILITY OF INSURER 
No insurance company which has issued or shall issue a policy or policies 
to this agreement shall be under any obligation with respect to the performance 
of the terms and conditions of this agreement. Any such company shall be 
bound only by the terms of the policies which it has issued or shall hereafter 
issue and shall have no liability except as set forth in the policies. 
8 
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ARTICLE X! 
GOVERNING LAW 
This agreement shall be subject to and governed by the laws of the State 
of Utah irrespective of the fact that one or more parties may become a resident 
of another state. 
ARTICLE XII 
EFFECT OF BAR AGAINST STOCK REDEMPTION 
If the company is unable to make any purchase required of it hereunder 
because of the provisions of the applicable statutes of its charter or by-laws, 
the company agrees to take such action as may be necessary to permit it to 
make such purchases and the shareholders who are parties to this agreement 
agree that they will also take action as may be necessary for the company to 
make such purchases. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this agreement 
at the City of Midway in the Wasatch County, State of Utah on the day and 
year first indicated. 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. 
mkh 
Shareholder 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
On this day of May, 1998, personally appeared before me, a Notary 
Public, Veralynne C. Porter, as President of Advanced Maintenance Services, 
Inc.; and shareholders, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley, all of whom duly 
acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing document. 
Notary Public 
10 1 
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SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE POLICIES SUBJECT TO STOCK-REDEMPTION 
Insurance Company Policy Number Face Amount Date of Policy 
Beneficial Life Insurance Co. BL2013210 $660,000.00 5 1 4 " 19 
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W ^ ^ w Division of Corporations & Commercial Code 
This form must be tvpe written or computer generated 
RECEIVED 





Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the undersigned directors or 
corporators adopt the following Articles of Dissolution. 
Corporation Name: Advanced M a i n t e n a n c e S e r v i c e s , I n c . 
The corporation has not issued shares, A majority of its director or if no directors have been elected 
or arc no longer serving, a majority of its incorporators hereby authorize the dissolution of this 
Corporation 
This dissolution was authorized by the directors or incorporators on: 
J u l y 1 , 2002 
The address of the corporation's principal office or other address where service of process may be 
mailed: 
1010 Magpie Circle, Midway, Utah 84049 4 
Fourth: 
Street Address City State Zip 
Under 
to the 
K P e r J iWJ declare that these Articles of Dissolution have been examined by me and are, 
>w/edgefciirfj belief, true, correct md complete. 
Title: P r e s i d e n t Dated:19 J u l ^ 2 ° o : 
FREE! You can visit our Web Sit^ to access this document and other information. 
' " " ' 'itotrtof. 
hpftecg V-
DMvonDwtof 
Mail In: S.M Box 146705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84! 14-6705 
7 -p^nbWalk In: 160 East 300 South, Main Floor 
°*
lf
-—~ ICorporation's Information Center: (801) 530-4849 
Toll Free Number: (877) 526-3994 (Utah Residents) 
Fax: (801) 530-6438 
Well Site: lutp://w\vw.commerce MUih.gov 
comm0rtWb*rM\Ot>rp«"Arich$s 
Revised OJ-2X-02 m o 
> 
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.: ..L? IN 
• ^ ; iRICT COURT 
' -'EOF UTAH 
"•' /•!CM COUNTY 
03 KAY 21 FN 12:59 
$&> 
JefferyR. Price (6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
One Thirty Nine East 
South Temple St., Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 961-7400 
Facsimile: (801) 961-7406 
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY 
TRACEY and KERIN COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




Civil No. 030500244 
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Defendants Slone and Veralynn Porter ("Defendants"), acting by and through their attorneys of 
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Defendants hereby incorporate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Complaint above as 
if set forth in their entirety below, and by way of further response to the Complaint hereby assert the 
following affirmative defenses: 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Any injury or damage sustained by Plaintiffs was caused by the fault of Plaintiffs, defendants other 
than Defendants, or third persons not parties to this action. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants deny every allegation of the complaint not expressly admitted, denied or qualified. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The fault of the Plaintiffs was the sole proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of, or, 
alternatively, was equal to or greater than that of Defendants, and such fault bars recovery. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The fault of Plaintiffs was a proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of, and any award 
of damages should be reduced proportionately. > 
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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have failed to mitigate damages and may not recover damages due to such failure. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The complaint fails to join an indispensable party. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred by the doctrine of waiver, estoppel, or uncleanhands. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred because no damages have been incurred by 
Defendants. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred as to Kerin Cowley because of the fact that she has no standing in this 
case. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred because Advanced Maintenance, Inc. was properly 
dissolved. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred by reason of accord and satisfaction. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred because the Stock Redemption Agreement was 
terminated upon dissolution. 
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FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants reserve the right to assert any and all other affirmative defenses as set forth in Rule 8, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which discovery reveals to be applicable, so as to avoid waiver of same. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants Slone and Veralynn Porter hereby request that judgment be 
entered in their favor and against Plaintiffs, that the Complaint dismissed in its entirety with prejudice such 
that Plaintiffs take nothing thereby, and that the Court award to Defendants all costs incurred in defending 
against Plaintiffs' claims in this action, including reasonable attorneys' fees, and together with all further 
relief the court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances. 
DATED t h i s ^ t ^ day of May, 2003 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
Jeffery R. Price 
Christopher C. Hill 
Attorneys for Defendants Slone & Veralynn Porter 
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Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this ^ t ^ d a y of May, 2003,1 caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES upon counsel for Plaintiffs by placing 
same in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first-class postage prepaid and correctly address as 
follows: 
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney at Law 
174 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
it 
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E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
I U O IN 
'-' [ . WRICT COURT 
v',\'<: or UTAH 
' ' - V - > < CCIJJJ7 i 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Case Number: 030500244 
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Plaintiffs have filed their Complaint herein; defendants have filed their Answer thereto. The 
filings show that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Complaint asserts, inter alia, that the parties each own half of the stock of Advanced 
Maintenance Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, as shown by a Stock Redemption Agreement 
attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A". The Complaint asserts that the 
corporation was improperly dissolved by Articles attached as Exhibit "B". 
While denying the stock ownership alleged, defendants have admitted the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, which plainly shows such interests. The thirteenth defense alleges that "the Stock 
Redemption Agreement was terminated upon dissolution". To have been terminated, the Stock 
Redemption Agreement must have existed until the alleged dissolution, which was July 22, 2002, 
according to the Articles of Dissolution, Exhibit "B'\ 
Having entered into a Stock Redemption Agreement, defendants are estopped to deny the 
issuance of the stock. Stock may be redeemed only according to the Agreement. The Agreement 
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recites that the parties are "shareholders" "owning" 50% each of the stock. Issuance of the stock 
certificates became a ministerial act which could have been compelled at any time by either party.1 
In that case, defendants could not unilaterally dissolve the corporation over plaintiffs objection. 
Because Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. had "shareholders", it could not be dissolved 
without the consent of the shareholders.2 The right to consent to, or dissent from, dissolution of the 
corporation is part of the right to the stock. 
Defendants have attempted to dissolve the company under provisions relating to dissolution 
of corporations without shareholders.3 Because they failed to obtain plaintiffs' consent, defendants' 
attempted dissolution was invalid as a matter of law. The invalid dissolution could not have 
terminated the Stock Redemption Agreement. 
Both Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. and the subject Stock Redemption Agreement 
remain in full force and effect, as alleged in the Complaint. Defendant's peculiar chicken-and-egg 
argument that the company was properly dissolved (Eleventh Defense) because it had no stock, 
because the Stock Redemption Agreement was terminated by the dissolution, is a subterfuge rather 
than a defense.4 
The pleadings here show that the allegations of the Complaint are true. The parties are equal 
shareholders of a corporation, which defendants have attempted to dissolve without plaintiffs 
1
 § 16-10a-625 (1), U.C.A (1953): "Shares may but need not be represented by 
certificates. Unless this chapter or another applicable statute expressly provides otherwise, the 
rights and obligations of shareholders are not affected by whether or not their shares are 
represented by certificates." SttBaggett v. Cyclops Medical Systems, Inc., 935 P.2d 1265, 1268 
(U. Apps. 1997). 
2
 § 16-10a-1402(l)(b), U.C.A. (1953): "the shareholders entitled to vote on the proposal 
must approve the proposal to dissolve 
3
 § 16-10a-1401, U.C.A. (1953). 
4
 Defendant has alleged no facts in support of its various "alternative defenses". Many 
are inapplicable on their face. The defenses denominated "second", "fourth" and "fifth" are 
inappropriate tort defenses. That denominated "third" is not an additional defense. The "tenth" 
defense is wrong on its face: Kerin Cowley, the wife of Tracy Cowley, has a dower right in the 
subject stock which gives her standing. Defendant has asserted no facts which could support its 
"defenses" denominated "sixth", "seventh", "eighth" or "twelfth". 
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consent. As a matter of law, plaintiffs are entitled to accounting of and payment for their share of the 
corporation, and a proper dissolution. 
Advanced Maintenance Systems remains to be properly dissolved. The present proceeding 
should be promptly converted into one under § 16-1 Oa-1402, or § 16-1 Oa-1430(2) et seq., Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). Meanwhile, an appropriate order should be entered requiring that the company be 
operated only with the participation and consent of plaintiffs, and only upon payment to plaintiffs of 
their share of the income as shown by prior operations. 
DATED this ^ of June, 2003. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fr^ of June, 2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON 
THE PLEADINGS" to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Jeffrey R. Price (6315) 
Christopher C Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
139 E. South Temple, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ph: (801) 961-7400 
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&?tack iRebemptxan AgrPFrrtFrti 
(Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc.) 
THIS AGREEMENT is made this yL day of May, 1998, by and between 
Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley (hereinafter referred to as "share-
holders") and Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., an S-Corporation (herein-
after referred to as the "company") created and existing under the laws of the 
Sate of Utah. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley are the primary 
shareholders of the company, Slone Dee Porter owning fifty percent (50%) of 
the stock thereof, and Tracy J. Cowley owning fifty percent (50%); and 
WHEREAS, the parties to this agreement believe that it is to their mutual 
best interest to provide for continuity and harmony in management and the 
policies of the company; and 
WHEREAS, the purposes of this agreement are (1) to provide for the 
purchase by the corporation of shares of an shareholder in the event of his 
death, (2) to provide for the purchase of shares of a shareholder who during his 
lifetime desires to dispose of any of his stock, and (3) to provide the funds 
necessary to carry out such purchases; 
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NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and 
covenants contained herein and for other valuable consideration, receipt of 
which is hereby acknowledged, it is mutually agreed and covenanted by and 
between the parties to this agreement as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
DISPOSAL OF STOCK DURING LIFETIME 
During his lifetime no shareholder shall transfer, encumber or dispose of 
any portion of his stock interest in the company except that if a shareholder 
should desire to dispose of his stock in the company during his lifetime, he shall 
first offer such stock to the company at a price determined in accordance with 
the provisions of Article II. Any shares not purchased by the company within 
thirty (30) days after receipt of such offer in writing shall be offered at the 
same price to other shareholders, each of whom shall have the right to 
purchase such portion of the remaining stock offered for sale as the number of 
shares owned by all other shareholders excluding the selling shareholder. 
Provided however that if any shareholder does not purchase his full propor-
tionate share of stock, the balance of the stock may be purchased by other 
shareholders equally. If the stock is not purchased by the remaining share-
holders within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the offer to them, the share-
holder desiring to sell may sell it to any other person but shall not sell it without 
giving the company and the remaining shareholders the right to purchase such 
remaining stock at the price and on the terms offered to such other persons. 
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ARTICLE !! 
VALUATION OF SHARES 
Unless changed as hereinafter provided, the value of each share of stock 
of the company held by each shareholder shall be one dollar ($1.00) per share. 
The price has been agreed upon by the shareholders of the company as 
representing the fair market value of the interest of each shareholder, including 
his interest in the goodwill of the corporation. 
The respective shareholders hereby mutually agree to sell the stock 
standing in their names and, subject to this agreement, at the value herein 
stipulated, or at the value stipulated in any proper amendment to this agree-
ment. The shareholders and the company agree to redetermine the value of 
the company and their respective interests within sixty (60) days following the 
end of each fiscal year. The value so agreed upon shall be endorsed on 
Schedule "A", attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement. If 
the shareholders and the company fail to make a redetermination of valuation 
for a particular year, the last previously stipulated value shall control, except 
that if the shareholders and the company have not so redetermined the value 
within twenty-four (24) months immediately preceding the death of a 
shareholder, then the value of a shareholder's interest shall be agreed upon by 
the representative of the deceased shareholder and the company through its 
surviving shareholders. If they do not agree upon a valuation within one 
hundred and twenty (120) days after the death of the shareholder, the value of 
the deceased shareholder's interest shall be determined by arbitration as 
follows: 
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The company, through the supervising shareholders and the personal 
representatives of the estate of the deceased shareholder shall each name one 
arbitrator. If two arbitrators cannot agree upon a value within thirty (30) days, 
they shall appoint a third arbitrator and the decision of the majority shall be 
binding upon all parties. In any determination of value made after the death 
of a shareholder, the value of the insurance proceeds in excess of the policy's 
cash surrender value at the time of the decedent's death must not be taken into 
account. 
ARTICLE Ml 
DISPOSITION OF STOCK UPON DEATH OF A SHAREHOLDER 
Upon the death of any shareholder, the company shall purchase and the 
estate of the decedent shall sell all of the decedent's stock in the company now 
owned or hereafter acquired. The purchase price of such stock shall be 
computed in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement. 
If the purchase price exceeds the proceeds of the life insurance, the 
balance of the purchase price shall be paid in five (5) consecutive annual 
payments beginning three (3) months after the date of the shareholder's death. 
Such unpaid balance of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a series of 
negotiable promissory notes executed by the company to the order of the 
deceased's estate with interest at ten percent (10%) per annum. Such notes 
shall provide for the acceleration of the due date on all unpaid notes in the 
series upon default in the payment of principal or interest. All such notes shall 
1% 
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become due and payable immediately upon default and shall give the company 
the option of prepayment in whole or in part at any time, provided however, 
that the personal representative of the decedent shareholder's estate shall have 
the option to demand in cash, an amount at least equal to thirty percent (30%) 
of the agreed purchase price. Upon failure of the surviving shareholder(s) to 
comply with such demand, this agreement may be terminated at the option of 
the personal representative. 
ARTICLE IV 
INSURANCE POLICIES 
The company has procured insurance on the lives of shareholders in order 
to fund its obligations under this agreement and made it subject hereto. 
A. Slone Dee Porter is insured under Beneficial Life insurance Com-
pany, policy number BL2013210 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof. 
B. Tracy J . Cowley is insured under Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, policy number BL2013196 in the amount of $660,000 and Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc. is the applicant, owner and beneficiary thereof. 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. agrees to pay the premiums on the 
insurance policies taken out pursuant to this agreement and shall give proof of 
payment of premiums to the shareholders whenever any one of them shall 
request such proof. If the premium is not paid within fifteen (15) days after 
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its due date, the insured shall have the right to pay such premium and be 
promptly reimbursed therefore by the company. 
The company shall have the right to purchase additional insurance on the 
lives of any or all of its shareholders. All insurance policies shall be listed in 
Schedule "B", attached hereto and thereby made a part of this agreement, 
along with any substitution or withdrawal of life insurance policies subject to 
this agreement. In the event that the company decides to purchase additional 
life insurance on the life of any shareholder, each shareholder hereby agrees to 
cooperate fully by performing all the requirements of the life insurer which are 
necessary conditions to the issuance of life insurance policies. The company 
shall be the sole owner of the policies issued to it and it may apply any 
dividends to the payment of premiums. 
Upon the joint agreement of the shareholders, other policies may be 
substituted for any policies made subject to this agreement or any policies made 
subject hereto may be withdrawn. If there should be no insurance subject to 
this agreement on the life of any shareholder, or if such insurance made subject 
to this agreement is impaired in value so that it would not provide proceeds 
equal to at least fifty percent (50%) of the face amount of such insurance, such 
shareholder may elect to declare this agreement terminated by giving written 
notice of termination to the other shareholder(s). Any addition, substitution or 
withdrawal of policies shall be endorsed on Schedule "B" attached hereto and 
signed by the shareholders. 
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ARTICLE V 
PURCHASE OF NONMATURED POLICIES BY THE INSURED 
If any shareholder withdraws from the company during his lifetime, or if 
this agreement terminates before the death of a shareholder, such shareholder 
shall have the right to purchase the policy or policies on his life owned by the 
company by paying an amount equal to the cash surrender value as of the date 
of transfer, less any existing indebtedness charged against the policy or 
policies. This right shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days after such 
withdrawal or termination. 
ARTICLE VI 
ENDORSEMENT OF STOCK CERTIFICATES 
The shareholders agree to endorse the certificates of stock as follows: 
The shares of stock represented by this certificate may not be sold, 
transferred or assigned except as provided in the corporation's cer-
tificate of incorporation, its by-laws, or agreement among the 
shareholders and any amendments thereto. 
ARTICLE VII 
EXECUTION OF AGREEMENT 
A duly authorized officer of the company and the personal representative 
of the deceased shareholder's estate shall make, execute and deliver any 
documents necessary to carry out this agreement. This agreement shall be 
binding upon the company and the shareholders, their heirs, personal 
representatives, successors and assigns. 
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ARTICLE VII! 
AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT 
This agreement may be altered, amended or terminated by an instrument 
in writing signed by the company and all shareholders. 
ARTICLE IX 
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
This agreement shall terminate on the occurance of any of the following: 
A. The written agreement of the shareholders to that effect. 
B. The exercise of a shareholders election to terminate this agreement 
pursuant to Article IV or the exercise of a similar option by the 
personal representative pursuant to Article III. 
C. Bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the company. 
D. Death of two or more shareholders simultaneously or within a 
period of thirty (30) days. 
E. When there remains only one shareholder, a party to the 
agreement. 
ARTICLE X 
LIABILITY OF INSURER 
No insurance company which has issued or shall issue a policy or policies 
to this agreement shall be under any obligation with respect to the performance 
of the terms and conditions of this agreement. Any such company shall be 
bound only by the terms of the policies which it has issued or shall hereafter 
issue and shall have no liability except as set forth in the policies. 
8 
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ARTICLE XI 
GOVERNING LAW 
This agreement shall be subject to and governed by the laws of the State 
of Utah irrespective of the fact that one or more parties may become a resident 
of another state. 
ARTICLE XII 
EFFECT OF BAR AGAINST STOCK REDEMPTION 
If the company is unable to make any purchase required of it hereunder 
because of the provisions of the applicable statutes of its charter or by-laws, 
the company agrees to take such action as may be necessary to permit it to 
make such purchases and the shareholders who are parties to this agreement 
agree that they will also take action as may be necessary for the company to 
make such purchases. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this agreement 
at the City of Midway in the Wasatch County, State of Utah on the day and 
year first indicated. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
On this day of May, 1998, personally appeared before me, a Notary 
Public, Veralynne C. Porter, as President of Advanced Maintenance Services, 
Inc.; and shareholders, Slone Dee Porter and Tracy J. Cowley, all of whom duly 
acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing document. 
Notary Public 
10 ^ 
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SCHEDULE OF INSURANCE POLICIES SUBJECT TO STOCK-REDEMPTION 
Insurance Company Policy Number Face Amount Date of Policy 
Beneficial Life insurance Co. BL2013210 $660,000.00 5 / 4 ^ 19' 
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£( j S ) j ) DEPARTMENT OF CK MERCE 
^ w ^ v fr*v*si°n °f Corporations & Commercial Code 
This form must be tvpe written or computer generated 
Articles of Dissolution 
(Prior to the Issuance of Shares) JUL 222002 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, the undersigned directors or 
incorporators adopt the following Articles of Dissolution. 









The corporation has not issued shares A majority of its directors, or if no directors have been elected 
or arc no longer serving, a majority of its incorporators hereby authorize the dissolution of this 
Corporation 
This dissolution was authorized by the directors or incorporators on: 
J u l y 1 , 2002 
The address of the corporation's principal office or other address where service of process may be 
mailed: 
1010 Magpie Circle, Midway, Utah 84049 
Street Address City Slate Zip 
Under pen 
to the 
>f perjuxxl declare that these Articles of Dissolution have been examined by me and are, 
w/edgejaod belief, tru^ correct and complete. 
Title: P r e s i d e n t Dated;19 J u l -V 2 0 Q : 
F R E E ! You can visit our W e b Site to access this d o c u m e n t and other informat ion . 
tn tut offip* ot W$ Owsion $nd h*rti*4&ft 
•? - rwst>WaIk In: 160 East 300 South, Mam Floor 
OMSKMOKKKX 
Mail In: S.M, Box 146705 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6705 
Corporation's Information Center: (801) 530-4849 
Toll Free Number: (877) 526-3994 (Utah Residents) 
Fax: (801) 530-6438 
Web Site: hltp'//www comma cc uU\h gov 
comnKinVlbrn»\tf"orp< Artdtst 
Revised 0J 2K-02 mo 
tf 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY & KERIN COWLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SLONE & VERALYN PORTER, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 030500244 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court upon the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings. The Court has reviewed said Motion and the Memorandum of Law filed both 
in support and in opposition thereto, and also the plaintiffs complaint and the Answer and 
affirmative defenses filed by the defendants. 
The plaintiffs filed their Motion pursuant to Rule 12 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure which permits a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In deciding such a motion, 
the Court can't look to anything outside the four corners of the pleadings, and the Court must 
interpret the pleadings in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
The defendants in their Answer deny paragraph 2 of plaintiffs Complaint which refers to 
the stock redemption agreement but acknowledges the Stock Redemption Agreement in its 
Thirteenth Affirmative Defense when they state: "Plaintiffs claims against Defendant's are 
oo 
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barred because the Stock Redemption Agreement was terminated upon dissolution." By such a 
statement they do impliedly acknowledge the Stock Redemption Agreement and that there had 
been a dissolution of the corporation. The Court still does not know by that acknowledgment 
whether the dissolution was proper or improper such that the Court could award the prayer of 
the plaintiffs complaint. Based upon the pleadings alone, there are still issues of material fact. 
This is the type of case that would be more properly disposed of by way of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment where the Court would have before it affidavits in support and in opposition 
thereto and would have information outside the four corners of the Complaint and Answer, so the 
Court could better determine if there were issues of material facts. 
For the above reasons, the Court denies the plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the 
pleadings. The Court directs counsel for the defendant to prepare an Order consistent with this 
decision and submit it to plaintiffs counsel for review and to the Court for execution. 
Dated this r^ day of ^ M ^ f r ^ Q Q 3 . 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 030500244 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Dated this / day of 
Mail CHRISTOPHER C HILL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
13 9 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 32 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail E CRAIG SMAY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
174 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
»03. 
h £JJ~^ 
Deputy Court Gler 
Qi 
Page 1 (last) 
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E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
I PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
I Case Number; 030500244 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER. 
Judge. Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Defendants, 
Plaintiffs move the Court, pursuant to Rule 16, U.R.C.P., to limit the evidence herein to (1) 
such disputed question of material feet as the Court believes remains following disposition of 
plaintiffs' most recent Motion for Summary Judgment and/or (2) to whether acts of the parties 
constitute "partial performance", "strictly referable" to a clearly and convincingly proven oral 
agreement in satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds-
Question (1) is said to concern whether the failure of Tracy Cowley to sign a document 
signed by Slone Porter on June 24,2002, indicated a failure of a meeting of minds on the terms set 
out in the document. If a meeting of minds occurred, the matter is at an end, as the resulting written 
contract could not be altered by the subsequent oral agreement alleged by defendants, and has 
otherwise been fally performed by plaintiffs. 
Matters recently raised by defendants, including the claim that Quality Maintenance Services, 
Inc ("QMS"), has recently been disbanded due to loss of contracts with 7-Eleven Corporation, and 
that this somehow alters defendants' obligation to plaintiffs, should not be permitted to be shown. 
Not only have defendants, despite a continuing request for production of documents, withheld for 
2m ft tf 2S 
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months the documents pertinent to the matter, the matter is simply irrelevant, 
Defendants attach to their most recent pleadings, a letter of February 4,2004, purportedly 
terminating certain contracts between QMS and 7-Eleven pursuant to particular paragraphs of the 
contracts. The contracts are not submitted. The letter i$ $ubmitted as the basts of a claim that QMS 
no longer exists, Despite a continuing request for all documents relating to the financial condition 
of QMS, neither the letter nor the contracts have been previously produced. They may not be used 
now to create further claims or defenses. Rule 37, U.R.CP. 
Furthermore, the terms of what defendants call an oral "contract entered into July 19,2002, 
to acquire plaintiffs' interest in Advanced Maintenance Systems, Inc. f AMS") for $4,000/month ft>r 
five years, have previously been summarized by defendants in writing, Exhibit 29, Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Exhibit UA" hereto. The terms do not include defendants7 present 
claim that in the event they lost the 7-Eleven business their obligation to pay plaintiffs terminated. 
The alleged termination of QMS is therefore wholly irrelevant to any issue herein. 
The Court must also disallow evidence extraneous to the issue of the bargain made between 
the parties. This includes, at least, disputation of the motives or feelings of personnel of 7-Eleven 
Corporation regarding the sale to defendants of plaintiffs7 share of AMS, and any effect it may have 
had on continuation of business with QMS, The admitted facts are that, upon being advised on June 
27, 2002, that plaintiffs had been bought out by defendants, 7-Eleven continued the work of AMS 
with QMS on a temporary basis, which was converted to a long-term contract basis in October, 2002, 
Nothing further is pertinent to the nature of the business purchased by defendants and delivered by 
plaintiffs The Court should therefore exclude evidence of communications between the parties and 
7-Eleven on June 27, 2002 and thereafter, except for the result thereof The Court should further 
exclude evidence regarding the propriety of the creation or maintenance of AMS (or QMS) under any 
rules of conduct of 7-Eleven Corp., insofar as it is admitted that 7-Eleven sought no relief with 
respect thereto, despite investigations conducted after June 27,2002 and prior to October, 2002 
Insofar as it is admitted that the business relationship of AMS and 7-Eleven was continued 
2 
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between QMS and 7-Eleven following the purchase by defendants of plaintiffs* share of AMS, 
without altering the nature or value of the business purchased by defendants from plaintiffs, all other 
matters regarding 7-Eleven are extraneous and should not be admitted. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2&h day of May, 2004. 
6^ ^ 
E. Craig Smay T 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26* of May, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE" to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage 
prepaid, to: 
Jeffrey R, Price (6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK& PRICE, PC. 
139 E. South Temple, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 111 
ph; (801) 961-7400 
E. Craig Smay. 
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STOCK TRANSFER AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
TfflSDBSOLimONSBTTIJEMEOTAGRBBMBOT 
by and between Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy J, Cowley, Kerin Cowley, Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc. CAdvanced"), Straight Line Striping, Inc. ("Straight Line"), and 
Listo, Inc. ("Listo"), collectively referred to herein as the ''Parties." 
WHEREAS, the Parties, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, wish to resolve their differences in accordance with the terms and 
conditions set forth herein. 
WHEREAS, the Parties wish to memorialize their oral contract which was entered into and 
agreed upon by all Parties, according to the terms and conditions set forth herein, 
WHEREAS, the Parties to date have complied with the terms and conditions set forth herein, 
and agree to continue to comply with the terms and conditions until all terms and conditions set forth 
herein have been satisfied. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound and in an effort to settle 
claims stemming from their dispute, hereby agree as follows: 
1. The Parties hereby agree that Tracy L Cowley and Slone D. Porter each owned fifty 
percent (50%) of the company known as Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc, 
Federal Tax LD. # 87-0548605, 
2. Tracy J, Cowley and Slone D* Porter, the two stockholders of the company, hereby 
agree to dissolve Advanced. 
3. The Parties hereby agree that one-half QA) of the cash assets from Advanced shall be 
distributed to Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley. This amount shall consist of 
previously allocated funds used by the Cowleys in three separate checks; $25,000 on 
June 27, 2002, $16,500 on July 29,2002, and $11,800 on July 31, 2002; totaling 
$53>300. 
4. Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter hereby agree to pay off Tracy Cowley's 2001 
F350 vehicle, VIN # 1FTSX31F11EC34760. The payment will be $1,062.57 per 
month until paid-oflfta full The current balance on the vehicle is $17,314.12. 
5 • The Parties hereby agree that Slone D, Porter and Veralynn Porter incorporated a pew 
company on July 1,2002 known as Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("Quality"), 
Federal Tax LD. # 04-3690183, Slone owns fifty percent (50%) of the company, and 
Veralynn owns fifty percent (50%) of the company. 
6. The Partie$ hereby agree that a cash payout of $240,000 will be paid out to Tracy J. 
Cowley and Kerin Cowley by Slone D, Porter and Veralynn Porter through their new 
company, Qualify. 
7. The Parties hereby agree that the $240,000 will be distributed in payments of $4,000 
per month for five (5) years, beginning August 1 > 2002. Each $4,000 check is to be 
paid to Straight Line. 
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8. Slone D> Porter and Veralynn Porter, through their new company> Quality, hereby 
agree to pay the health insurance premiums for Tracy J, Cowley and Kerin Cowley 
through December 31, 2002. The health insurance plan is known as ValueCare 
Health Insurance. The monthly premium payment is $724,40. 
9. The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line, Federal Tax LD. # 844429330, was 
owned by Veralynn Porter and Kerin Cowley, each owning fifty percent (50%) each. 
10. The Parties hereby agree that the entire business of Straight Line, including A/R, A/P, 
equipment, and all cash on hand was valued at $41,336.96 as of June 30,2002. 
11. Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to transfer her fifty percent (50%) ownership of 
Straight Line to Kerin Cowley on July 1,2002. 
12. The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line is now completely owned by Kerin 
Cowley as of July 1,2002. 
13. Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to be responsible for one-half (J4) of the taxes owed 
by Straight Line through June 30,2002. Veralynn Porter will be filing a final K-1 at 
the end of 2002. 
14. The Parties hereby agree that Listo, Federal tax IJX # 87-0657135, was owned in 
equal shares of twenty-five percent (25%) by Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy 
J. Cowley, and Kerin Cowley. 
15. The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter transferred their 
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in Listo to Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley, 
respectively, on July 1,2002. 
16. The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J, Cowley and Kerin Cowley took complete 
control of Listo on July 1,2002. 
17. The Parties hereby agree that Slone D* Porter and Veralynn Porter are responsible 
for one-forth (1/4), respectively, of the taxes of Listo, Inc., through the end of 2002. 
Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter will each be filing a final K-l at the end of 2002. 
18. The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J, Cowley and Kerin Cowley, as owners of Listo 
will take possession of the rental property located at 294 South Center Street, 
Midway, UT 84049, which was purchased for the price of $115,000.00. 
19. The Parties hereby agree that this Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement is a 
written confirmation of the verbal agreement entered into by thfc parties on or about 
June 22,2002; 
20. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties, 
including their successors and assigns. 
21. The Parties agree that this Agreement in no way constitutes or infers an admission 
or concession of fault or liability by any party. 
Page 2 of 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22. The Parties warrant and represent that the individuals whose signatures appear below 
have been duly authorized to enter this Agreement on behalf of each party for whom 
they sign. 
23. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be 
considered an original of the Agreement The Parties further agree to warrant that 
signatures made and received via telefacsimile shall, for the convenience of the 
Parties, 
have the same force and effect as original signatures until such time as original 
signatures of all the Parties may be obtained-
24, The Parties warrant that no promise, inducement or agreement not expressed herein 
has been made to them in connection with this Agreement This Agreement 
contains the entire agreement between the Parties* All prior negotiations and 
discussions arc merged herein as expressed by the written terms set forth herein, 
and/or in any Exhibits identified and/or incorporated herein by reference. This 
Agreement may not be modified, changed, or altered in any way except in a writing 
signed by the Parties or their authorized representatives, which sets forth the 
change(s) to be made, and the intent of the Parties to modify or amend this 
Agreement 
25, If any provision of this Agreement, by way of this lostrument or otherwise, or the 
application thereof, shall for any reason and to any extent be found invalid or 
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this Agreement 
with all remaining clauses, directives, provisions, Parties, and circumstances, with 
my application thereof, shall continue in Ml force to the maximum extent 
permissible under applicable law. Concerning any successfully challenged provision 
in this instrument, insofar as it is reasonable and possible, shall be GOVERNED BY 
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
26, This Parties to this Agreement hereby agree that any action on this Agreement shall 
be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction located in Heber City, Utah, which 
is located in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Wasatch, State of Utah. 
27. The successful party to any action arising in connection with the enforcement of this 
Agreement shall be awarded its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby set their hands and 
respective seals on the day and date set forth below. 
ADVANCED MAINTENANCE SERVICES INC. 
— B y _ 
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Defendants also assert that plaintiffs* present position is somehow illegitimately contrary to 
the position stated in the Complaint. This is nonsense. 
The Complaint presumes that defendants had destroyed the copy of the $10,000/month 
agreement they signed. They admit an attempt to destroy it Certainly, they did not voluntarily admit 
the signature, and instead routinely produced an unsigned copy, consistent with plaintiffs presumption 
that they would conceal it if they could, Plaintiffs were stunned when - apparently by mistake - the 
document turned up in a document production. 
It was plain - and remains plain - that as a matter of plenary and unarguable local law 
defendants cannot prove either that there was an oral agreement to accept $41000/month> or anything 
close to "partial performance" "strictly referable" to it. See cases cited in the Reply Memorandum. 
In that circumstance, it was always more direct to simply seek a judicial dissolution, and 
consistent with the fact that plaintiffs' share was always worth substantially more than $ 10,000/month 
in any case. Counsel did not anticipate that the Court would ignore a written and fully executed 
Stock Redemption Agreement, and other written admissions that the company had stock and 
stockholders, on the basis of inadmissible (under the Parole Evidence and hearsay rules) claims that 
someone told defendants the documents were not what they were on their face 
The matter now devolves into a defense that everything done by the parties from and after 
June 24, 2002 was "part performance'* under the Statute of Frauds of either an oral agreement 
reached June 24th to pay $ 10,000/month or an oral agreement reached July 19* to pay 54,000/month, 
Defendants do not dispute that the behavior of the parties June 24th - July 19, 2002, is entirely 
consistent with the document signed June 24, 2002 They claim only that it is also consistent with 
the "agreement" they alleged occurred July 19, 2002. 
Defendants have never bothered to understand that "partial performance'" "strictly referable'7 
to a "clearly defined" oral agreement is not some activity which might, or might not, be related to 
what might, or might not, be a requirement of what might or might not be an agreement. Thus, they 
presume that the showings necessary to demonstrate performance constituting acceptance of a written 
4 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the law or in fact for the Plaintiffs' third attempt at summary judgment 
concerning the same facts and evidence as has been previously argued unsuccessfully to this Court. 
Defendants should not have to respond time, after time, after time, to the same unmeritorious argument 
because Plaintiffs and their counsel are disappointed and contemptuous of the result. 
In the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, they raised the same argument about the typed 
counterpart signed by Mr. Porter, which matter was already considered by the Court. The Court has again 
found that their remain issues of material fact concerning whether there was a meeting of the minds 
sufficient to support an agreement, and the terms of that agreement, and whether the agreement reached by 
the parties is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The Plaintiffs continually emphasize that the 
agreement was subject to change depending upon the continuance of the business between the Porter's 
company and 7-Eleven. However, in their latest contrived argument, they seek to have the Court 
conveniently ignore the totality of the record for the period between June 22, 2002 and October 21, 2002, 
and have taken the signed counterpart completely out of its factual context relating to the termination of 
AMS by 7-Eleven, and the conversations Mr. Cowley had with 7-Eleven representatives after June 22,2002 
and prior to July 19, 2002. The Cowley's latest argument is simply a tortured, unreasonably limited 
commentary on a broader complex set of undisputed facts which has already been determined - twice - by 
this Court to be without merit for purposes of summary judgment. There is nothing new before the Court 
to support some new ruling. The Court has ruled, and the case should proceed to trial as scheduled on these 
issues. 
The Court should note at this point that the Plaintiffs have completely abandoned the theories 
underlying the Complaint by which they commenced this action. Plaintiffs, in the Complaint claimed that 
there was no oral or other agreement reached between the parties, and based upon the lack of an agreement 
-8-
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were seeking judicial dissolution of AMS. Now, without any amendment to the Complaint, they are wholly 
relying on the existence of an agreement which is nowhere mentioned in the Complaint, and which is based 
solely upon their spin on the facts established by this Court in denying their two prior summary judgment 
requests. Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways, where they simply seem to be adopting a new legal theory 
of the moment as they deem convenient in order to avoid having to bring their claims to trial. The Plaintiffs' 
latest attempt at summary judgment lacks credibility because the Plaintiffs' cannot even figure out what it 
is they are claiming or suing for in this case at this point, because the record evidence and the court's prior 
rulings have resulted in a finding that there was an agreement, which completely eliminates the Plaintiffs' 
position set forth in the Complaint. Plaintiffs latest spin on its motion for summary judgment is merely an 
inappropriate attempt at damage control where their previous theories have wholly failed to cajole 
Defendants into paying them more money than was agreed to on July 19, 2002. 
Plaintiffs' have completely mischaracterized the facts and Defendants' defense on those facts to 
their latest theory. The alleged written agreement on which Plaintiffs now seek to rely was not signed by 
Plaintiff Tracy Cowley. Not only was it not signed, but Mr. Cowley, in his own handwriting indicated his 
lack of assent to its terms by stating that he had issues to discuss. Thereafter, Mr. Porter, crumpled up the 
paper and threw it away. It would not exist, except for the fact that Mrs. Porter retrieved it from the garbage 
and kept it in her own file, unbeknownst to either Slone Porter or Tracy Cowley. There is no evidence that 
either Tracy Cowley or Slone Porter ever intended to be bound by the terms of that writing after June 24, 
2002, and particularly after 7-Eleven fired Tracy Cowley and AMS after Mr. Cowley's telephone 
conversation with Ann Atkin. There is no evidence of mutual assent to the terms of that writing. The 
Plaintiffs now only argue otherwise for their own convenience and out of desperation having lost the issue 
on whether there was some agreement. There latest argument simply begs the question as to whether there 
-9-
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6. Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter agreed to dissolve AMS. 
7. The Porters have performed part of the agreement by making monthly payments 
on the Cowleys' truck, and by making payments of $4,000 per month to SLS beginning August 5, 
2002, paying the Cowleys' health insurance premiums through December 31, 2002, transferring a 
piece of property owned by Listo, Inc. to the Cowley Family Trust, transferring ownership of two 
additional Ford trucks, and transferring Tracy Cowley's life insurance policy from AMS to SLS. 
RULING 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law," Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A corporation may be dissolved voluntarily if (1) no stock has been issued, an act of a 
majority of its directors or a majority of its incorporators is sufficient to dissolve a corporation, 
Utah Code § 16-10a-1401,or (2) stock has been issued, a vote of the majority of the shareholders 
is sufficient to dissolve a corporation, Utah Code § 16-10a-1402. The Court finds that there is a 
material dispute of fact regarding whether AMS issued stock. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that a verbal buy-out agreement was reached, 
but they disagree as to the materials terms of the agreement. The Court finds that there is a 
material dispute of fact as to which offer was accepted as the buy-out agreement between the 
parties. 
The Court finds that all buy-out offers violate the Statute of Frauds. The Statue of Frauds 
requires that any agreement regarding interests in real estate or agreements that cannot be 
performed within one year to be in writing or they are void. Utah Code § 25-5-1, 4(1). Both 
alleged agreements consist of the transfer of property and payments to be made over a period of 
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years. These agreements would be void under the Statue of Frauds unless the agreement has been 
partially performed. Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002). The Court finds that there 
are material disputes of fact regarding whether sufficient part-performance has been completed 
that would allow this Court to enforce the oral agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that there are material issues of fact regarding the issues in this case, 
therefore, the Court hereby denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for 
Plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling, submit it to counsel for 
Defendant, and then to the Court for execution. 
DATED this ^  day of February, 2*04. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY AND KERIN COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SLONE AND VERAL YNN PORTER, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 030500244 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and Defendants' 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the 
memoranda filed by the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, issues the following: 
RULING 
Defendants' brought their Motion to Reconsider under Rule 59 and Rule 52 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court notes that Motions to Reconsider are disfavored, however, 
Rule 59 allows the Court to amend the judgment if there has been an error of law. 
Additionally, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to show that this Court erred as a 
matter of law. This Court can grant Motions for Summary Judgment only if there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has found 
and still finds that there are genuine disputes as to material facts of this case, such as what 
agreement was reached by the parties, whether the parties agreed to dissolve AMS, and whether 
AMS issued stock. The Court's mistake on the date of additional offers does not change the fact 
that are genuine issues of material fact in this case, therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
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For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider is denied, and that Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is denied. Counsel for 
Defendant prepare an Order consistent with this ruling, submit it to Defendants for review, and 
then to the Court for execution. 
4 
DATED this / day of February,s2004 
DONALDTTEYRE, 
Ruling Page 2 
v \ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 03 0500244 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JEFFERY R PRICE 
ATTORNEY DEF 
13 9 E SOUTH TEMPLE STE 320 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail E CRAIG SMAY 
ATTORNEY DEF 
174 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated t h i s H day of J"g,|flrM&rl4 2o£X£_-
Cr\Ajyy\ (j, / 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 ( l a s t ) \ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
STAT." 
W.V. . J :..'Y 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case Number: 030500244 
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr. 
The Court has amended its Ruling of December 17,2003, apparently concluding, as argued 
by defendants, that plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was cognizable only insofar as it was 
treated as a Rule 52 motion to correct mistakes in findings. Thus, the Court, regarding the Motion 
as "a request to correct a mistake", "has changed the incorrect dates". 
In fact, "Trial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their positions with 
respect to any orders or decisions as long as no final judgment has been rendered." Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968,973 (Utah 2002) quoting U.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen 7, Inc., 
990 P.2d 945 (Utah 1999); Hall v. Utah State Bd. Of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 962 (Utah 2001) 
("[I]t is well settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decisions at any point prior to entry 
of a final judgment or order," quoting Ron Shepard, Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650,654 (Utah 1994). 
In Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 891 (U. Apps. 1995), it is said that 
"Reviewing courts will analyze such motions for reconsideration in accordance with their substance 
and purpose", and " . . . the Davis' motion to reconsider is the functional equivalent of a Rule 59 
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motion requesting a new trial" Thus, a "motion to reconsider" (by that or any equivalent name) is 
appropriate, not only under Rule 52, but on any of the grounds stated in Rule 59, U.R.C.P., and 
suffices to alter the entire ruling. 
In fact, plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration was specifically brought under Rule 59, and 
recited three grounds listed in the rule (Rule 59(a)(4), (6), and (7)), namely, mistake of fact, mistake 
of law, and new evidence. All three grounds were either admitted or wholly uncontested. Defendants 
admit that the Court's December 17th findings contain mistakes of fact, and that Slone Porter signed 
the written counteroffer tendered by plaintiffs June 24, 2002, a fact not previously acknowledged. 
They do not contest that a writing signed by a single party charged with performance satisfies the 
Statute of Frauds, or that the question whether acts which are all admitted constitute "part 
performance" under the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. 
The reason motions to "reconsider" are not entertained unless based upon factors which allow 
correction of judgments under the Rules, is to encourage finality {Davis v. Grand County Service 
Area, supra); on the other hand, such motions lie where based upon such factors, at least because 
otherwise such factors justify immediate amendment and re-filing of the proceeding sought to be 
reconsidered. A motion for summary judgment may always be renewed where previously 
unacknowledged facts become undisputed, and the applicable law changes in response. 
Insofar as the Court did not reconsider the matter in light of the admitted change of facts, and 
that such facts in light of the uncontested law render the December 17th Ruling moot, plaintiffs re-
submit these matters by filing the following further Motion for Summary Judgment. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. June 22, 2002, defendants offered plaintiff, among other things, $10,000/month for five 
years for plaintiffs' share of Advanced Maintenance Systems ("AMS"). Ruling 12/17/03, Undisputed 
Fact No. 14. 
2. Plaintiffs did not immediately accept the terms offered by defendants. (This eliminates 
2 
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Disputed Material Fact No. 4, Amended Ruling of February 9, 2004.) 
3. June 24, 2002, plaintiffs made a counteroffer, adding provisions relating to non-
competition and vehicle payments. Id., Undisputed Fact No. 16. Veralynn Porter reduced the 
counteroffer to writing. 
4. June 24, 2002, defendant Slone Porter "in anticipation of Tracy Cowley accepting the 
proposal" signed the counteroffer as typed by Veralynn Porter. Defendants' Opposition to Motion 
for Reconsideration at 3; Exhibit "A" hereto. 
5. Plaintiffs accepted, by orally representing that the typed terms of this counteroffer were 
acceptable to them. Ruling 12/17/03, Undisputed Fact No. 16; Defendants' Supplemental 
Memorandum 11/14/03, Material Fact No. 3. This eliminates Disputed Material Fact No. 6, 
Amended Ruling 02/09/04. Mr. Cowley indicated that he wished Mrs. Cowley, who was away, to 
be present when he signed; defendants assert that no approval of Mrs. Cowley was necessary. 
6. Plaintiffs then fully performed the $10,000/month agreement on their side by turning the 
business over to defendants and vacating the premises, by June 29,2002, more than two weeks prior 
to any alleged discussion of purchasing plaintiffs' share for $4,000/month. Defendants accepted this 
performance without reservation. Second Affidavit of Slone Porter, H 111. 
7. Defendants then partially performed the agreement on their side by transferring bank and 
investment accounts, transferring realty, and continuing payments on vehicles and insurance, prior 
to any alleged offer to pay $4,000/month. Id. at ffi{ 109, 121, 127. 
8. Defendants assert that on June 27,2002, AMS was "fired" by Johan de Besch of 7-Eleven, 
its main customer. The facts underlying this assertion are: 
a. On June 25, 2002, following the agreement reached June 24, 2002, defendants 
incorporated Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS"), with all of the stock in the names of defendants. 
Id. at H 122. 
b. On June 27,2002, defendants and 7-Eleven agreed that the business of AMS for 7-Eleven 
would be continued by the employees of AMS, except the Cowleys, using the equipment, expertise, 
3 
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offices and management of AMS, under the name of QMS, on a "time and materials" basis, pending 
completion of an investigation of defendants' prior behavior. This followed Cowleys' representation 
to 7-Eleven that they would withdraw. That is, defendants, as QMS, received everything part of 
AMS - its business with 7-Eleven, its employees, its equipment, its offices, its accounts, its goodwill -
except plaintiffs Cowley. Id. atffi[ 102-103, 106, 111, 134. 
c. In October, 2002, upon favorable completion of the investigation, the contracts with 7-
Eleven previously held by AMS were renewed with QMS. 
d. There is no evidence that the business of AMS transferred to QMS was worth a penny less 
after June 27, 2002 than before June 22, 2002, or produced less income from 7-Eleven. 
9. July 19, 2002, defendants proposed that they pay plaintiffs $4,000/month for five years, 
other considerations remaining as previously agreed. Second Affidavit of Slone Porter, ]f 98, 112-
114. Plaintiffs assert that this was proposed and agreed as a temporary discount, until 7-Eleven 
confirmed that defendants could continue to work for 7-Eleven. The latter occurred in October, 
2002. Defendants claim that it was agreed by Mr. Cowley, but not by Mrs. Cowley, as a permanent 
discount. Immediately upon hearing plaintiflFs' response, defendants executed and filed Articles of 
Dissolution for AMS, representing that it had no shares or shareholders. Amended Ruling 02/09/04, 
Undisputed Fact No. 22. Defendants subsequently tendered to plaintiffs a written "Share Transfer 
and Settlement Agreement", designating Cowley and Porter as the "shareholders" of AMS, and 
purporting to set out the terms "agreed" on July 19, 2002. Defendants' Memorandum 09/29/03, 
Exhibit "29". 
10. Following July 19, 2002, defendants made four payments of $4,000 to plaintiffs before 
plaintiffs, in October, 2002, objected that such payments were insufficient, and threatened suit. 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
For purposes of the Statute of Frauds, a written contract is enforceable if it is "signed" by the 
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party against whom enforcement is sought.1 "The following agreements are void unless the 
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement " § 25-5-4, U.C.A. (1953). This does not mean that the contract 
is not subject to other defenses. It means that a written contract "signed" by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought, and regardless of whether it is signed by the opposite party, is not within the 
Statute of Frauds. Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 34 (U. Apps. 1993); cf. 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).2 That the signing party now claims that the 
contract was not "executed,"or valid, or is avoidable (because not delivered after signing, or 
otherwise) is a contract defense; the Statute of Frauds is satisfied by the signature. LeVine v. 
Whitehouse, 109 Pac 2, 5-6 (Utah 1910). 
Of course, one who signs an agreement, and thus procures full performance from the other 
party, cannot then disavow the obligation to pay on the ground that the performing party did not sign 
the document. Commercial Union, supra. 
PERFORMANCE 
A contract is not defective for lack of "mutuality" because it is only signed by one party. 
LeVine v. Whitehouse, supra. A party may indicate acceptance in other ways, including orally and 
may obtain specific performance so long as he is prepared to perform on his side. Id.\ Commercial 
Union, supra. The latter ceases to be an issue where the non-signing party has fully performed. Id. 
1
 "The memorandum prescribed by the Statute of Frauds is usually required by the Statute 
to be signed by the 'party to be charged' . . . [t]he quoted words are held to refer, not to the party 
or parties 'charged' with the contract, but to the party or parties 'charged' in the action; that is, 
the defendant or defendants. And, the fact that the plaintiff has not signed the memorandum does 
not affect his right to maintain the action." LeVine v. Whitehoase, 109 Pac 2, 6 (Utah 1910). 
2
 "The Statute of Frauds does not reach the substance of contracts and render them valid 
or invalid; it simply furnishes a rule of evidence. Whenever, therefore, any agreement is enforced 
against a defendant who has signed it by a plaintiff who has not, it cannot be said that the 
agreement, so far as it purports to bind the plaintiff, is a nullity. In a suit against him the statute 
does no more than require a certain kind of proof, in case he avails himself of it as a defense. The 
defense, however, is wholly a personal one; and, if he neglects to set it up, the agreement would 
be established against him notwithstanding the statute." LeVine, supra, 109 Pac. at 6. 
5 
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Here, it is conceded not only that defendants signed the agreement as an acceptance presuming that 
plaintiffs accepted, but that plaintiffs indicated their acceptance orally, and then fully performed, 
before any demand for reduction of the price was made. 
Defendants insist that Mrs. Cowley need never have accepted defendants' offer to buy; only 
Mr. Cowley had anything to sell. They also insist that Mr. Cowley, on June 24,2002, "accepted" the 
terms which he then proposed and which Veralynn Porter had then typed and Slone Porter had then 
signed. See Exhibit "A"; Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum 11/14/03, Material Fact No. 3. 
Insofar as plaintiffs did not disavow this acceptance (they have denied only acceptance of the 
subsequent offer of $4,000/month), defendants cannot.3 Defendants concede that they signed 
plaintiffs' counteroffer, intending to accept, and that plaintiffs then orally affirmed their acceptance. 
If plaintiffs now choose not to assert the Statute of Frauds as a defense, defendants cannot assert it 
for them. LeVine, supra, 109 Pac. at 6. 
Further, the only performance required of plaintiffs Cowley under the "Partnership Buy-out", 
Exhibit "A", is that implied by paragraph 1 ("Slone Porter will keep all Advanced Maintenance 
Services, Inc. as it currently exists.") and required by paragraph 7 ("Cowley family telephones will 
be returned July 14, 2002"). Both have been accomplished by timely surrender of the phones and by 
turning over the business no later than June 29,2002. That plaintiffs fully performed in these respects 
is conceded. That defendants fully accepted this performance before anyone suggested that it was 
worth a penny less than $10,000/month for five years is equally conceded. 
Any question that might be based upon the claim that AMS was "fired" by 7-Eleven on or 
about June 27,2002, is immaterial. Whatever "fired" means in this claim, it did not prevent the work 
of AMS for 7-Eleven being transferred to defendants, acting as QMS, on a temporary "time and 
3
 Plaintiffs have indicated from the outset that, under the Statute of Frauds, a far better 
case of "part performance" of an agreement to pay $10,000/month for five years was shown, 
since defendants admitted making this offer, and then admitted that plaintiffs had accepted it. 
Until defendants admitted plaintiffs' acceptance (in proceedings on plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment) it was unnecessary to pursue "part performance": the Court could simply 
value the interest co— in a judicial dissolution proceeding. To avoid a fair evaluation, defendants 
claim "part performance" of a $400 deal, acceptance of which they can't prove. 
6 
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materials" basis. No one claims that basis produced less income for the work. No one claims that 
QMS could have done the work without the employees, offices, equipment and expertise of AMS. 
It is admitted that this condition was imposed by 7-Eleven as much because of questions about prior 
behavior of defendants as because of questions about plaintiffs, and that such questions were resolved 
in favor of AMS by October, 2002. The latter resulted in re-institution of contracts for the 7-Eleven 
work. There is no claim that these contracts were upon less favorable terms. That is, there is no 
question that plaintiffs performed the transfer of AMS required by the "Partnership Buy-Out", Exhibit 
"A", or that the transfer resulted in any diminishment in value. It does not matter that such value was 
not confirmed until October, 2002: the only performance required of plaintiffs was the transfer, which 
had occurred in June, 2002. 
Plaintiffs' acceptance of the $10,000/month agreement was long ago established by 
performance. Commercial Union, supra, 863 P.2d at 34; R.L Daum Const Co, v. Child, 247 P.2d 
817, 819-20 (Utah 1952); Walters v. Natl Beverage Co., 402 P.2d 524, 525 (Utah 1967). 
The obvious fact is that, prior to plaintiffs' transfer of the business, defendants' choices were 
two: insist upon an unfair price, such as $260,000, and plaintiffs would refuse to sell, devaluing the 
interests of both; pay plaintiffs a fair price, and the interests of both would be preserved, as actually 
occurred. Having obtained a transfer by trick, defendants now attempt to enforce a cheap price by 
trick; but the law declines to enforce such agreements, either as without consideration or as contracts 
of adhesion. 
APPLICABILITY OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The agreement between the parties to buy and sell plaintiffs' share of AMS for $ 10,000/month 
for five years fully satisfies the Statute of Frauds. It is shown by a writing signed by the party 
charged, and has been fully performed by the charging party. It is fully enforceable. 
A prior agreement on the subject being shown, a subsequent agreement could only function 
as a modification. Any modification - such as the alleged July 19,2002 agreement to buy and sell at 
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$4,000/month for five years - was also required to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. S.C.M. Land Co. 
v. Watkins&Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986). 
More importantly, even a subsequent modification which satisfied the Statute of Frauds would 
have to be supported by a new consideration. That is, in the present case, some diminishment in the 
value of the interest conveyed resulting from the behavior of plaintiffs, justifying a decrease in the 
amount payable to plaintiffs. Mclntyre v. AjaxMining Co., 60 Pac. 552, 556 (Utah 1899); Brodie 
v. Gen. Chemical Corp., 934P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1997); Shanghai Investment Co. v. AltekaCo., Ltd., 
993 P.2d 516 (Ha. 2000); Bennett v. Farmers'Ins. Co., 26P.3d 785 (Or. 2001). In fact, defendants 
do not even claim that the value of AMS changed between June 24, 2002 and July 19, 2002. 
Thus, while it might be said that questions of fact remain regarding what happened on July 
19, 2002, and thereafter, they are not substantial questions. Whatever happened, it could not have 
resulted in the contract alleged by defendants. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Defendants orally proposed to purchase plaintiffs' interest in AMS for $ 10,000/month for five 
years, with supplementary terms. Plaintiffs made some oral additions to the supplementary terms, and 
counter-offered. Defendants orally accepted the changes. Defendant Veralynn Porter then typed the 
agreement, and defendant Slone Porter signed it. Plaintiffs orally indicated their acceptance. 
All of that occurred on June 24, 2002, before the parties met on June 27, 2002, with Mr. de 
Besch, of 7-Eleven, and any decisions were made regarding a continuing relationship between 7-
Eleven and the parties. 
Mr. de Besch, on June 27th or thereafter, decided that, in view of plaintiffs' prior agreement 
to withdraw from AMS, the business of 7-Eleven could continue to be done by the employees, 
equipment and management of AMS. Defendants, on June 25, 2002, immediately following the 
agreement with plaintiffs, had incorporated QMS, to which they then transferred the employees, 
equipment, offices and, after June 27,2002, the remaining accounts of AMS, including the 7-Eleven 
8 
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account. QMS then performed the work of AMS for 7-Eleven. In October, 2002, contracts for the 
7-Eleven work were re-issued to QMS. 
By June 29, 2002, plaintiffs had performed the agreement of June 24,2002, on their side, by 
relinquishing the business to defendants. Defendants accepted this performance without reservation 
and commenced compliance on their side by transferring funds and realty. Defendants could not have 
complied with their agreement to carry on the 7-Eleven work after June 27, had plaintiffs not then 
fully performed. 
Defendants assert that on July 19, 2002, they offered to pay plaintiff only $4,000/month for 
five years. They do not deny that they had previously offered $10,000/month for five years, nor do 
they withdraw their assertion that plaintiff had previously accepted the $10,000/month offer. They 
do not deny that, by July 19, 2002, plaintiffs had fully performed under the $10,000/month 
agreement. There is no evidence that the parties had left it open to defendants to bargain to lower 
the price after the transfer. 
Instead, it appears that they claim that they retained a right to rescind the prior agreement, 
and to substitute for it a different, $4,000/month agreement, so long as plaintiffs accepted. Thus, 
Slone Porter asserts, without support of other evidence, that Tracy Cowley on July 19, 2002, 
accepted the $4,000/month offer. Tracy Cowley denies it. 
The simple and complete answer to any claim of rescission and replacement is that even if 
defendants' claims about what happened on July 19,2002, were true, it would not suffice to rescind 
the prior agreement, or to substitute a $4,000/month agreement. Rescission of an old agreement and 
replacement with a new agreement must be supported with new consideration. 
Defendants at first seemed to assert that after June 27, 2002, AMS had disappeared; thus, it 
was generous of them to pay plaintiffs anything. QMS, they claimed, was a wholly new thing. The 
undisguisable fact, however, is that QMS at the outset had no employees, equipment, premises, 
management, expertise, goodwill, or accounts which had not immediately previously belonged to 
AMS. Moreover, the change in name, while convenient, was not required. 
9 
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Defendants now seem to assert that consideration for reducing the payment requirement of 
the June 24th agreement was provided by a reduction in value of the interest conveyed, due to AMS 
being "fired" by 7-Eleven on June 27, 2002. The word "fired", however, is defendants', and merely 
reflects that the willingness of 7-Eleven to continue the business it had done with AMS required the 
withdrawal of plaintiffs. As the Cowleys' withdrawal was fully comprehended - indeed, required -
by the agreement to sell at $10,000/month, the coincidence of 7-Eleven's requirement did not alter 
the agreement of the parties. 
There is no evidence that what transpired between QMS and 7-Eleven after June 27, 2002, 
was different in any degree from what would have happened between them had defendants not 
brought 7-Eleven into the matter. (Indeed, it seems plain enough that defendants went to 7-Eleven 
simply to create pressure to enforce their demand to buy plaintiffs' share of AMS, and that they 
would never have done so had they supposed that the result would be to diminish the value of what 
they got.) In particular, there is no evidence that QMS earned a penny less from work for 7-Eleven 
than it would have earned had 7-Eleven not been informed, or not objected to any past employment 
of any party. 
In short, the evidence shows no diminishment of any kind in the value of the interest for which 
defendants agreed to pay $10,000/month, and which they received. While defendants insinuate that 
plaintiffs were forced, on July 19, 2002, to "fire sale" their interest, this simply begs the question 
whether plaintiffs had not previously sold the interest by an enforceable agreement. Plaintiffs then 
had neither need nor obligation to "fire sell". Defendants then had no excuse for refusing to pay what 
they had agreed to pay. Defendants, moreover, cannot show that they would not have been pleased 
to enforce their prior bargain, had plaintiffs then put the interest on the open market. 
10 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this / / ^ day of March, 2004. 
/ 1 
ralg Smay1 
Attorney for RJamtifk 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"7* 
I hereby certify that on the / / - - day of March, 20041 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT" to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Jeffrey R. Price (6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, PC. 
139 E. South Temple, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ph: (801) 961-7400 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, 
WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kertn COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
V 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case Number' 030500244 
Judge- Donald Eyre, Jr 
THE RULING OF DECEMBER 17, 2003. SHOULD BE RECONSIDERED 
The Ruling of the Court herein December 17,2003, should be reconsidered pursuant to Rules 
52 and 59, U.R C P. for three readily established reasons* 
1. The Court has mistaken the dates of certain events, which are clearly admitted, 
2 The Court has treated as a dispute of material fact the applicability to certain admitted facts 
of the Statute of Frauds. Applicability of the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. 
3. Defendants have finally produced the signed writing which voids defendants* claims of an 
agreement of plaintiffs to accept $4>000/month for their half of Advanced Maintenance Services 
(UAMS"X and establishes a contract of defendants to pay $I0,000/month 
The position of defendants here appears to be that while defendants, on June 22,2002, orally 
offered to pay plaintiffs SlO^OO/month for five years ($600,000) for their half interest in AMS, and 
while plaintiffs orally accepted this offer on June 24, 2002, any agreement resulting was revoked and 
superceded on July 19, 2002, when defendants orally offered, and plaintiffs orally accepted, 
$4>000/month for five years ($240,000). The latter agreement is said to be outside the Statute of 
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Frauds because thereafter defendants made, and plaintiffs accepted, several payments of 
$4,000/month. 
Thus, the Court identifies the issue in the matter as "which offer was accepted as the buy-out 
agreement between the parties." Ruling 12/17/03 at 5. 
The truth, however, is that: 
1. June 22, 2000, defendants offered $10,000/month for five years, 
2> June 24, 2000, plaintiffs advised defendants that they would accept this offer, with some 
modifications. 
3. Defendants then (June 24,2002) accepted the changes proposed by plaintiffs, reduced the 
agreement to writing, and executed the writing, See Exhibit "A" hereto* 
4. Plaintiffs did not execute the writing because Mrs. Cowley was not able to be present. 
They re-affirmed their acceptance, however, and thereafter fully performed their pari of the 
agreement before defendants, on July 19, 2002, proposed to pay only $4,000/month. 
Since the Statute ofFrauds (§§ 25-5-1,25~5~4( 1), U.C. A, 1953) requires only that the writing 
setting out the agreement be signed by the party to be bound, Exhibit "A" hereto satisfies the Statute 
of Frauds, and is fully binding upon defendants. Plaintiffs' acceptance has been shown by full 
performance on their part. See CommercialUnion Association v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29,34 (U.Apps, 
1993), Plaintiffs, therefore, are entitled to fully enforce Exhibit "A". 
An agreement subject to, and which satisfies the Statute ofFrauds, can only be revoked or 
superceded by an agreement which satisfies the Statute ofFrauds. SwSCMLandCo. v. Watkins& 
Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1986), citing numerous cases. Even if there were an exception to 
this rule for revocations said to be outside the Statute ofFrauds because of partial performance, 
defendants* claim of an agreement to accept $4,000/month cannot succeed. 
As only the $4,000/month payments made by defendants after July 19, 2002, and before 
plaintiff protested them in October, 2002, could be regarded as "exclusively referable*' to an 
agreement to revoke the earlier agreement to pay $10,000/month, they could not constitute "partial 
2 
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performance" avoiding the Statute of Frauds, See below. The Court is bound to so rule, as 
applicability of the Statute of Frauds is a question of law. Spears v. Warr% infra 
THE RULING CONTAINS MISTAKES OF FACT AND LAW 
In concluding that there is a dispute of material fact which offer was accepted, the Court has 
confused the admitted dates of offers and acceptances in this matter. 
It is admitted that defendants, on June 22,2002, offered to pay plaintiffs $ 10,000/month for 
five years ($600,000) for their half of ("AMS"), and that, on June 24, 2002, plaintiffs accepted this 
offer. Undisputed Material Facts Nos. 14, 16, Ruling 12/17/03 Defendants cite Tracy Cowley's 
deposition testimony in admitting the latter fact (Defendants' Supplemental Statement of Material 
Facts, 11/24/03, No 3), and the testimony is unequivocal that the date of acceptance was June 24, 
2002.l There was not then pending defendants' subsequent offer to pay only $4,000/montlv 
It is admitted that the second offer of $4,000/month was not made until July 19, 2002 2 The 
Court's Disputed Material Fact No. 6 is simply mistaken in this respect. The Cowleys' acceptance 
of June 24,2002 could not have applied to this later offer. Nevertheless, defendants claim that Tracy 
called later the same night (July 19, 2002) and told Slone Porter that the $4;000/month offer was 
accepted. Neither the offer nor the acceptance are in writing A writing (denominated "Stock 
Purchase . . ,v) was submitted by counsel months later, but not signed. 
The Court has indicated that, in the absence of signed documents, and in view of the Statute 
of Frauds, there remains a question which proposal - the one for $10,000/month, or the one for 
$4>000/month - was accepted, In fact, by conceding Tracy Cowley's testimony on the point, 
1
 See the pages of Deposition of Tracy Cowley 11/18/03, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" It is admitted that Veralynn Porter then typed out the agreement, inserting terms sought by 
Cowleys, and tendered it to Tracy Cowley. Affidavit of Slone Porter 09/29/03, pgs. 92-93; 
Affidavit of Veralynn Porter 09/29/03, pgs. 79-81. Undisputed Material Fact No 16, Rulmg 
12/17/03, 
2
 Affidavit of Slone Porter 09/29/03, pgs, 112-114; Affidavit of Veralynn Porter 09/29/03, 
pgs, 100-103. 
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defendants admit that the first $10,000/month proposal was accepted before the second, 
$4,000/month> proposal was made That leaves only a dispute about whether the $4,000/month 
proposal was also "accepted", or whether the conversation about paying $4,000/month could have 
revoked the agreement at $10,00Q/month. 
DEFENDANTS HAVE CONCEALED A CRITICAL FACT. RECENTLY DISCLOSED 
What defendants have concealed is that the $!0,000/month offer transcribed by Veralynn 
Porter was signed by Slone Porter. The document attached to defendants' prior responses is an 
unsigned copy. 
Tracy Cowley's testimony, cited by defendants, is that when he met with the Porters on June 
24, 2002, he advised the Porters that Mrs. Cowley was away on a prior engagement, but that they 
had discussed the $10,000/month offer, and would accept it, with certain changes The Court has 
noted these changes' $30,000 for a new truck and no non-compete clause Undisputed Material Fact 
No. 16, Ruling 12/17/03. The Porters accepted the changes, and Veralynn Porter typed the 
agreement Slone Porter then signed the agreement. See Exhibit *A» attached hereto; Deposition 
of Tracy Cowley U/18/03, pgs. 190-197,199-200 (pages attached as Exhibit "B" hereto), 
Mr Cowley then said that he would prefer to sign when Mrs. Cowley returned shortly, citing 
the example of William Berg, the original third partner, who had offended his wife by signing a buy-
out agreement without informing her, 
The parties next meet with the representatives of 7-Eleven Corporation ("7-Eleven") on June 
27, 2002, It does not appear that even defendants claim an agreement on this date, except to perform 
an inventory, The Court's Disputed Material Fact No. 5 is also mistaken. Defendants have 
frequently asserted that Tracy Cowley advised 7-Eleven in these meetings of the June 24th agreement 
Mr. Cowley testifies that Slone Porter said he had shown the agreement to the 7-Eleven 
representative, Mr. de Besch Tracy Cowley Deposition at 200. In reliance upon an agreement 
having been made to buy out Mr Cowley, 7-Eleven agreed to continue doing business with AMS 
4 
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(now re-incorporated as Quality Maintenance Systems ("QMS")), dependant on a further 
investigation of any past wrongdoing by AMS, 
Plaintiffs then fully performed their part of the bargain* before defendants claim that they 
offered only $4,000/month. Plaintiffs turned over the employees, equipment, premises and business 
of AMS to defendants no later than June 29, 2002. Affidavit of Slone Porter 09/29/03, pg. 111, 
Plaintiffs, however, retained only the handwritten draft of the agreement prepared by Veralynn 
Porter prior to typing the agreement. When defendants thereafter denied the agreement, and 
produced only an unsigned copy, plaintiffs assumed that all signed copies had been lost or destroyed. 
In fact, the document signed by Slone Porter was preserved by defendants. It was not produced or 
disclosed before now. It was included in documents finally produced by defendants December 15, 
2003. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES ONLY DEPENDANTS SIGNATURE 
The applicable Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-4(1), U.C.A (1953) is as follows. 
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, sigftecfby the party to be charged with 
the agreement: (1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year . . . . 
(Emphasis added,) (Section 25-5-1 requires the signature of "the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring" an interest in realty.) 
To avoid the Statute of Frauds, the agreement need only be in a writing signed by the "party 
to be charged". Where oral acceptance by the other party is acknowledged, and full performance by 
the other party has occurred, a writing signed by the party to be charged with the remaining 
performance suffices. Commercial Union Assoc, supra. 863 P.2d at 34 Here, acceptance and 
performance by plaintiffs is acknowledged, The production, at last, of the agreement signed by 
defendant Slone Porter, the party to be charged with the remaining performance, is, therefore, 
conclusive, 
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MODIFICATION OF A WRITTEN AGREEMENT MUST BE IN WRITING 
But defendants will say that whatever happened on July 19, 2002, when they first proposed 
to pay only $4,000/month, constituted a modification of the original $10,000/month agreement. 
Utah law is entirely clear that a contract subject to the Statute of Frauds can only be rescinded 
and replaced where the new agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be bound. SCbALand Co. 
v. Waikim & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986); Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton. 863 P.2d 29 
(U. App. 1993). No such writing reflecting an agreement at $4>000/month exists, In fact, the 
evidence here establishes a written agreement to pay $10,000/month for five years ($600,000), fully 
enforceable against the Porters. 
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS A QUESTION OF LAW. NOT OF FACT 
The Court's "disputed material fact" number 8 regarding part performance of a $4>000/morrth 
agreement by defendants, is neither a question of fact, nor disputed. The occurrence of the various 
acts and payments listed is not disputed. Whether such acts constitute "part performance'* satisfying 
the statute of frauds, is not a question of fact. It is unequivocally a question of law. "The 
applicability of the statute of frauds is a question of law . ." Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 742, 751 
(Utah 2002). 
It is an undisputed fact that the only performance by defendants not related to an earlier 
"promise" to pay $10,000/month, is four payments of $4,000/month apiece That is because (a) it 
is impossible to show that "performance** - transfer of realty, payment of insurance, etc, - agreed 
upon in connection with an earlier promise to pay $ 10,000/month, and not thereafter altered, was in 
exclusive reliance upon a later "promise" to take $4,000/month; and (b) once such payments were 
contested in October, 2002, defendants could avoid "detrimental reliance" by declining to make 
further payments (and returning the business). 
As a matter of law, a short series of payments which can be refunded is not sufficient part 
performance to take an oral agreement out of the Statute of Frauds. It must be shown thatvt the 
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failure to perform on the part of the promisor [Cowleys] would result in fraud on the performer 
[Porters] who relied, since damages would be inadequate,7 Id Where damages in the form of a 
refund are available, specific performance is not 
"Part performance** is a term of art, which does not signify any performance which can be 
claimed to reflect an agreement.3 The Court is not at liberty to submit such evidence to a jury (which 
cannot exercise equity jurisdiction) to make a determination in equity whether it is sufficient to avoid 
the statute of frauds. Where the entirety of what is claimed to be part performance is admitted, the 
decision, in equity, of applicability of the statute is for the court. 
THE RULING OF DECEMBER 17™ DOES NOT DISPOSE OF THE MOTION FOR SUMM ARY 
JUDGMENT 
The Court has failed to determine plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, The claim of 
disputed questions of fact has never been a sufficient defense to summary judgment in this case since 
all facts related to "part performance* are undisputed. Conceding the occurrence of everything 
defendants can claim as acts exclusively referable to the alleged promise to accept $4>000/month, 
revoking the admitted agreement to pay $10,000/month, for plaintiffs' share of AMS? it is plain that 
they do not constitute "sufficient partial performance'* under the Statute of Frauds. 
Defendants are bound by a written agreement to pay $10,000/month for five years. Such an 
agreement could only be revoked by a writing signed by plaintiffs. Even if there were a partial 
performance exception to the latter rule4, defendants cannot satisfy it, and the Court must so hold. 
3
 Spears v. Wan, 44 P 3d 742, 751 (Utah 2002): 
The standard for sufficient partial performance in Utah is as follows. [1] the oral 
contract ami its terms must be clear and definite, [2] the acts done in performance of 
the contract must be equally clear and definite; and [3] the acts must be in reliance on 
the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they would not have been 
performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to perform on the part of 
the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who relied, since damages would 
be inadequate. Reliance may be made in innumerable ways, all of which could refer 
exclusively to the contract.. 
4
 White v. Fox 665 P,2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983), indicates that a fully executed oral 
modification may be enforced where one party has induced the other to change position in 
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Nor do the admitted facts permit a claim that somewhere in the process defendants withdrew 
the $10,000/month offer. Defendants have recited their story many times without so claiming. 
Moreover, the performance of plaintiffs' acceptance occurred immediately upon its oral 
pronouncement, and was complete by June 29, 2002, when plaintiffs vacated the AMS premises. 
Defendants could not have accepted this performance while withdrawing the offer which induced it 
and making no new offer which could have been consideration for such performance until July 19, 
2003. 
Defendants have withheld a central fact from the Court, and the Ruling contains a mistake of 
fact regarding dates of offers, and a mistake of law regarding applicability of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Court should incorporate the fact that the agreement between the parties at $ J 0,000/month was 
signed by defendants, and accepted orally and by fall performance by plaintiffs This constitutes a 
binding written agreement, which could not have been revoked by defendants' alleged oral agreement 
at $4,000. The latter, moreover, conceding everything defendants claim a$ "part performance" is 
plainly unenforceable as a matter of law under the Statute of Frauds. The Court should so rule. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29* day of December, 2003. 
E. Craig Smay T~ 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
reliance upon on oral modification, then attempts to void the oral promise by insistence upon the 
prior writing. There, plaintiffs real estate agents had induced their client to execute an irrevocable 
one-for-one exchange of properties by orally promising not to assess realtor's fees. Defendant 
would not have made the exchange, which produced no income with which to pay fees, except 
upon waiver of the fees. Plaintiffs then sought to enforce the original broker's commission. Here, 
defendants do not even claim an irrevocable change of position following the alleged promise to 
accept $4,000/month: they simply paid money, which is readily refundable. 
2 
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Nor do the admitted facts permit a claim that somewhere in the process defendants withdrew 
the $10,000/month offer. Defendants have recited their story many times without so claiming. 
Moreover, the performance of plaintiffs' acceptance occurred immediately? upon its oral 
pronouncement, and was complete by June 29, 2002, when plaintiffs vacated the AMS premises. 
Defendants could not have accepted this performance while withdrawing the offer which induced it 
and making no new offer which could have been consideration for such performance until July 19, 
2003. 
Defendants have withheld a central fact from the Court, and the Ruling contains a mistake of 
fact regarding dates of offers, and a mistake of law regarding applicability of the Statute of Frauds. 
The Court should incorporate the fact that the agreement between the parties at $10,000/month was 
signed by defendants, and accepted orally and by full performance by plaintiffs- This constitutes a 
binding written agreement, which could not have been revoked by defendants' alleged oral agreement 
at $4,000. The latter, moreover, conceding everything defendants claim as "part performance" is 
plainly unenforceable as a matter of law under the Statute of Frauds The Court should so rule, 
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E, Craig Smay 
Attorney for Plamtijffs 
reliance upon on oral modification, then attempts to void the oral promise by insistence upon the 
prior writing. There, plaintiffs real estate agents had induced their client to execute an irrevocable 
one-for-one exchange of properties by orally promising not to assess realtor's fees. Defendant 
would not have made the exchange, which produced no income with which to pay fees, except 
upon waiver of the fees. Plaintiffs then sought to enforce the original broker's commission, Here, 
defendants do not even claim an irrevocable change of position following the alleged promise to 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3 Is day of December, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION" to be mailed by U S mail, first-class postage prepaid, to 
Jeffrey R Price (6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK& PRICE, P.C. 
139 E. South Temple, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Partnership Buy-out 
Stone Portet**»'f*acy Cowley have come to an agreement to split their partnership of 
Advanced Mau&oancJ Services, inc. and Straight Line Striping, Inc. 
Hate term? of this agufenent are as follows: 
1. Stone Porter will keep all Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc, as ft currently exists. * 
2. Tiaey Cowfcy will keep ail of Straight Line Striping, Inc. as it currently exists-* 
if,Tracy O w t e v ^ b e f a i d $<W0,000VOJW* 60 months^l0,000 perriftrah with NO interest, 
due and pay able 1o fast o i the S* of each month beginning Jury 2002. 
4< ttmqtM&fcy wflVbe paid $30,000 cash for purchase of a new vehicle for SLS. 
5r Tracy Cowley w&Vbwh the property through List©, Inc. (a ifaird corpotatio^md by**ah 
parties) located at 294&faxh Center Street, Midway, Utah. The Articles of l a c o r p f c d for 
Ltsto,*lnc. will he cha^ee8"/bUowing the Deed process with Founder's Title 
6. Tracy OjvvkiyVKeaita insurance wfli be paid through July 31,2002. 
7. Cov^femiiy telephones v ^ be returned Jufy 14,2092. 
8. Skmc Porter and Tra4y Cowley have agreed to not seek legal counsel arxi this dojonnent will 
Serve as"&4ege! and bindiig contract 
Parties have agreed &> have NO nun-compete clause. 
Passes have:«^reed $ rib confidentiality clause. 
f All ^T^e^b*x»gpotatkm wiB be changed to reflect this agreement Al$ash and hard assets, 
bquytfoetnV vaaclcsiik^S, telephone numbers wiS remain the property of said 'corporations. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY 
-00O00-
TRACY and KERIN COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SLONE and VERALYNN PORTER, 
Defendants. 




TAKEN: November 18, 2 003 
Judge Donald Eyre, Jr. 
COPY -oo0oo« 
Deposition of TRACY COWLEY, taken on behalf 
of the Defendants, at the offices of Bostwick & Price/ 
One Thirty Nine East South Temple St., Suite 320, Salt 
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couple of times. 
Q, What was your relationship on June 22nd, what 
was your relationship like with Ann Atkin? 
A. You know, not terrible. I read her affidavit 
and it puzzled me. Because at the time we had been 
going — we had had one of those brand new gas pumps 
backed into by a car and just wrecked. I was working 
through either A, replaceraent; B, replace the parts, 
replace the whole part or just replace the parts. And I 
know we had had a — we had sent some E-mails back and 
forth the prior week/ right up to and including the 
Friday, 
I had updated her that Christy •- I was waiting 
on the parts from Christy at West Tech who was the 
Gilbarco distributor that we had to buy parts for the 
pump from. And I had sent her an E-mail I believe it was 
on the Thursday. On the Friday I got quite a pleasant 
E-mail back saying, *No big deal. Let ne know when they 
get the parts/ 
And I think I sent her a response on Monday, the 
24th, saying, "The parts are in and we'll get it taken 
care of this week/ 
So I realize now that certainly over the year and 
a half that I have been gone that relationship has turned 
quite sour. And obviously/ the time up to the 22nd/ 
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1 proof of that, 
2 Q. Okay, 
3 A, At the time when this all happened, I had no 
4 idea that Ann had some big grudge. I didn't know. So 
5 yes, when we had Our conversation on the 22nd, ! did not 
6 know the extent of what they hid done to make Ann feel a 
7 particular way about m 
8 Throughout the time after I left 7-11, Ann called 
9 ae at least for the first six months pretty regular on 
10 every situation that came up, "What do' 1 do? How do I 
11 handle it? what should 1 do here? How should I do this? 
12 How should I do that? We had regular conversations 
13 helping her adjust to her new job.u 
14 Q, Okay, When after the evening of th* 22nd was 
15 your next communication with the Porters? 
16 A. On a Sunday* 
17 p. On the 23rd of June? 
18 A, That would be correct. 
19 Q. Do you know what tit&c of day? 
20 A. In the afternoon/ evening. 
21 Q. Was that another meeting face-to-face? 
22 A. It was face-to-face, 
23 Q* Where did that meeting occur? 
21 A. At the AMS. office. 
25 Q. Who contacted who about tnat meeting? 
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those situations have changed where she didn't want to 
deal with ne or whatever she wants to say. But that 
recollection of E-mail didnft — at least to me I didn't 
have any indication that Ann was really unhappy with ne. 
But I also would say that I was not present on 
most of Sione's meetings with Ann, I had no idea the 
aiaount of daiaage that Slone and Vera were in the process 
of doing to roe personally. 
0, What do you mean by that? 
A* The aiaount of things they were blaming on me 
or whatever — I had no idea that they were in the 
process of this personal character sabotage they were in 
the ttiddle of. 
0, Describe for roe what you mean by that. 
A* I aean -by that/ I would refer to the 
statements on the meeting between Johan and Ann and Slone 
and Vera later on* 
Q. It happened on June 27th, correct? 
A. That's correct* That's after that. But I 
guess that helps M understand. If they are willing to 
say the things they said to Johan and to Ann then, 
certainly there were lots of things being said in their 
private meetings with Ann. 
Q. By the Porters? 
A. Yes, 1 believe. I don't know. I don't have 
1 A* I believe I called then* to find out what time 
2 we were going to meet that day. 
3 Q. Describe fcr me as you did with the previous 
4 meeting, describe for me what happened, 
5 A. Ohf we went to the office. I believe the 
6 first thing they said was, "You know, we decided that we 
7 are going to go — we'were going to go and tell Ann. We 
8 called Ann last night and are having a meeting today. We 
9 have already told her everything about AMS, its 
10 inception/ 
11 Q. Let me stop you so we can keep track of — 
12 A. I'm sorry. He is Slone. When I say he, that 
13 will refer to Slone. If 1 say she, that will refer to 
14 Veralynn, 
15 Q. I apologize. 1 just need to roake sure the 
16 transcript gets ail that correctly when we read it later. 
17 A, Absolutely. 
18 Q, $0 you and the Cowleys show up at the office? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Who was present? 
21 A, Slone and Veralynn. 
22 Q. Arid Tracy and Karen Cowley? 
23 A. That's correct, Tracy and Kerin Cowley, 
!24 Q. Anybody else there? 
25 A. Not that 1 recall. 
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1 Q. Just with that little instruction, you can 
2 help me keep the record straight, Tell m what happened. 
3 A. I prefer the record to be straight-
4 They then proceeded to tell us that following my 
5 conversation with theft on the Saturday, that they had 
6 felt it imperative that they go down and talk to Ann and 
7 make sure she knew how AMS was started, everything that 
8 had happened, and cleared their chest of any wrongdoings 
9 that they felt we had been a party to. 
[10 It always struck ae as odd that thsy waited until 
11 a year and a half after the conflict of interest was over 
12 to need to clear that, But that's their call, 
13 Q. ffhen you say conflict of interest in the year 
14 and a half, what are you talking about? 
15 A. They felt that there was a huge conflict of 
16 interest* At least that's what they said that Sunday, 
117 That was all fairly new conversation as well. We had 
talked about it in the past. But it had never been a 
119 point of heavy contention or heavy something needs to be 
[20 done about it. 
21 And we felt like » in fact, I remember when I 
22 quit we were tickled pink that that conflict of interest 
j 23 was over. I was no longer in a decision making role with 
j 24 7-11. We were going to then survive on solely what we 

























Q. But there had in fact been a conflict of 
interest problem with AMS; isn't that right? 
A. It could oe perceived as that, absolutely, 
Q. In ('act, AMS went M t of its way to make sure 
that Tracy Cowley's name and picture didn't show.up 
anywhere on AMS while you woriced at 7-U; isn't that 
right? 
A. I — you know — 1 didn't ever have my 
picture taken with the AMS guys, no. 
Q. Why not? 
A, I didn't really feel it was necessary, 
Q. Bat you were a part of the company, weren't 
you? 
A, I was, absolutely, 
Q, Finish telling me about the meeting on the 
23rd. 1 think you told me they had gone to talk to Ann? 
A. They had told us that he had gone and talked 
to Ann. We questioned their need tc do that at this 
particular point, "Why no: finish what we had started, 
and then if you want to talk to Ann, fine." 
They assured us that Ann was going to continue to 
do business with them and that we would still be able to 
stripe at that point. And I think — 
Q. tfho said that? Was that Vcralynn? Was that 
Slone? Whc was speaking for the Porters? 
1S4 
1 Q. In that 18-month time frame that you are 
2 talking about that shows up in 7-11's policy, isn't that 
3 where that 18-aonth time frame comes from? 
4 A, No, 
5 Q. Where did that come from? Why was that 
6 significant, 18 months? 
7 A. I'm missing something, 
8 Q, You told m a timite ago that it was 
9 convenient that it came up at 18 months. 
110 A. No, it surprised me that they needed to clear 
11 their chest 18 month* after I had left 7-11 and there was 
12 no conflict of interest, 
13 Q, Eight months, why is 18 months significant? 
14 A. I have.no idea. You would have to — that's 
15 the time. 
16 Q, You brought it up, 
17 A. That's the tint* frame from when I quit 7-11 
18 to when they decided that we have got to tell 7-11 about 
19 our conflict of interest. 
20 Q. And prior to that the, during the whole time 
21 at AMS there had never been a conflict of interest? 
22 A. frior to that time we had never had a 
23 discussion about needing to go talk to 7-11 to let them 
24 know that there was a conflict of interest. Never, not 
[25 once. 
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1 A. Both of them at odd tines, I don't recall 
2 which one specifically said i t , I believe i t was Sione 
3 at the time that said Ann had assured them through this 
4 breakup that we would continue to stripe. That striping 
} contract would remain in place, Everything would be 
i fine. 
7 Kerin and I Mtt^ both fairly upset because we 
8 didn't see a need at that juncture, at that point to go 
$ talk to 7-11 and tel l the whole thing. But we left at 
10 that point and scheduled a meeting the following morning. 
11 Q. How long did the meeting last? 
12 A. Not very long; laaybe 15 minutes, 
13
 J L . PJf*il-Jil l i?. y o ^ s c h ^ l e d a meeting for 
14 Moncay7~the24 t h ? " " 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. Were there any other communications between 
17 you and either of the Porters on the 23rd; on Sunday/ 
18 after that meeting? 
19 A, I donft believe so. r m not certain, but 1 
20 don't believe so. 
21 Q. So there were no further communications 
22 between the Cowleys and the Porters until Monday, the 
23 24th; is that correct? 
24 A. I believe so* 
25 Q, What happened on Monday, the 24th? 
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A. Monday, the 24th, I came into the office. I 
believe I handled a few E-mails that had been going on. 
The one that comes to mind is the one on that damaged 
pump I was working on for Ann, I made a couple of phone 
calls and then we closed the door. I believe Gail was 
out in the outer office and it was Slone and Vera and L 
Kerin had been scheduled to go to a Latter-day Saint 
girls' camp. And she had already committed to that and 
they didn't have enough leaders to have her not go. So I 
encouraged her and told her she needed to go fulfill 
that. 
Q, She left early, 1 think her testimony was 
early in the morning? 
A* At 5:00, yes. 
Q. So at some point later in the morning do I 
understand then — 
A. toh. 
Q, •• you were in this closed door meeting 
with — 
A. Yeah.. And I failed to recall, both on Sunday 
night that meeting was also recorded as well as Monday 
morning when we shut the doors and went into our 
discussions. First thing turned on was the recorder and 
Slont I believe just clarified irto the recorder that 
this meeting was between Vcraivnr. Porter and Slone Porter 
ltf 
A, %le are willing to do this." 
Q. Okay, Speaking on behalf of the Cowle/s? 
A. Speaking on behalf of the Cowleys, Slone 
reiterated again that he had spoken with Ann Atkin that 
niorning and that both the general - both the maintenance 
business would stay intact and that I would be able to 
hold the striping contract, but that we would end up 
having meetings with Johan later that week to discuss it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I asxedl specifically that as we were 
finishing this, whatever you want to call it, I saic, "So 
we are going to be able to keep the striping contract?" 
And he said, "According to ton, you will." 
Q. This was at your meeting? 
A, HOnday-
Q. T i calling it a meeting. 
A. Moncay morning at the AMS office. 
Q. Okay. How long did that meeting last? 
A. Oh — you know — not that long. I don't 
recall how long exactly. It wasn't a long, length/ 
meeting. As soon is we — as soon as 1 said, "We are 
willing to do this/ Vera wrote down all the terns that 
we had discussed on a sheet of paper. 
Q. Did she write it down by hand? 
A. YeSiShecid. 
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1 and myself. 
2 Q« Okay. 
3 A, At that point Vera had said -* you know — "I 
4 don't know if this is going to go right/ 
5 And I said, Must hear me out/ And I told her 
6 Kerin and I had discussed it on Sunday night# and that at 
7 this point we were willing to accept the offer and move 
8 on with our lives. 
9 Q, When you say accept the offer, you are now 
0 talking about the terms of what was a demand, which I 
1 think you described the demand? 
.2 A. I did describe it as a demand. And on 
.3 Monday, I did label i t a$ an offer. 
H Q. And I don't mean to make anything of 
15 distinction. I just wanted to make sure when you talk 
16 about the offer you are talking about the same terms as 
17 you described from the — 
L8 A. Absolutely. 
19 0, — from the Saturday meeting. 
!0 A. Absolutely. 
*i Q. Okay, 
B A, Vera made it very clear in Saturday's meeting 
ft that, "It was my way or the highway,* which is not really 
U a change of personality for Vera. 
25 Q. And so then you communicated to them? 
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1 Q. Okav. 
2 A. She\hen took i t over to the computer and 
3 typed i t all and put signature blames on it for Slo^and 
4 myself, 
5 I did not want to sign it until Kerin was back/ 
i because I remembered when Bill and Slone and I split up_ 
7
 initially .years earlier^ I continued to deal with Bill in 
8 my capacity w.th 7-U and 1 recalled his devastation over 
i j l l J O a d gone tnrough at aome, because he did his deal 
10 and signed everything without ever talking to his wife. 
1 i And I said, T U be happy to sign.it when Kerin 
tt q e U back from girls* camp, but i want her to physically 
I) read all of this so she knows what we are signing off on 
It at the front end/ 
15 Q. I'm sorry for looking away. I was just 
15 thinking what would happen if I did that kind of thing 
1) without my wife. 
IB A. Dead. That's how it — honestly In a 
19 business that we had all been involved in since the 
20 onset, $h^ deserved that courtesy. 
21 Q. Ho disagreement. I'm picturing Bill Berg all 
22 of a sudden getting confronted with that* 
23 A, That was brutal. And it went on for months. 
2< But so that's why I didn't sign it. Slone had actually 
25 signed the paper. When I said, "I'll sign it when Kerin 
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i oetg back/ they wadded it up and threw it away. 
2 Q. And why cid they say they did that? 
3 A.„ Because 1 wasn't going to sign it right then, 
4 They didn't say jt's nil. They just said! "We'll deal 
5 with it when she gets back,* 
6 Q. Okay. So did the paper stay in the garbage? 
7 Did it ever come out of the garbage? 
8 A, I didn't get the paper. I believe they got _. 
9 the paper. In fact, after our meeting with Johan later 
10 that week, Slone and Vera's and nine solely with Johan 
11 and Anny Slone indicated to me that he had actually 
12 showed Johan that agreement. 
13 Q. Okay, So we have the meeting on the morning 
14 of the 24th that you have just described. Is there 
15 anything else about that fleeting you haven't told me 
16 about? 
17 A. It struck me funny that that morning they had 
18 all the doorknobs out. They were changing all the locks 
19 on the building. 
20 Q* Okay. Anything else? 
21 A. That's the size of it. 
22 Q* Anything else? 
23 A. They had my computer disk — actually they 
24 had Allen come over later to di$connect my computer and 
25 take it over to my house. 
200 
AMS offices' 
A, In any kind of an official capacity, 
absolutely, yes. From that point forward the locks were 
changed. I didn't have access to that office. 
Q. Was the sign changed at the office as of that 
day' 
A. I con't recall the exact date the sign came 
down. I believe it was that day, but I'm not certain. 
And I don't know when they got the new sign up. In fact, 
you know what7 As I think about it, they were there. 
Jared was changing the locks on the doors and I believe 
one of Clay's guys was there scraping the AMS logo off 
the windows. 
Q, Off the wiidcw of the office? 
A. The door to the otfice. But I'd not certain 
on the time frame on that, 
0. That's Jared Porter you are talking about. 
And Clay would be Ciay Coleman who is VeralynrTs brother; 
is that correct? 
A. Tnat is correct. 
Q, And Clay Coleman own? a Sign company called I 
thifk CRC Signs or something to that effect? 
A. CRC Design. 
0. And his office is located conveniently right 
next to the --
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1 Q. Who was Allen? 
2 A. Alien is the guy that runs computer works in 
3 Heber. He had done our computer work in the past. 
4 Q. U he sort of the computer service technician 
$ for AMS? 
6 A. Yeah, that would be a good way to put it. 
7 Q. So at some point he came and disconnected 
8 your computer and brought it to you at your home? 
9 h Yes. 
10 Q. Was there anything different or changed about 
11 your computer? 
12 A. Sot that I recall. 
13 Q. You later at soae point l assun.e booted it up 
14 or turned it on? 
15 A. Yeah, at turned on. It was the oldest 
16 computer in the office. 









same data there? 
A. Oh, stupid roe. Yes. 
5. That was later in the day on the 24th? 
ft. I believe JO. 
Q. Did you take any personal effects with yoo 
out of the office that day? 
A. feah. That was all kind of boxed up. 
Q. Was that the last day that you were at the 
20l] 
A- Pink Palace, yes, the rental property. 
Q, — to the Midway property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which is about a block away from the AMS 
office? 
A, That is correct. 
Q. If I measured thhgs correctly? 
A. That is correct. 
Q, Eetween the AMS office and Gary and Card 
Coleman's house, then a pasture? 
A. Yes. Yes. 
Q. Khat other communications, if ^ t &4 you 
have with either Slone or Veralynn Porter on the 24th? 
A. 1 remember going home and thinking, okay, I'm 
jus: going to touch base with Ann to verify that what 
Slone has told me is correct. 
And I called her and she was very explicit that 
not only would I not retain the contract, I would no 
longer do any work for 7-11, if she had any control over 
that. 
Q. Okay. You say a telephone conversation with 
Ann Atkin? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And do you recall what time of day that 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, 
WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 




Case Number: 030500244 
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr. 
Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 59, U.R.C.P., respectfully move the Court to reconsider its ruling 
herein dated December 17, 2002, upon the grounds that: 
a. the Court has mistaken the dates of events clearly admitted; 
b. the Court has treated applicability of the Statute of Frauds as a dispute of material 
fact, rather than a question of law; and 
c. defendants have finally produced the dispositive signed writing. 
This Motion is supported by a Memorandum of authorities filed herewith. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 2003. 
It-
E. Craig Smay 
Attorney for f\ 
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I hereby certify that on the 29th day of December, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
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first-class postage prepaid, to: 
Jeffrey R. Price (6315) 
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paid at $4,000 per month, that the Porters would pay the Cowleys' health insurance costs through 
December 31, 2002, that the Cowleys would receive three trucks, that the Porters would pay the 
remaining balance on one of those trucks, that ownership SLS would be transferred to the 
Cowleys, and that the Cowleys would receive one of two properties owned by Listo, Inc. The 
Cowleys verbally accepted this offer during a phone conversation between the parties. 
7. Tracy Cowley and Slone Porter agreed to dissolve AMS. 
8. The Porters have performed part of the agreement by making monthly payments 
on the Cowleys5 truck, and by making payments of $4,000 per month to SLS beginning August 5, 
2002, paying the Cowleys' health insurance premiums through December 31, 2002, transferring a 
piece of property owned by Listo, Inc. to the Cowley Family Trust, transferring ownership of two 
additional Ford trucks, and transferring Tracy Cowley's life insurance policy from AMS to SLS. 
RULING 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A corporation may be dissolved voluntarily if (1) no stock has been issued, an act of a 
majority of its directors or a majority of its incorporators is sufficient to dissolve a corporation, 
Utah Code § 16-10a-1401,or (2) stock has been issued, a vote of the majority of the shareholders 
is sufficient to dissolve a corporation, Utah Code § 16-10a-1402. The Court finds that there is a 
material dispute of fact regarding whether AMS issued stock. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledge that a verbal buy-out agreement was reached, 
but they disagree as to the materials terms of the agreement. The Court finds that there is a 
material dispute of fact as to which offer was accepted as the buy-out agreement between the 
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parties 
The Court finds that all buy-out offers violate the Statute of Frauds The Statute of 
Frauds requires that any agreement regarding interests in real estate or agreements that cannot be 
performed within one year to be in writing or they are void. Utah Code § 25-5-1, 4(1). Both 
alleged agreements consist of the transfer of property and payments to be made over a period of 
years. These agreements would be void under the Statute of Frauds unless the agreement has 
been partially performed. Spears v. Wan, 44 P.3d 742, 751(Utah 2002) The Court finds that 
there are material disputes of fact regarding whether sufficient part-performance has been 
completed that would allow this Court to enforce the oral agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that there are material issues of fact regarding the issues in this case, 
therefore, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment The Court directs 
counsel for Defendants to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling, submit it to counsel for 
Plaintiffs for review, and to the Court for execution. 
DATED this 17th day of Dece: 
••asrv 
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E. Craig Smay #2985 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone Number (801) 539-8515 
Fax Number (801) 539-8544 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, 
WASATCH COUNTY 
Tracy and Kerin COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Slone and Veralynn PORTER. 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT 
MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case Number: 030500244 
Judge: Donald Eyre, Jr. 
INTRODUCTION 
The question presented by plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is whether defendants 
can present any evidence which could carry defendants' burden of proof to substantiate their denials 
to date that the corporation, the subject of the action, was never dissolved. The basis of defendants' 
denials is now conceded to be a claim of part performance of an otherwise void oral agreement. This 
is combined with a claim that a fully executed written Stock Redemption Agreement doesn't really 
mean the corporation had stock. 
Though it is utterly irrelevant to any defense to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
defendants provide, by way of "Introduction", a nutshell history of what they call "the demise of a 
business association". The account is a fairy tale. Only the toads are real. To correct this obvious 
attempt at diversion, the facts (more fully elaborated, with citations to the record, pg. 12 infra), at 
last admitted (some inadvertently), are as follows: 
*- +\ n F it ~ ~A * 
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THE FORMATION 
In December, 1995, defendant Slone Porter, a discharged employee of 7-Eleven, and plaintiff 
Tracy Cowley, a continuing employee of 7-Eleven, together with William Berg, a non-employee of 
7-Eleven, formed Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. ("AMS"), to provide maintenance services 
to 7-Eleven and others. AMS then purported to be owned by William Berg. 
THE TRICKERY 
The 7-Eleven Code of Business Conduct ("CBC"), adopted in January 1996, supposing it was 
applicable to a company formed in 1995, forbade 7-Eleven's relationship with AMS because of the 
ownership of former employee Slone Porter. It did not forbid the relationship with a current 
employee, Tracy Cowley. 
THE SUCCESS 
AMS prospered. In March, 2001, Tracy Cowley left 7-Eleven to work for AMS. This fact, 
and Cowley's ownership in AMS, was then disclosed to the powers-that-be at 7-Eleven. 
The relationship of 7-Eleven with Cowley, now a former employee, then became forbidden 
by the CBC. The former employee prohibition lasts five years; thus it had then lapsed for Slone 
Porter. Despite Cowley's status, 7-Eleven continued and expanded the relationship with AMS. 
THE BUY-OUT 
Eighteen months later, defendants offered to buy out plaintiffs' half of AMS. The main term 
of the offer was payment of $10,000/month for five years ($600,000). Plaintiffs suggested instead 
that they buy out defendants on the same terms. 
To avoid the latter result, and believing that the prohibition against relationships of 7-Eleven 
with former employees lasted only two years, defendants wasted no time in complaining of plaintiff 
Cowley to 7-Eleven. 7-Eleven determined inter alia, to investigate all past transactions with AMS 
2 
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for improper charges. 
THE INVESTIGATION 
7-Eleven never "fired" AMS. It took the position that it could not publicly continue the 
relationship with AMS under the same name, but that, if Cowley sold-out, AMS was re-incorporated 
under another name, and the investigation proved negative, 7-Eleven would continue with the re-
incorporated company. If the investigation proved positive, 7-Eleven would terminate and seek 
redress against both Cowleys and Porters. 
Cowleys then agreed to discuss the $ 10,000/month offer with changes proposed by Cowleys. 
Tracy Cowley moved out of the AMS offices. QMS ("Quality Maintenance Systems") was 
incorporated by defendants and the business of AMS was transferred to it. The "A" in the logo on 
equipment was changed to "Q". 
Defendants then asserted that until the 7-Eleven investigation was completed, and they were 
assured of the 7-Eleven business, they could only pay $4,000/month. Plaintiffs agreed to accept that 
sum temporarily, and resume discussion of the price when 7-Eleven completed its investigation. 
The 7-Eleven investigation was completed with a negative result by October, 2002 and the 
business relationship was fully restored. Plaintiffs then sought resumption of the buy-out 
negotiations. 
THE BAIT-AND-SWITCH. 
Defendants then claimed that plaintiffs' acceptance of $4,000/month from July to October 
constituted an enforceable oral agreement to sell for $4,000/month for five years ($240,000). The 
result of the transfer of the business of AMS to QMS, therefore, would be that Porters received 100% 
of the value of their half of AMS, plus 60% of the value of Cowleys' half, and Cowleys received no 
more than 40% of the value of their half. 
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STRUT YOUR MUTT 
This transparent bait-and-switch, tricked out in fresh lipstick and high heels, is now paraded 
by defendants as a "fraud" and "a pattern and practice of deceipt (sic), coercion and manipulation of 
the Porters by the Cowleys." Defendants do not even attempt to show the elements of fraud, or 
anything that could reasonably be called "coercion". 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Defendants seem to suppose that so long as the word "genuinely" is used before the word 
"disputed", it is permissible to assert, in response to a properly supported statement of facts on 
summary judgment, the bare, unsupported denials of their Answer. Rule 56 (e) forbids such a course. 
Defendants have "genuinely disputed" nine of twelve facts set out in plaintiffs' Motion, 
without disclosure of a basis for any denial. Many of the facts "genuinely disputed" are simply 
recitations of the contents of documents which are admitted. The remainder follow from facts 
previously admitted. 
The following observations, set out with each fact"genuinely disputed", show that, once again, 
defendants' denials are wholly irresponsible and in bad faith. 
"2. Exhibitc A' to the Complaint was in full force and effect as of July 1, 2002". Exhibit "A" 
is the admitted Stock Redemption Agreement for AMS. As defendants now claim that their alleged 
agreement to buy plaintiffs' share of AMS was not made until July 19, 2002, Exhibit "A" must have 
been in effect July 1, 2002. 
"4. On or about July 19, 2002, Slone Porter, purporting to be the President of Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc., signed and, on or about July 22, 2002, filed with the Utah Department 
of Commerce the Articles of Dissolution for Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a copy of which 
is Exhibit 'B' to the Complaint." This statement simply reflects the contents of the document, the 
filing of which was previously admitted. Porter clearly denotes himself "President", and dates his 
signature July 19, 2002. The filing date is shown as July 22, 2002. 
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"5. Insofar as Exhibit 'B' purports to reflect an action taken by "the directors or 
incorporators" of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. on July 1,2002, it reflects the action of Slone 
Porter only." The document plainly purports to be on behalf of the directors and incorporators of 
AMS. The only signature on it is Slone Porter's, and it is otherwise admitted that Slone Porter was 
then the only director of AMS. 
"6. As of July 1, 2002, plaintiff Tracy Cowley was the owner of 50% of the stock of 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation." Cowley's 50% ownership of AMS is 
otherwise admitted; that AMS had issued stock is shown by Exhibit "A". 
"7. Unless terminated by the execution and filing of Exhibit CB', the stock ownership of AMS 
from and after July 1, 2002, was as shown by Exhibit CA'." It is admitted that no other dissolution 
of AMS than Exhibit "B" was ever filed. If Exhibit "B" was ineffective, Exhibit "A" necessarily 
remains in effect. 
"8. A majority of the shareholders of Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. has never 
approved the filing of the Articles of Dissolution, Exhibit 'B' ." Exhibit "B" purports to be the act 
of directors and incorporators of AMS. There is no evidence that the matter was ever submitted to 
shareholders. 
"9. Defendants have solicited the approval, by plaintiffs, of a written agreement to dissolve 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., upon terms approved by defendants, but plaintiffs have 
declined to execute such agreement." The submission of two proposed writings by defendants to 
plaintiffs, one reflecting an offer of $10,000/month and one reflecting an offer of $4,000/month, is 
otherwise admitted. The drafts are not signed by plaintiffs. 
"11. As of July 1, 2002, Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation, was a 
going concern." Insofar as defendants assert an agreement to dissolve AMS not reached until July 
19, 2002, this must be true. 
"12. Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., has not been administratively, or judicially 
dissolved." As defendants admit No. 10 ("Except for Exhibit 'B', no articles of dissolution for 
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Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., have been filed."), they cannot truthfully deny No. 12. 
Where some extraordinary basis is claimed for denying facts which on their face are true, or 
where denial is made to avoid an extraordinary reading of the fact asserted not readily apparent on 
its face, a factual basis for denial must be stated. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. It does not avoid 
the rule to merely reiterate denials in the Answer under the rubric, "This statement by the Cowleys 
is genuinely disputed by the Porters." 
Defendants' "genuine disputes" are inadequate as a matter of law. Plaintiffs' statement of 
material facts must be affirmed in its entirety. 
"MATERIAL FACTS" 
The vast bulk of the statements defendants denote "material facts" are wholly immaterial and 
irrelevant to any issue raised on the Motion. These include at least those numbered 5-11,13-26,28-
38,40-54,58-78,83,93-95,99-100,148-149,154-171. It is unnecessary to respond formally to any 
of these claims. Many, in addition to being irrelevant, are "scandalous" within the meaning of Rule 
12(f), U.R.C.P. - e.g. 5, 19-20, 43-45, and 157-158. 
Of the assertions which have general relevance, the vast majority are supported only by the 
self-serving affidavits of defendants, including at least those numbered 26,39,79-80,85-90,98,105-
113, 116-117, 119, 122, 124-126, 128, 130-133, 135, 141-142, 144-147, and 151-152. Insofar as 
any of these attempts to assert that plaintiffs agreed to accept payments of $4,000/month for their 
interest in AMS, they have been denied by the previous affidavit of Tracy Cowley. 
Some of the relevant assertions have some support in addition to the affidavits of defendants. 
These include 81, 84, 96-97, 104, 114-115, 118, 121, 127, 129, 134, 137-140, 143, 150 and 153. 
These are generally uncontroversial, and to the extent corroborated by an independent source, 
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uncontroverted. Of the remainder, 102 and 123 are entirely unsupported by the material cited. 
The first sentence of the last statement, No. 172, is a conclusion of law, based upon the 
second sentence, an argument purporting to be a fact. The statement summarizes defendants' 
position in its entirety: "disputes of material fact" regarding whether the parties made an oral 
agreement to dissolve AMS are sufficient to overcome the Statute of Frauds rendering any such oral 
agreement void; thus, defendants properly denied that AMS had not been dissolved. The difficulty 
with this position is the long-standing Utah rule that disputes of fact are never sufficient to overcome 
the Statute of Frauds. See infra, pg. 18 et seq. Defendants' assertion that its denials are based 
merely upon "disputes of fact" whether an oral agreement of dissolution existed is a confession that 
the denials are without basis and in bad faith. 
As a general proposition, defendants' Statement of Material Facts is rife with hearsay and 
generally lacking in adequate foundation. It is unnecessary, however, to particularize these and 
similar objections, since the Statement of Material Facts is not cited even once in the "Argument". 
It is sufficient, with respect to the limited "facts" recited in the "Argument", to address them in 
addressing the argument itself. 
AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF SOUGHT 
For reasons not apparent, defendants claim that plaintiffs have failed to cite the authority 
under which they seek judicial dissolution of AMS. In fact, plaintiffs have repeatedly cited Sections 
16-10a-1430 and 1431, U.C.A. (1953), which govern judicial dissolution. Presumably, defendants' 
oversight in this regard reflects their claim that wilful ignorance of the obvious is a proper basis for 
denial. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants' ponderous filing prompts two questions: (1) is any of the material attached as 
exhibits relevant to the issue raised on the Motion for Summary Judgment (i.e., was AMS properly 
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dissolved); and (2) was any relevant material unavailable at the time defendants made a Rule 56(f) 
motion? The plain answers are "very little" and "no". The question that next arises is whether 
anything in the Opposition justifies defendants' denials to date that AMS was never properly 
dissolved. Again, the answer is "no". 
Defendants by their filing raise two objections to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
first is that, while a half interest in a corporation having shares to issue was admittedly conveyed to 
plaintiffs, plaintiffs lacked the right of shareholders to object to defendants' unilateral dissolution of 
the company, because stock certificates were not issued. The second, as predicted, is that there has 
been partial performance of an oral agreement to sell plaintiffs' interest to defendants. 
The first ground is wrong as a matter of law. See infra, pg. 10 et seq. Quite literally none 
of the materials attached to defendants' Opposition, except Exhibit "10", the Stock Redemption 
Agreement, and Exhibit "29", a "Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement", bears upon this 
question. 
The only material relevant to the second issue is parts of the affidavits of defendants, which 
are repetitive, part of the affidavit of Ann Atkin, the deposition of Andrew Garcia, and plaintiffs' 
admissions and responses to interrogatories. The Court must wade though a surplusage of gossip, 
innuendo and hearsay in the affidavits to find these parts, only to discover that they duplicate what 
plaintiffs otherwise have long conceded. Once found, they do not even show an oral agreement, let 
alone performance of one. All of this material was readily available from the outset. 
Further, since "part performance" is an exception to the statute of frauds (§ 25-5-4, U.C. A. 
(1953)) rendering any oral agreement "void", defendants' claim of part performance in the present 
case was always an affirmative defense. Defendants have the burden of presenting positive, 
undisputed proof, in order to maintain the claims. That is, the mere denials that the corporation was 
properly dissolved previously proffered by defendants were insufficient on their face to raise this 
defense. The simple assertion of an oral contract was deficient on its face, and would have entitled 
plaintiffs to judgment on the pleadings pursuant to their Motion, because the contract alleged is void 
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under the Statute of Frauds. To demonstrate the good faith of defendants' denials, it was necessary 
for defendant to assert what they claimed by way of "part performance", and to submit their evidence 
to a test by summary judgment. This evidence was readily available at all times. 
Further, defendants claim only "disputes of material fact" regarding the making of an 
"agreement of dissolution". It does not show part performance taking an oral agreement out of the 
statute of frauds, however, for defendants to simply dispute, or "genuinely dispute", plaintiffs' 
assertion that they made no contract. Under Utah law, the statute resolves all disputes whether a 
contract existed. Relief is available only where there is unequivocal evidence of substantial change 
of position in exclusive reliance upon an agreement the terms of which are indisputable. See infra, 
pg. 18 et seq. Defendants do not even claim such evidence exists. 
The long and short of this is that defendants have known or should have known, from the 
outset that, to make the denials (which are not made upon information and belief), or their positive 
assertion that AMS was properly dissolved, upon which they have insisted in this case, they had to 
have in hand indisputable evidence of the terms of an oral agreement, together with direct, clear, 
convincing evidence that defendants substantially changed their position in ways explained only by 
reliance upon such an agreement. Defendants could never have supposed that they were in 
possession of such evidence, or that they could obtain such evidence. The delay obtained by their 
Rule 56(f) motion was not used to depose plaintiffs in the hope of obtaining a useful admission. 
Defendants knew what plaintiffs would say. It was used to assemble a cacophony of unfounded 
suspicions and peevish accusations (i.e., if Mr. Porter had a notorious extramarital affair, it was all 
Mr. Cowley's fault), in the hope of distracting attention from the undeniable: there has never been 
a basis for defendants' denial that AMS was never dissolved. 
ONLY A MAJORITY OF SHAREHOLDERS COULD DISSOLVE AMS 
Section 16-10a-626(2) U.C. A. (1953) provides that a corporation which does not provide its 
shareholders certificates evidencing their shares shall nevertheless provide them in writing within a 
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reasonable time the information listed in section 16-10a-625(2)U.C.A. (1953). (For purposes of the 
present case, all of this information is contained in the admitted Stock Redemption Agreement, and 
plaintiffs do not dispute its timely delivery.) Defendants now claim that corporations which violate 
this statute, may also violate the right of those entitled to stock to consent or withhold consent to a 
dissolution of the corporation. 
The rights of a shareholder attach as soon as he acquires an equity interest in a stock 
corporation (§16-10a-621(4), U.C.A. (1953)), and persist whether or not the corporation issues 
stock. Section 16-10a-625 (l)U.C. A. (1953). Such a person has a right to compel issuance of stock 
and appropriate certificates. His rights cannot be diminished by refusal to recognize them. 
Furthermore, say defendants, a Stock Redemption Agreement for AMS, signed by both 
defendant Porter and plaintifFCowley, and acknowledging both as shareholders, should be discounted 
as "executed . . . for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of the insurance company which issued 
life insurance policies for the benefit of the Cowleys and Porters." The Parole Evidence Rule (§ 78-
25-16, U.C.A (1953)), forbids any evidence of the content of the writing except the writing itself. 
Here, the writing (Exhibit "10", Article IV) plainly provides, "The Company has procured insurance 
on the lives of shareholders in order to fund its obligations under this agreement...." In short, the 
insurance was bought to implement the prior Agreement; the Agreement was not made, as alleged, 
to fake a basis for obtaining insurance. 
Counsel choose to ignore their own draft of a Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement, 
Exhibit "29", purporting to be the agreement reached by the parties, which specifically acknowledges 
in paragraph 2 that "Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter [are] the two stockholders of the company 
. . . ." It is disingenuous at best for counsel to now invent diversions from a fact they otherwise 
openly acknowledge. 
It is preposterous to read the Utah statutes on dissolution of corporations to allow unilateral 
dissolution by one minority owner of a stock corporation having many owners. The rule cannot be 
subverted by failure to issue stock certificates. Defendants' revisionist interpretation of the Stock 
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reasonable time the information listed in section 16-10a-625(2) U.C. A. (1953). (For purposes of the 
present case, all of this information is contained in the admitted Stock Redemption Agreement, and 
plaintiffs do not dispute its timely delivery.) Defendants now claim that corporations which violate 
this statute, may also violate the right of those entitled to stock to consent or withhold consent to a 
dissolution of the corporation. 
The rights of a shareholder attach as soon as he acquires an equity interest in a stock 
corporation (§16-10a-621(4), U.C.A. (1953)), and persist whether or not the corporation issues 
stock. Section 16-10a-625 (l)U.C.A. (1953). Such a person has a right to compel issuance of stock 
and appropriate certificates. His rights cannot be diminished by refusal to recognize them. 
Furthermore, say defendants, a Stock Redemption Agreement for AMS, signed by both 
defendant Porter and plaintiff Cowley, and acknowledging both as shareholders, should be discounted 
as "executed . . . for the purpose of satisfying a requirement of the insurance company which issued 
life insurance policies for the benefit of the Cowleys and Porters." The Parole Evidence Rule (§ 78-
25-16, U.C.A (1953)), forbids any evidence of the content of the writing except the writing itself. 
Here, the writing (Exhibit "10", Article IV) plainly provides, "The Company has procured insurance 
on the lives of shareholders in order to fund its obligations under this agreement.. .." In short, the 
insurance was bought to implement the prior Agreement; the Agreement was not made, as alleged, 
to fake a basis for obtaining insurance. 
Counsel choose to ignore their own draft of a Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement, 
Exhibit "29", purporting to be the agreement reached by the parties, which specifically acknowledges 
in paragraph 2 that "Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter [are] the two stockholders of the company 
. . . ." It is disingenuous at best for counsel to now invent diversions from a fact they otherwise 
openly acknowledge. 
It is preposterous to read the Utah statutes on dissolution of corporations to allow unilateral 
dissolution by one minority owner of a stock corporation having many owners. The rule cannot be 
subverted by failure to issue stock certificates. Defendants' revisionist interpretation of the Stock 
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Redemption Agreement is contrary to the face of the document. Defendants' convenient description 
of the Stock Redemption Agreement cannot disguise the fact that it confers enforceable shareholder's 
rights upon plaintiff Cowley, which cannot be discounted at whim. 
AMS, a stock corporation, had two equal owners. It was not within the power of one of them 
to dissolve the corporation without the consent of the other. The only evidence defendants offer of 
plaintiffs' consent to the dissolution of AMS is an alleged oral agreement to purchase plaintiffs' 
interest over five years. Defendants concede that such an agreement is void on its face under the 
Statute of Frauds. "A contract is within the statute, as a general rule, if the time for the full 
performance of the contract exceeds a year." 72 AmJur2d, Statute of Frauds §11; Goldstein v. Abco 
Construction Co., Inc., 334 So.2d 281 (Fla.App.1976). 
THE ADMITTED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ELIMINATES ANY CLAIMS OF ORAL 
AGREEMENT 
Challenged to produce evidence supporting their denial that Advanced Maintenance Services, 
Inc. ("AMS") was never properly dissolved, defendants, following a thirty day extension pursuant 
to Rule 56(f), have produced a ponderous compendium of gossip, hearsay and innuendo, most of 
which is utterly irrelevant to the matter in issue. The scintilla of relevant material was readily 
available to defendants from the outset, without resort to Rule 56(f). That the latter material was not 
previously produced is explained by the fact that, as a matter of law, and on its face, it is insufficient 
to substantiate defendants' denial. That this inadequate needle is now produced in a haystack of the 
impertinent and the scandalous, is explained only as desperate distraction. 
Stripped of the merely meretricious, the record presented by defendants shows a chronology 
which eliminates defendants' denial: 
1. November, 1995, defendant Slone Porter left the employ of 7-Eleven. Defendants' 
Statement of Material Facts ("MF") 1. December, 1995, AMS was formed, intending to provide 
maintenance services to 7-Eleven. MF 7,12. Plaintiff Tracy Cowley was then an employee of 7-
Eleven (MF 10,12), leaving its employ to work full time for AMS in March, 2001. MF 5 5. Cowley 
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and Porter were owners of AMS from the outset. MF 12. 
2. Saturday, June 22, 2002, defendants volunteered to buy plaintiffs' half interest in AMS. 
MF 79. Defendants offered to split corporate property and funds not essential to the business, to 
divest to plaintiffs Straight Line Striping ("SLS"), a small related pavement striping company, and 
to pay plaintiffs $10,000 per month for five years ($600,000). Id. Plaintiffs declined, and proposed 
instead that defendants take the deal defendants offered and plaintiffs take the business. MF 80. The 
matter was left for further discussion. Id. 
3. The latter "threat" induced in defendants a crisis of conscience: after more than seven years 
of benefitting from their co-owner's relationship with 7-Eleven Corporation ("7-Eleven"), which 
provided "95%" of the business of AMS, defendants suddenly saw that this was a despicable "conflict 
of interest". MF 81, 83. They determined to bear their breasts at once to a friendly ear at 7-Eleven. 
Id. They did so Sunday, June 23, 2002. MF 94. 
4. Andrew Garcia, a 7-Eleven executive, and Johan de Besch, the pertinent senior manager 
of 7-Eleven, had known for the eighteen months since plaintiff Tracy Cowley left 7-Eleven that 
Cowley was an owner of AMS and, of course, a former employee of 7-Eleven. MF 56, 58; 
Deposition of Andrew Garcia, 09/19/03, at 24-26,38-39. Nevertheless, 7-Eleven had continued over 
that period to send AMS an increasing amount of 7-Eleven business. MF 68. Defendants, however, 
say that they believed that 7-Eleven would be angry to discover that Cowley had been an owner of 
AMS since its inception in 1995 and while Cowley was an employee of 7-Eleven, which defendants 
style a "blatant conflict of interest". MF 81-83. 
5. Defendants' contact at 7-Eleven, Ann Atkin, contacted the man who made decisions in 
such matters, her superior Johan de Besch. MF 84, 91; Affidavit of Atkin, |^ % 34, 35. Meanwhile, 
Atkin suggested that if Tracy Cowley was prepared to sell his interest in AMS, defendants could keep 
the 7-Eleven business, but that they should re-incorporate under another name. MF 84, 96; Atkin 
Affidavit, 1f 41. 
6. June 24,2002, Monday, plaintiffs indicated that they were prepared to consider with some 
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changes defendants' offer to pay $10,000 per month for five years for plaintiffs' interest and invited 
further negotiations. MF 88. The $10,000/month for five years offer was then promptly reduced to 
writing and submitted to plaintiffs for signature. Id.; MF 90; Exhibit "14". 
7. June 25,2002, the first day they could do so, defendants incorporated Quality Maintenance 
Systems ("QMS") to take over the business of AMS. QMS is wholly owned by defendants. MF 98, 
100,117, 118. 
8. June 27, 2002, Mr. de Besch met with plaintiffs. MF 101. His chief concern was that the 
work of AMS for 7-Eleven not be interrupted. Atkin Affidavit, ^ 45; Exhibit "4", pg. 6. Tracy 
Cowley told de Besch that he believed he could negotiate a fair break-up of AMS, and that AMS 
could continue to work for 7-Eleven. Exhibit "4" pg. 2. Mr. de Besch indicated that an investigation 
would be done to determine whether any transaction between 7-Eleven and AMS had taken 
advantage of 7-Eleven. Exhibit "4", pg. 1. Cowley assured de Besch that he would find no such 
transactions. Exhibit "4", pg. 2. 
9. Later the same day, Johan de Besch met with defendants. Exhibit "4" pg. 3. He sought 
assurances that the employees of AMS would continue to do the work of 7-Eleven, but said that 7-
Eleven could not continue to do business with AMS as then constituted. He thought the formation 
of a new corporation with a new name at least useful. He also indicated that an investigation of 
improprieties in prior AMS/7-Eleven transactions would be made, and that if any were found, 
defendants could not be associated with the new corporation doing the 7-Eleven business. Exhibit 
"4",pgs. 6,7; MF 105. 
10. The business of AMS was then transferred to QMS, which has continued to do the 7-
Eleven business in the ordinary course, ever since, under the management of defendants. Exhibit "4", 
pg. 7; MF 105. 
11. The parties then agreed to split the properties and accounts of AMS not essential to its 
business, and arranged for temporary continuation of health and insurance policies, without 
acceptance by plaintiffs of defendants' offer to pay $10,000/month to complete the transaction. MF 
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106. Straight Line Striping ("SLS") was transferred to plaintiffs. MF 107, 145. Some transfers (a 
Merrill-Lynch account, ownership of SLS) were completed by July 1, 2002. MF 145; Exhibit "15". 
Tracy Cowley closed his office at AMS the week-end of June 29, 2002. MF 107. Discussions of the 
price to be paid plaintiffs were deferred. MF 109. 
12. July 19, 2002, the parties again met to discuss the price of plaintiffs half of AMS. MF 
109. Defendants claim that they then, for the first time, indicated that they intended to pay plaintiffs 
only $4,000 per month for five years ($240,000), not $10,000 per month ($600,000). MF 110. 
Defendants claim that by evening Tracy Cowley had telephoned Slone Porter to accept this hitherto 
unannounced 60% reduction. MF 111. Defendants have no other witnesses to this alleged phone 
conversation. Id. Tracy Cowley denies that it occurred. Affidavit of Tracy Cowley 10/15/03, \ f 
9-12; Exhibit "6", Answer No. 19. (Mrs. Cowley testifies that on the evening of July 19th, she heard 
Mr. Cowley's end of a phone call in which Tracy Cowley informed Slone Porter that Cowleys would 
accept $4,000 per month temporarily, pending completion of 7-Eleven's investigation, but that, 
presuming 7-Eleven continued to do business with the company under the name of QMS, the parties 
should then settle an appropriate price, not less than $10,000 per month.) The $4,000/month 
proposed was not reduced to writing until months later, after plaintiffs threatened suit. Exhibit "29". 
13. In October, 2002, plaintiffs confronted defendants asserting that plaintiffs were entitled 
to at least $10,000 per month insofar as 7-Eleven's investigation, then complete, had resulted in no 
diminishment of work. MF 146. Defendants then claimed an "oral agreement" to pay $4,000 per 
month. MF 147. 
14. The 7-Eleven "Code of Business Conduct" ("CBC") adopted after the incorporation of 
AMS, and said by defendants to prohibit as a "conflict of interest" Tracy Cowley's continued 
employment by 7-Eleven while owning AMS, provides by way of prohibition only: 
Unless prior written approval has been obtained . . . the Company shall not engage in 
any form of business relationship with & former employee or family member thereof, 
or with a business controlled by or affiliated with such former employee or family 
member. 
CBC Exhibit "2", pg. 7, §2. (emphasis added). This prohibition lasts for five years (not two years 
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as alleged by Slone Porter) after a person leaves the employ of 7-Eleven. Id, pg. 8. There are no 
direct prohibitions against business dealings with current employees. 
15. 7-Eleven can waive any "conflict" with a company owned by a former employee, by 
writing in advance of work to be done. Exhibit "2", pgs. 6-8. Mr. de Besch had effectively done this 
for the past eighteen months with respect to Tracy Cowley; but he had not done so in writing as 
required by the CBC. He could have done so in future with respect to Tracy Cowley. Upon 
questioning Cowley, de Besch learned that Cowley was prepared to sell out voluntarily, rendering 
consent to future work by AMS moot. Exhibit "4", pg. 2. 
16. Despite an investigation, 7-Eleven never found evidence of a disadvantageous transaction 
between AMS and 7-Eleven during Tracy Cowley's tenure with either company. As a result, it fully 
resumed with QMS the work formerly done by AMS. Deposition of Chad Coleman, 09/19/03, at 63-
65. 7-Eleven has never made a claim of "conflict of interest" or any other wrongdoing against AMS 
or Cowley. 
17. There is only one sufficient reason shown by the record for Mr. de Besch's requirement 
that, to continue working for 7-Eleven, AMS be re-constituted without Tracy Cowley. It is that, 
once defendants had exposed the matter to Mr. de Besch's inferior, Ann Atkin, Mr. de Besch could 
no longer wink at the fact that Tracy Cowley was a former employee, employed within the last five 
years. Slone Porter's employment with 7-Eleven was then more than five years old, and de Besch 
had ignored Cowley's more recent employ for eighteen months; but the rule of the CBC was that 7-
Eleven was prohibited from doing business with a company which had among its owners someone 
employed by 7-Eleven within five years. There is literally no admissible evidence of behavior of 
plaintiffs Cowley (exploited equally by defendants Porter) injurious to 7-Eleven, which caused 7-
Eleven to decline to do business with either of Cowleys or Porters. 
One conclusion that must be drawn from this is that defendants' Epiphany about "conflict of 
interest" with 7-Eleven was simply a ploy to force plaintiffs to accept a buy-out, while defending 
against plaintiffs' demand that defendants take the buy-out. Porter had been gone from 7-Eleven 
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more than five years; Cowley had not. Porter could stay with AMS and not lose the 7-Eleven 
business; Cowley might not. Though neither Porter nor 7-Eleven could divest Cowley of his half of 
AMS, the most direct means of protecting the value of plaintiffs' interest was to accept a fair buy-out. 
If Cowley refused to sell, he might prevent AMS serving 7-Eleven, or reforming under a new 
name to do so, de-valuing the interests of both Porters and Cowleys. If Cowley voluntarily sold out, 
the value of both interests was preserved. If Porters insisted on discounting the value of the Cowleys5 
interest, they risked similar devaluation of their own interest. 
After Cowleys agreed to sell upon a price to be negotiated, preserving the value of both 
interests, Porters demanded that Cowleys accept at least a 60% reduction in value, which necessarily 
escheated to Porters, who had already seized the business. It is this devil's bargain of 40% of original 
interest to Cowleys, 160% of original interest to Porters, which defendants now claim as an "oral 
agreement". In short, defendants' claim of "conflict" had no effect on the value of Cowley's interest, 
so long as he agreed to sell it. Other necessary conclusions, equally anathema to defendants, are 
discussed below. 
THE CLAIM OF "PART PERFORMANCE" OF AN "ORAL AGREEMENT" IS DEFECTIVE ON 
ITS FACE 
Defendants have seriously misapplied the rules regarding claims of "part performance" of oral 
"contracts". 
First, the oral contract and its terms must be clear and definite, second, the acts done 
in performance of the contract must be equally clear and definite; and, third, the acts 
must be in reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance must be such that (a) they 
would not have been performed had the contract not existed, and (b) the failure to 
perform on the part of the promisor would result in fraud on the performer who 
relied, since damages would be inadequate. 
Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983), quoting Randall v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust 
Co., 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956), quoted in Spears v. Warr, 44 P.3d 743, 751 (Utah 2002). 
Part performance to be sufficient to take a case out of the statute must consist of 
clear, definite, and unequivocal acts of the party relying thereon, strictly referable to 
the contract, and of such character that it is impossible or impracticable to place the 
parties in status quo, mere non-action being insufficient. 
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Martin v. Scholl, supra, 678 P.2d at 275. See also Spears v. Warr, supra, 44 P.3d at 751. 
[A]cts of part performance must be exclusively referable to the contract . . . . The 
reason for such requirement is that the equitable doctrine of part performance is based 
on estoppel and unless the acts of part performance are exclusively referable to the 
contract there is nothing to show that the plaintiff relied on it or changed his position 
to his prejudice.... 
Martin v. Scholl, supra, 678 P.2d at 277 quoting In re Roth's Estate, 269 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah 
1994); Spears v. Warr, supra, 44 P.3d at 751. 
Apparently, defendants are unaware that the conduct which they must show was in 
detrimental reliance upon the alleged agreement to sell plaintiffs' interest in AMS for $4,000 per 
month for five years was defendants' "change of position" in seizing the business of AMS and 
transferring it to a corporation owned by them, QMS. Plaintiffs1 "change of position" would be 
relevant only to an attempt by plaintiff to enforce the alleged "contract". 
Defendants openly admit that defendants' demand that plaintiffs accept $4,000 per month did 
not occur until long after defendants had sought, without prompting from plaintiffs, to acquire 
plaintiffs' share of the business for $10,000 per month for five years, and that, during the pendency 
of the $10,000 per month offer, defendants had incorporated a replacement company, QMS, and had 
the business of AMS transferred to it following the ejectment of plaintiffs from the business. In short, 
defendants admit that any "change of position" on defendants' part had occurred while the only offer 
that had been discussed was $10,000 per month, and long before an offer of $4,000 per month had 
even been made. Defendants' "change of position" could not possibly have been in reliance upon the 
alleged acceptance of an offer that hadn't yet been made, or even suggested. The only viable claim 
of "change of position" in detrimental reliance adhering in these facts, is plaintiffs' vacating the 
business in reliance upon the offer of $10,000 per month. 
All that defendants could have relied upon was plaintiffs' expression of willingness to sell for 
an appropriate price, not less than $10,000 per month for five years. That is all that was on the table 
when defendants "changed position". As that continues to be plaintiffs' position, defendants have 
suffered no injury at all. The equitable doctrine of "part performance" taking the alleged contract out 
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of the Statute of Frauds (§ 25-5-8 U.C.A. (1953)) does not apply. All that is presented here is 
defendants' attempt to get for $4000/month what they had already seized under guise of an offer to 
pay$10,000/month. 
Defendants presume that, having dispossessed plaintiffs of their business and income under 
false pretenses of discussing a fair price, and having persuaded plaintiffs to take temporarily, in order 
to live, a fraction of what defendants represented was due, defendants can rely upon plaintiffs' receipt 
of the reduced sum to bind them to a permanent reduction. The only evidence which defendants 
assert shows that this otherwise transparent circumstance was the result of a sudden abandonment 
of self-interest, is the testimony of Slone Porter, already denied by Tracy Cowley, that he alone heard 
Cowley say by phone that the offer was accepted.1 Defendants concede that, having started the 
$4,000/month payments in August, 2002, they were confronted in October, 2002, with a demand by 
defendants that the negotiation of a fair price be promptly completed. 
"The critical observation to make in reading these delineations of what constitutes sufficient 
part performance is that it must be proved by strong evidence." Martin v. Scholl, supra, 678 P.2d 
at 275. Other cases routinely recite that the evidence must be clear and convincing, reasonably 
explicable only by reference to the alleged oral contract. E.g., Montgomery v. Barrett, 121 Pac. 569, 
570 (Utah 1912); Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982); Coleman v. Dillman, 624 
P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981); Ravarino v. Price, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953); Price v. Lloyd, 86 Pac. 
767 (Utah 1906); Downtown Athletic Clerk v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275, 279-80 (U.Apps. 1987). 
Defendants' "strong evidence" of the terms of an agreement is a single phone call, to which 
defendants claim a single witness, at radical variance from an admitted prior course of conduct, and 
denied by both witnesses on the other side. Not only had defendants offered $10,000 per month 
1
 Defendants will say that the affidavit of their sister-in-law, Lisa Coleman, recites an 
admission of Kerin Cowley that an "agreement" existed. The affidavit, however, lacks 
foundation, and does not disclose which "agreement", if any - including one to attempt to work 
out a fair price - was in reference. It is of doubtful admissibility if only because Lisa Coleman was 
not listed in defendants' Rule 26(a) disclosures. Further, of course, even if Slone Porter's claim 
of prompt agreement to accept a fait accompli for 60% less than previously offered were true, it is 
doubtful that it could show more than a classic, voidable contract of adhesion. 
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before they attempted to raise trouble with 7-Eleven, it is known that the parties were then awaiting 
completion of a 7-EIeven investigation to determine whether defendants' trouble-making had actually 
diminished the value of AMS's business. The $10,000/month offer was promptly put in writing and 
a signature solicited; the $4,000/month offer was not. Defendants produce no evidence of their 
reliance upon the alleged agreement except a short series of payments, which even defendants admit 
were promptly protested. Having seized th business, defendants had to make some payments. These 
payments are readily explained as temporary, short payments against a fair price remaining to be 
finally negotiated, while an investigation was completed which could confirm the propriety of a 
previously offered higher price. They were received of necessity, and contested legally as soon as 
defendants disavowed further negotiations. If there is any other rational explanation for the amount 
of the payments except contractual obligation, no contract can be found. Such evidence - a dispute 
as to the terms of the alleged "agreement", supported by a paucity of equivocal evidence of 
"performance" - as a matter of law, never suffices as a defense to the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
Montgomery v. Barrett, supra; Coleman v. Dillman, supra. 
Had Tracy Cowley not volunteered to sell his interest in AMS, 7-Eleven could have enforced 
its rule against dealings with companies owned by recent former employees. It is speculation whether 
they would have done so, given 7-Eleven's dependence upon AMS. Had it done so, the effect would 
have been to devalue the interests of both Porters and Cowleys in AMS, due to the loss of business 
There might have been what Porters feared, a struggle over AMS and an attempt by either or both 
parties to re-constitute it in order to service 7-Eleven. Presumably, this was feared because it was 
unlikely to work. Plainly, Porters could not force Cowleys to sell out, except upon terms acceptable 
to Cowleys, and 7-Eleven (had it been inclined to do so) could not force Cowley's withdrawal from 
AMS except with consequences either equally detrimental or equally beneficial to the Cowleys and 
Porters, within the discretion of Cowleys. 
Plainly, Tracy Cowleys' voluntary withdrawal from AMS, leaving the company intact and able 
to continue serving 7-Eleven, was a matter to be bargained for, not coerced, and for which he could 
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insist upon being paid fair market value for his half of AMS. It was plainly not within any legal power 
of Porters to insist that Cowley withdraw, then pay him 40% of the value of his half, while Porters 
took 100% of the value of Porters' half plus 60% of Cowleys' half. 
CONCLUSIONS, RULE 11 
Defendants have supposed from the outset that, because this is a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, they had only to show some dispute of material fact to avoid it. They have been wrong 
from the outset. The Statute of Frauds fixes on the defendants the burden, on their claim of part 
performance of an oral contract, to provide unequivocal evidence of agreement upon clear terms 
sought to be enforced, and unequivocal evidence of substantial acts of defendants explicable only as 
strict reliance upon such terms, raising an equity that compels enforcement. Mere dispute of facts 
regarding any of these matters, or paucity of evidence of reliance, dictates a ruling as a matter of law -
the Statute of Frauds - that no enforceable agreement exists. Here, defendants assert mere dispute 
of facts regarding the existence of a sudden agreement to accept $4,000/month for what defendants 
had offered $10,000/month, and a short series of payments, timely disputed in the circumstances, 
unsupported by any change of position which raises any equity in favor of defendants. 
Any "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" would have fully informed defendants' 
counsel that their denial that AMS was dissolved, and their positive assertion that AMS was properly 
dissolved, were not "warranted on the evidence". Rule 11(b), U.R.C.P. Moreover, this cannot be 
justified on the basis of an excusable mistake of law. 
The pleadings filed by counsel certify that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification 
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." Rule 11(b)(2), U.R.C.P. The law of 
Utah respecting part performance sufficient to negate the Statute of Frauds has been clear and 
unchanging for 100 years. Counsel admit to being warned of the effect of the Statute of Frauds long 
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before this action was commenced. 
Defendants' wholly unwarranted denials and assertions have prevented the Court moving 
promptly to dissolve on fair terms a corporation which, in the meanwhile, defendants have operated 
to provide themselves 160% of their prior interest, while reducing plaintiffs to 40% of theirs. It has 
caused delay and expense to plaintiffs, who have been at a grave disadvantage since being 
dispossessed of the business which provided their support and the support of their family. It raises 
serious questions about the intent of defendants and their counsel to use delay and obfuscation in this 
proceeding to compel acquiescence in what amounts to theft of a business. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. As a matter of law, AMS has never 
been properly dissolved. The only issue remaining in this matter is assessment against defendants of 
the value of plaintiffs' half of AMS. 
Plaintiffs are entitled, under Rule 11(c), U.R.C.P., to an award of their fees and costs in 
presenting their Motion for Summary Judgment and in resisting defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion. 
Defendants have known from the outset that they lacked any colorable basis for denying that AMS 
had not been dissolved, and that further time for discovery could not reasonably have been expected 
to disclose pertinent evidence not presently readily available. Morse v. Packer, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah 
2000); Hudemcm v. Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491 (U.Apps.1999); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1998). 
J 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ? day of November, 2003. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
#fof I hereby certify that on the /% *" of November, 2003,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT " to bemailodby 
UrSrWtlTHftrst^ ass-rKJStage-pfepatd, to: 
Jeffrey R. Price (6315) 
Christopher C. Hill (9583) 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
139 E. South Temple, #320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ph: (801)961-7400 
-C~ ^ 
E. Craig Smay 
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1 A. No, I'm not aware of that. 
2 Q. As far as you were aware, was the business 
3 that Quality Maintenance Systems I think it's called, the 
4 business that they did for 7-11 less than the business 
5 that AMS had previously done for 7-11? 
6 A. There was -- from my understanding, there was 
7 a reduction in the value of the contracts that Quality 
8 Maintenance had with 7-11 as opposed to what the original 
9 contracts that AMS or Advanced Maintenance did have with 
10 7-11. 
11 Q. Where did you obtain that information? 
12 A. From Veralynn from the nature of what had 
13 gone on at 7-11. I am aware they did require -- Johan 
14 DeBesche required a reduction of what Quality was able to 
15 do based on what had occurred. 
16 Q. Who told you that? 
17 A. I believe that conversation was had between 
18 Johan and I in many of those hit and miss conversations 
19 we had as well as the Porters. 
20 Q. And what was the nature of the reduction, as 
21 you understand it? 
22 A. I believe that the nature was some of the 
23 striping business. I believe Advanced Maintenance had 
24 had a gasoline image contract that was taken away at the 
25 time. I believe that there were some electrical 
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1 contracts or lighting type contracts or something that 
2 was reduced and given to another vendor. That might not 
3 be all, but that's a few of what I am aware of. 
4 Q. What on earth is a gasoline image contract? 
5 A. Similar to a general maintenance and image 
6 contract as it pertains to the gas island at a 
7 convenience store, the stickers on the pumps, the handles 
8 that you hold onto when you fill your car. You have 
9 obviously filled your car at a fuel station that doesn't 
10 change the hand warmers very often and they are very 
11 dirty and very greasy. And gasoline image is to keep 
12 those clean and tidy. 
13 Q. Do you have any idea what the value of that 
14 contract had been when it had been at AMS? 
15 A. I don't. It was lucrative. 7-11 at the time 
16 was spending a substantial amount of money to gain a 
17 share of the market in gasoline and, therefore, they were 
18 spending some serious money upgrading the gas islands. I 
19 worked on those projects during that period of time. 
20 Q. Do you know who picked up that contract when 
21 AMS lost it? 
22 A. I believe that 7-11 basically had done a 
23 reduction, and I don't know that that contract has been 
24 let again to a specific company. 
25 Q. They simply reduced what they were doing by 
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way of gasoline image? 
A. Yes. 
3J Q. What about the lighting contract? Do you 
4 know what the value of that may have been? 
5 A. I really don't have a specific on that. But 
6 I believe they went to either a local electrical vendor 
7 or Sylvania which they had a national contract with. 
8 Those may be spotty facts, but I know that that was --
9 Q. Sylvania is the company we all know who makes 
10 the light bulbs? 
11 A. Yes, they also have a service division that 
12 does contractual electrical work. 
13 Q. Do you have any view whether or not those 
14 reductions that you have discussed would have reduced the 
15 value of quality below what the value of AMS had been? 
16 A. In signed contractual agreements it would 
17 have reduced the value of potential earning power. But 
18 the basic earning potential of the company I guess is 
19 untapped. I mean it's kind of a variable. 
20 Q. So that you couldn't put your finger upon any 
21 particular reduction in value of that company as a result 
22 of those reductions? 
23 A. No, no, sir. 
24 Q. Did you tell us what it was that Mr. DeBesche 
25 now does for Trugreen? I may have missed making a note 
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Q. You were the market manager or -- is that 
2| what you called it? 
3 A. Yes, market manager. 
4| Q. Was he the regional maintenance manager or 
something? 
A. For me. 
7| Q. No, Jim Craig? 
8 A. Yeah, he was like a regional maintenance 
9 manager. So he had -- the people that reported to him 
10 would be like somebody in Tracy Cowley's position, but 
11 they were in Colorado. Tracy was in Utah and then he had 
12 folks in Texas as well. 
13 Q. So he had responsibility for a number of 
14 stores in various states? 
15 A. Yes, and he would coordinate all the repairs 
16 and maintenance. And he would go in and basically he was 
17 at the same job that I had only he was over all the 
18 repairs and maintenance folks. I was over all the 
19 operations folks. 
20 Q. Were you still employed at 7-11 when 
21 Mr. Cowley left? 
22 A. Yes, I was. 
23 Q. Do you know why Mr. Cowley left the 
24 employment of 7-11? 
25 A. Because he -- I'm going from what he told 
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me -- he had become a part owner with Slone Porter and 
Advanced Maintenance Systems. 
Q. When did he tell you that? 
A. I don't remember. It was before he left. It 
was kind of a surprise to me. I didn't see it coming. 
Q. Why was that a surprise? Or why is it 
significant to you that you didn't see it coming? 
A. Because AMS was doing a number of repairs and 
bidding a number of projects for 7-11. And to me when he 
left the company, it appeared like it could have been a 















and the guy that's over it is now a partner with them. 
Q. Do you know when he left? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Did you voice any concern to anybody within 
7-11 about that issue? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. To who did you talk? 
A. I'm not sure. It wasn't Jim Craig because he 
had passed away. But Tracy's -- in fact, Tracy's new 
boss, Johan DeBesche, he came over and talked to me and 
we visited about that. And I know that Johan was doing 
some investigation. 
Q. Do you recall when that was? 
A. I don't recall the dates. 
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1 Q. Do you recall when in relationship to when he 
2 left it was? Was it a month after? Two months? A week? 
3 Five months? 
4 A. Well, on the phone call Johan called me and 
5 asked me some questions about it. And I said yeah, it --
6 you know -- it raised some concern and I recommended that 
7 Johan go through all the invoices and bids to see if, in 
8 fact, they were true just to make sure that there was 
9 nothing that would have been a questionable practice 
10 going on while Tracy was in position. I think Johan went 
11 through all that stuff. 
12 Q. Prior to Mr, Cowley leaving, were you aware 
13 of any concerns by anybody else about Mr. Cowley and his 
14 work at 7-11 as it related to AMS? 
15 A. I know that Gary Tibbetts who was a field 
16 consultant expressed a concern to, and I believe it was 
17 Jim Craig at the time, when Tracy Cowley had his new home 
18 built in Heber. Gary Tibbetts1 concern was that he was 
19 getting free services from some of the vendors, repairs 
20 and maintenance vendors from 7-11 to help Tracy build his 
21 home because he was doing the bids for 7-11. That was 
22 investigated by Jim Craig, I believe. 
23 Q. Were there other maintenance vendors other 
24 than Advanced Maintenance Systems? 
25 A. Yeah, there were a number of maintenance 
2 6
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2 
A. The maintenance. 
Q. -- Mr. Cowley's position once he left? 
3I A. Yes, uh-huh, because she had access to all 
4 the records then that were going on in maintenance, all 
5 the bids and everything. 
6
 Q. My understanding from my investigation of 
7 this case is that Mr. Cowley's last day at 7-11 was March 
8 the 31st of 2001. 
9 Do you have any reason to dispute that? 
10 A. No, I don't. 
11 Q. Does that sound about right to you? 
12 A. Spring? March of 2001? I'm trying to 
13 remember when I took over the whole state, because I 
14 don't think I had the whole state at the time he left. 
15 But again, I have no reason to dispute that, just because 
16 I can't remember. 
1 7 Q. And when he left, is that the first time that 
18 you became aware he was an owner or part owner in AMS? 
19 A. I was aware right before he left, because 
20 when he gave his notice he told me what he was doing and 
21 I -was very surprised. 
22 Q. I think you talked about then you had the 
23 conversation with Mr. Johan DeBesche. Is that correct? 
24 A. Uh-huh. 
25 Q. Telephone conversation, correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And the reason I tell you about the March 
3 31st date is I want to see if that helps you at all to 
4 place in time when your conversation with Mr. DeBesche 
5 took place. 
6 A. It would have been very shortly after that. 
7 Because he did not have a maintenance manager and he had 
8 to get somebody in that position to take his place. And 
9 we had a few people applying like Gary Tibbetts and Ann 
10 Atkin, so forth. And I highly recommended Ann. 
11 Q. Ann ended up with that position; is that 
12 correct? 
13 A. Yes, she did. 
14 Q. Do you recall how long after Mr. Cowley left 
15 that Ann Atkin took that position? 
16 A, I don't recall. 
17 Q. Is she still in the same position today? Do 
18 you know? 
19 A. She was in that position when I left. And 
20 again, I have not been in contact with those folks, so I 
21 don't know. I did receive a call from Jill Abbott about 
22 two weeks ago that a manager that had worked for me was 
23 retiring and she wanted me to give them a call. 
24 Q. Who is Jill Abbott? 
25 A. She is in human resources at 7-11. 
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Partnership Buy-out 
Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley have come to an agreement to split their partnership of 
Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. and Straight Line Striping, Inc. 
The terms of this agreement are as follows: 
1. Slone Porter will keep all Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc. as it currently exists.* 
2. Tracy Cowley will keep all of Straight Line Striping, Inc. as it currently exists.* 
3. Tracy Cowley will be paid $600,000 over 60 months at $10,000 per month with NO interest, 
due and payable to him on the 5th of each month beginning July 2002. 
4. Tracy Cowley will be paid $30,000 cash for purchase of a new vehicle for SLS. 
5. Tracy Cowley will own the property through Listo, Inc. (a third corporation owned by both 
parties) located at 294 South Center Street, Midway, Utah. The Articles of Incorporated for 
Listo, Inc. will be changed following the Deed process with Founder's Title. 
6. Tracy Cowley's health insurance will be paid through July 31,2002. 
7. Cowley family telephones will be returned July 14,2002. 
8. Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley have agreed to not seek legal counsel and this document will 
serve as a legal and binding contract. 
Parties have agreed to have NO non-compete clause. 
Parties have agreed to NO confidentiality clause. 
•All Articles of Incorporation will be changed to reflect this agreement. All cash and hard assets, 
equipment, vehicles, logo's, telephone numbers will remain the property of said corporations. 
Slone Porter Date Tracy Cowley Date 
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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW 
DARREL J. BOSTWICK 
JEFFERY R. PRICEf 
MICHAEL E. BOSTWICKJ 
ROBERT K REYNARD 
CHRISTOPHER C. HILL 
fAiso ADMITTED IN PENNSYLVANIA 
$ALSO AOMfTTED IN IDAHO 
December 17,2002 
VIA TELEFAX (531-9926^ and U.S. MAIL 
Scott E. Savage, Esquire 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, 
SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
50 S. Main Street, #1250 
Salt Lake City', Utah 84144 
Re: Slone and Veralvnn Porter and Kevin and Tracv Cowley 
Dear Mr. Savage: 
As I indicated to you in our telephone conversation yesterday, I and this firm represent 
Mr. and Mrs. Porter in connection with the issuos raised by your clients Mr. and Mrs. Cowley. 
All further communications regarding this matter should be made to my attention at the Salt Lake 
City address and telephone number indicated above. This letter serves to follow up on our 
telephone conversation yesterday concerning issues raised by your clients. 
Early in the summer of this year, there were detailed discussions between our respective 
clients concerning the transfer of ownership in certain business enterprises as a means of 
discontinuing the business relationship between the Porters and the Cowleys. Those discussions 
resulted in an agreement, the details of which provided for the distribution of assets, and for 
payment of cash in specified amounts from the Porters to the Cowleys. That agreement was 
reached during June and July 2002. From that time, Porters have paid substantial sums of cash to 
the Cowleys as the parties had agreed. The Porters continue to make monthly payments toward 
the remaining balance due under the agreement, in accordance with the terms to which the parties 
agreed. 
Inexplicably, the Cowleys have lately determined to request more money from the Porters 
contrary to the terms which were agreed to, and under which the parties have been operating now 
for several months. At the Porters' request we have prepared a written document which contains 
the terms and conditions of the agreement reached between the Porters and the Cowleys, which 
are the terms and conditions under which the Porters have been making payments to the 
ONE THIRTY MINE EAST 
SOUTH TEMPLE ST., SUITE 320 
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Cowleys, and will continue to make payments to the Cowleys until the now remaining balance of 
the initial $240,000 is paid in full. A copy of the agreement is enclosed. The Porters request the 
Cowleys to execute the document and to return it to us signed at their convenience. 
In our telephone conversation, you indicated that the Cowleys believe they are entitled to 
50% of "the business" value. I am not clear from your comments as to what the Cowleys believe 
constitutes the 50% that they are entitled to as compared with what has been agreed to by the 
Parties. In the process of reaching an agreement, the various companies were evaluated and 
valued and an appropriate price agreed upon. In that process, the cash assets were split equally, 
and the Cowleys5 share paid out to them already. On or about July 9,2002, a complete inventory 
of all capital assets of the companies was conducted, from which it was determined the value of 
the vehicles, shop tools and materials and other miscellaneous property was $208,000.00. Fifty 
percent of that amount would have been $104,000.00 to be paid to the Cowleys. The Cowleys 
wanted more to settle with the Porters over the stock transfer issues. In order to reach an 
agreement, the Porters agreed to pay a total of $240,000 by way of monthly payments to the 
Cowleys. In addition, the Porters agreed to be responsible for the debt associated with the 
vehicles, which at that time totaled approximately $135,000.00. Normally, the debt would have 
been split equally as well, resulting in a liability to the Cowleys of approximate $65,000.00. 
You did not indicate in our conversation that the Cowleys were interested in being responsible 
for any of the debt of the business enterprises as part of the distribution. 
The agreement as set forth with this letter, reflects that the Cowleys have received more 
than 50% of the value of the companies in the distribution agreement the parties have reached. 
Our review of the information relating to the valuation supports that conclusion. We suggest that 
in lieu of commencing the threatened legal proceedings, the Cowleys should review the 
agreement and provide us with information as to why or how it does not represent the agreement 
of the parties pertaining to the assets and liabilities as distributed by the parties' agreement, and 
the Porters will review and respond to that position. As I indicated, whether this matter ends up 
in litigation is your clients' choice at this point. We have no information to suggest that any 
court ordered distribution would be any more favorable to your clients than the agreement the 
parties have already reached. In light of the existing liabilities, we believe any result in litigation 
would only serve to dissipate the resources available for payment to the Cowleys and in the end 
serve no useful purposes. Nonetheless, please be advised that should the Cowleys determine to 
pursue legal action, the matter will be vigorously defended by the Porters to enforce the terms of 
the agreement the parties have already reached, and under which they have been operating for 
several months. We look forward to hearing from you on behalf of the Cowleys. 
Sincerely^ ^ 1 — — * ^ 
BOSTWipC ^ M C E , P ^ V f 
JRP:c/md/5031/Ltr.01.1217 / IIjr 
enclosure " / 
cc. Veralynn Porter (w/encl.) / 
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STOCK TRANSFER AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS DISSOLUTION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is hereby entered into 
by and between Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porter, Tracy J. Cowley, Kerin Cowley, Advanced 
Maintenance Services, Inc. ("Advanced"), Straight Line Striping, Inc. ("Straight Line"), and 
Listo, Inc. ("Listo"), collectively referred to herein as the "Parties." 
WHEREAS, the Parties, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, wish to resolve their differences in accordance with the terms and 
conditions set forth herein. 
WHEREAS, the Parties wish to memorialize their oral contract which was entered into and 
agreed upon by all Parties, according to the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
WHEREAS, the Parties to date have complied with the terms and conditions set forth herein, 
and agree to continue to comply with the terms and conditions until all terms and conditions set forth 
herein have been satisfied. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound and in an effort to settle 
claims stemming from their dispute, hereby agree as follows: 
1. The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter each owned fifty 
percent (50%) of the company known as Advanced Maintenance Services, Inc., 
Federal Tax LD. # 87-0548605. 
2. Tracy J. Cowley and Slone D. Porter, the two stockholders of the company, hereby 
agree to dissolve Advanced, 
3. The Parties hereby agree that one-half (Vi) of the cash assets from Advanced shall be 
distributed to Tracy Cowley and Kerin Cowley. This amount shall consist of 
previously allocated funds used by the Cowleys in three separate checks; $25,000 on 
June 27, 2002, $16,500 on July 29, 2002, and $11,800 on July 31, 2002; totaling 
$53,300. 
4. Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter hereby agree to pay off Tracy Cowley's 2001 
F350 vehicle, VIN # 1FTSX31F11EC34760. The payment will be $1,062.57 per 
month until paid-off in full. The current balance on the vehicle is $17,314.12. 
5. The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter incorporated a new 
company on July 1,2002 known as Quality Maintenance Systems, Inc. ("Quality"), 
Federal Tax LD. # 04-3690183. Slone owns fifty percent (50%) of the company, and 
Veralynn owns fifty percent (50%) of the company. 
6. The Parties hereby agree that a cash payout of $240,000 will be paid out to Tracy J. 
Cowley and Kerin Cowley by Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter through their new 
company, Quality. 
7. The Parties hereby agree that the $240,000 will be distributed in payments of $4,000 
per month for five (5) years, beginning August 1,2002. Each $4,000 check is to be 
paid to Straight Line. 
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8. Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter, through their new company, Quality, hereby 
agree to pay the health insurance premiums for Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley 
through December 31, 2002. The health insurance plan is known as ValueCare 
Health Insurance. The monthly premium payment is $724.40. 
9. The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line, Federal Tax ID. # 84-1429330, was 
owned by Veralynn Porter and Kerin Cowley, each owning fifty percent (50%) each. 
10. The Parties hereby agree that the entire business of Straight Line, including A/R, A/P, 
equipment, and all cash on hand was valued at $41,336.96 as of June 30,2002. 
11. Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to transfer her fifty percent (50%) ownership of 
Straight Line to Kerin Cowley on July 1,2002. 
12. The Parties hereby agree that Straight Line is now completely owned byKerin 
Cowley as of July 1,2002. 
13. Veralynn Porter hereby agrees to be responsible for one-half (Yi) of the taxes owed 
by Straight Line through June 30,2002. Veralynn Porter will be filing a final K-l at 
the end of 2002. 
14. The Parties hereby agree that Listo, Federal Tax ID. # 87-0657135, was owned in 
equal shares of twenty-five percent (25%) by Slone D. Porter, Veralynn Porta-, Tracy 
J. Cowley, and Kerin Cowley. 
15. The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter transferred their 
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in Listo to Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley, 
respectively, on July 1,2002. 
16. The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley took complete 
control of Listo on July 1,2002. 
17. The Parties hereby agree that Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter are responsible 
for one-forth (1/4), respectively, of the taxes of Listo, Inc., through the end of 2002. 
Slone D. Porter and Veralynn Porter will each be filing a final K-1 at the end of 2002. 
18. The Parties hereby agree that Tracy J. Cowley and Kerin Cowley, as owners of Listo 
will take possession of the rental property located at 294 South Center Street, 
Midway, UT 84049, which was purchased for the price of $115,000.00. 
19. The Parties hereby agree that this Stock Transfer and Settlement Agreement is a 
written confirmation of the verbal agreement entered into by the parties on or about 
June 22,2002. 
20. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Parties, 
including their successors and assigns. 
21. The Parties agree that this Agreement in no way constitutes or infers an admission 
or concession of fault or liability by any party. 
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22. The Parties warrant and represent that the individuals whose signatures appear below 
have been duly authorized to enter this Agreement on behalf of each party for whom 
they sign. 
23. This Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts, each of which shall be 
considered an original of the Agreement. The Parties further agree to warrant that 
signatures made and received via telefacsimile shall, for the convenience of the 
Parties, 
have the same force and effect as original signatures until such time as original 
signatures of all the Parties may be obtained. 
24 The Parties warrant that no promise, inducement or agreement not expressed herein 
has been made to them in connection with this Agreement. This Agreement 
contains the entire agreement between the Parties. All prior negotiations and 
discussions are merged herein as expressed by the written terms set forth herein, 
and/or in any Exhibits identified and/or incorporated herein by reference. This 
Agreement may not be modified, changed, or altered in any way except in a writing 
signed by the Parties or their authorized representatives, which sets forth the 
change(s) to be made, and the intent of the Parties to modify or amend this 
Agreement. 
25. If any provision of this Agreement, by way of this Instrument or otherwise, or the 
application thereof, shall for any reason and to any extent be found invalid or 
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remainder of this Agreement 
with all remaining clauses, directives, provisions, Parties, and circumstances, with 
any application thereof, shall continue in full force to the maximum extent 
permissible under applicable law. Concerning any successfully challenged provision 
in this instrument, insofar as it is reasonable and possible, shall be GOVERNED BY 
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
26. This Parties to this Agreement hereby agree that any action on this Agreement shall 
be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction located in Heber City, Utah, which 
is located in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Wasatch, State of Utah. 
27. The successful party to any action arising in connection with the enforcement of this 
Agreement shall be awarded its costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties, intending to be legally bound, hereby set their hands and 
respective seals on the day and date set forth below. 
ADVANCED MAINTENANCE SERVICES INC. 
B y _ 
Date 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
- > * - i 








TRACY COWLEY Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No: 030500244 
vs Bench Trial 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
SLONE PORTER Et al, 
Defendant. 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE FIRST DAY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the first day of June, two 
thousand four, the bench trial in the matter of Tracy Cowley Et 
al vs Slone Porter Et al was electronically recorded before the 
Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre of the above entitled court at 
the Fourth Judicial Court building, Heber, Utah, 
i. 



























t h i r t y . 
Q. What did you say a t that meeting? 
A. Nothing. Slone sa id what did you need, what e l s e do 
|you want? And he sa id . 
Q. Who i s he? 
A. Tracy said we have an insurance situation. We want 
|you to pay our insurance through the end of December two 
thousand and two and possibly further because we've checked 
into it, I guess, I assume during that last month, we checked 
into it and we're going to have a hard time getting insurance. 
|And I told him I'll call Kyle Fuller, our insurance agent and 
see what we can do. Right now we've agreed because we had 
agreed earlier to cover their insurance not through July as it 
Ihad said previously but through December and I'll see what Kyle 
Fuller has to say and then he asked if he could have the Skagg 
lawnmower and we said sure. 
Q. Okay. Anything else you recall that was said at that 
[meeting? 
A. That's when he said, Tracy was probably more relieved 
than I'd seen him and he said just get it drawn up Veralynn, 
call me and I'll get it signed. 
Q. And what, if anything, did you say after that? 
A. That was it. 
Q. How long did that meeting last? 
A. That was not a very long meeting. Two or three 
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{minutes, four minutes. 
Q. Is there anything else that transpired at that meeting 
[|you haven't told us about? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I would like, if you would, to turn to two 
[exhibits laying side by side. The first one being Plaintiffs 
Exhibit Number Seven. 
A. Okay. Alright. 
Q. And what has been marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit Number 
(Three. 
A. Plaintiffs Three? 
Q. Excuse me. Plaintiffs Five. Plaintiffs Five and 
Plaintiffs Seven. 
A. You have them laying side by side? 
Q. (inaudible) 
A. Seven and three. Okay. Got them. 
THE COURT: Five, excuse me, Five and Seven. 
THE WITNESS: Five and Seven. Okay. Got them. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Looking first at Exhibit Number Five. 
A. Okay. 
Q. It's got some numerated items, one through eight and a 
couple that we've heard some testimony about. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. With respect to number one it says, "Slone Porter will 
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keep all Advanced Maintenance Services Inc as it currently 
exists." Do you know if that happened? 
A. It didn't happen. We got fired. 
Q. Okay. Number two, it says "Tracy Cowley will keep all 
|of Straightline Striping Inc. as it currently exists." Did 
that happen? 
A. It did happen. 
Q. Number three, "Tracy Cowley will be paid six hundred 
thousand over sixty months at ten thousand dollars per month at 
ino interest due and payable to him on the fifth of each month 
[beginning July of two thousand two." 
A. That did not happen. 
Q. Okay. Number four, "Tracy Cowley will be paid thirty 
thousand dollars cash for purchase of a new vehicle for 
Straightline Striping." 
A. That did not happen. 
Q. Same question for number five, "Tracy Cowley will own 
fproperty through Lis to Inc." 
A. That did happen. 
Q. And he chose the Midway property. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Number six, "Tracy Cowley's health insurance will be 
|paid through July thirty-first, two thousand and two." 
Correct? 
A. That did not happen. We paid it through December 
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Q. Number Seven, "Cowley family telephone will be 
returned July fourteenth, two thousand two." 
A. That did happen. 
Q. Are those the cellular phones? 
A. Those were the cell phones. 
Q. Okay. Did they return the phones or did they transfer 
the account? 
A. They transferred the account. We were going to have 
them return the phones but then he wanted to just transfer and 
keep the numbers and so that's, he filled out the paperwork for 
[Verizon to do that. 
Q. Number eight says "Slone Porter and Tracy Cowley have 
agreed to not seek legal counsel and this document to serve as 
a legal and binding contract.". 
A. That did not happen. 
Q. Okay. With respect to the next item, "Parties have 
agreed to have no non-compete clause." Did that happen? 
A. That did happen. We compete and they compete. 
Q. Okay. "Parties have agreed to no confidentiality 
clause." 
A. That did happen. Everybody knows everything. 
Q. Okay. And then the next asterisk says "All articles 
[of incorporation will be changed to reflect this agreement. 
ffi.ll cash and hard assets, equipment, vehicles, logos, telephone 
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[numbers will remain the property of said corporations." 
A. That did not happen. We split the cash of AMS with 
them and some of the hard assets. They took three pickup 
trucks. 
Q. Now I'd like you to look at Exhibit Number Seven if 
|you would. 
A. Okay. I'm there. Is that the one that's titled Stock 
Transfer and Settlement Agreement? 
Q. Right. I think you testified that this was an attempt 
to summarize what had been agreed to on July the nineteenth. 
Correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Albeit subject (inaudible) your attorney? (inaudible) 
the same (inaudible)? 
A. Yes. 
Q. With respect to number one, let's see. Number two, 
let's start with number two. Did that happen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were articles of dissolution filed because of number 
two? 
A. They were. 
Q. Okay. Number three, did that happen? 
A. That did happen. Yes. 
Q. How about number four? 
A. That did happen. 
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Q. Okay. Number f i v e ? 
A. That d i d happen. 
Q. Number s i x ? 
A. That is currently happening. I've paid them four 
thousand per month every month. I'm not in breach of that. 
Yes. 
Q. Okay. How about number seven? 
A. That's, that's ongoing and continuing. Yes. 
Q. Number eight? 
A. That is, that did happen. Yes. 
Q. How about number nine? 
A. That did happen. 
Q. Number ten? 
A. That did happen. 
Q. How about number eleven? 
A. That did happen. 
Q. How about number twelve? 
A. I think it happened. I think she put it all in her 
name. I don't know. But I transferred mine to her. 
Q. Okay. How about number thirteen? 
A. Yes. That did happen. 
Q. How about fourteen and fifteen? 
A. There again, it happened. I don't know whose name 
they put everything in. The transfer happened, yes. 
Q. How about number seventeen? 
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A. That did happen. Yes. 
Q. How about eighteen? 
A. That did happen. 
Q. You testified that you made some audio recordings of 
these various meetings. Do you recall that? 
A. We did. Yes. 
Q. You also testified that you threw them into the 
Jordanelle Reservoir. Do you recall that? 
A. I did. 
Q. Do you recall when you did that? 
A. It was the twenty-fourth of July. 
Q. Why do you recall that? 
A. Because we had agreed on the nineteenth. Slone and I 
[went for a picnic lunch that day and I took them with me and 
chucked them at the bottom of the lake. 
Q. Can I have just a second, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Your Honor, at this time I have no further questions 
but as a matter of keeping the records straight we would offer 
[Exhibits Five, Seven and Seventeen. That is Plaintiffs Exhibit 
Five, Seven and Seven and also Exhibit Number Seventeen. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Smay? Five and Seven 
are your exhibits. 
MR. SMAY: Exhibits Ten, Eleven, Twelve should also be 
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Q. Did you and Mrs. Cowley have any further discussion? 
A. We had a lot of discussion that night. Absolutely. 
Q. One result of that discussion must have been, as Mrs. 
Porter's testified, you came in the next day and said you'd 
take the offer? 
A. Absolutely. 
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor. That's leading and 
suggestive. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. SMAY: I'd like to rephrase, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
IBY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Mr. Cowley, describe for me then, if you would, your 
discussions with Mr. Cowley on the night of the twenty-third. 
A. My discussions with Kerin that night were that at that 
[point any option of me staying with Advanced Maintenance 
Services and make that work was over. With 7-Eleven having 
full knowledge of my involvement from the inception, there was 
no option for me to be able to stay. I had not had a great 
relationship with Ann. Part of that was based on the fact that 
[when I left 7-Eleven with Ann digging real hard into AMS's 
stuff I had always said look, if you need a scapegoat or 
somebody to blame stuff on, I'm a good guy to blame it on 
because they are already unhappy with me. I want to keep them 
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really happy with Slone and Vera. So if we need somebody to 
tell, messed things up, it's probably Tracy, if there's issues 
that come up. So I knew when they had told Ann that the option 
for me to go talk to Johan or 7-Eleven or anybody else about 
continuing to be able to move forward with Advanced Maintenance 
Systems or any kind of a maintenance company with 7-Eleven was 
effectively over and having discussed with her we arrived at 
the decision that the best option at this point would be to 
take the offer without any further squabble or fight and move 
on with our lives. 
Q. And what did you do about that? 
A. X went to the office Monday morning to have that 
discussion. It took a little while longer to have the 
[discussion than was indicated. I went into the office and 
actually checked my voice mail and answered a couple of e-
(mails. One specifically to Ann Atkin that morning about an 
issue that had been ongoing and then I sat down at the table 
Iwith Vera and Slone. 
Q. Was the matter you discussed to Miss Atkin by E-mails 
germane to any of the rest of this (inaudible)? 
A. Not really. We had had a gas pump and I was the guy 
in charge of getting it fixed and back on line and repaired and 
it was just giving her a heads up when that was going to be 
done. 
Q. Those errands out of the way, did you then have a 
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Idiscussion with the Porters? 
A. I did. And as with Saturday's and Sunday's meeting, 
the very first thing they did before we could proceed was start 
the tape recorder and enunciate who was going to be at the 
[meeting that morning. 
Q. And did they tell you on that occasion what the 
[purpose of the taping was? 
A. No. Although we had requested copies of the tape both 
Saturday, Sunday and again on Monday, we requested copies and 
Slone assured us each time that we would get copies of those 
tapes. He just not had time to make copies for us. Each time 
|he assured us that that would be the case. No problem. 
Q. Did you give the Porters any indication about your 
reaction to their offer? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did you tell them? 
A. I told them at that point that we were, we were 
[willing to accept the offer and move on and even, you know, 
it's pretty naive, even at that meeting, Slone had assured that 
in their conversations with Ann that Ann was prepared to allow 
|me to continue to do striping for 7-Eleven and maintain that 
contract. But I told them that we were ready to take the deal 
and that we just, we had a couple of issues that Vera wrote 
{down. 
Q. Can you recall (inaudible) a couple of additional 
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terms you wanted to add were? 
A. No. We had to deal with cell phones. We had to deal 
with health insurance. We were struggling with whether or not 
to have a no compete clause or that double negative you keep 
talking about, the no non-compete clause. 
Q. The no non-compete clause. 
A. Just those few, just a couple of things like that. 
Q. Did you suggest the no non-compete? 
A. I did. 
Q. Or the no, no, non-compete? 
A. I suggested that we both be able to pursue options in 
{whatever field. 
Q. Mr. Cowley, let me have you take a look at some 
(exhibits that have been, they're all still here. This is 
Plaintiffs Three. Would you take a look at that document? 
A. Number Three? 
Q. Yes. Those, well, tell us what they are? 
A. These are the things Vera wrote down that morning when 
we sat there in the office. 








Look them through, if you would Mr. Cowley, just for 
[purposes of refreshing your recollection and tell me if they 
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accurately reflect what your discussion was with Mrs. Porter at 
the time? 
A. They do accurately reflect that. 
Q. There is a, as I recall, a note in the upper corner,. 
July one? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You see that? Tell me what that signifies. 
A. That signified that it would be done by July first in 
conjunction with Vera's wishes that it all be done before the 
end of the second quarter. 
Q. At the point that that document was written up by Mrs. 
Porter, had you been told that Mr. de Besche was planning a 
trip to town and wanted to speak to? 
A. No. I had not. 
Q. With you and the Porters? Was Mrs. Cowley present on 
that occasion? 
A. She was not. 
Q. Why was she not? 
A. It's my fault. She was in the young women's and they 
had their young women's camp that week all scheduled. And she 
had agreed to be one of the camp directors and I just didn't 
feel like she could deal on that with them and we did come to 
an agreement on Sunday night that we were going to put the deal 
to bed and move on. 
Q. Had you discussed with Mrs. Cowley the additional 
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terms that you wanted (inaudible) Veralynn to add at that time? 
A. Yes. We had discussed it. 
Q. So that when you expressed to the Porters that this 
[was an arrangement acceptable to you, you were speaking for 
[both of the Cowleys (inaudible) ? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Did the Porters then suggest to you that they wanted 
to add or alter any of the terms that they had expressed to you 
on the twenty-second? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you make the choice at that point between the two 
[(properties of Listo that you wanted? 
A. I did. We chose the Midway property due to the fact 
that we had acquired the St. George property through Vera's 
family was selling it and we just felt like the decent thing to 
[do was let them keep the family property. 
Q. Upon transcribing the arrangement in handwriting as 
|you have (inaudible) Mr. Cowley, what transpired next? 
A. Vera wanted to get it typed up and signed and sealed 
so she went on over to the computer and typed it up. 
Q. Let me have you look on down at the next (inaudible) 
stack? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you'll look over here, perhaps this one doesn't 
Ihave (inaudible) . You may want to look at those two then 
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(possibly. Let me have you look at Exhibits Number Five and 
dumber Four in the Plaintiffs Exhibits if you would Mr. Cowley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me what those are if you know. 
A. This is what Vera typed up that morning. 
Q. The underlying typed material is identical. Is it 
not? 
A. It is correct. Yes. 
Q. Two copies of the same thing? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Alright. Do you recall, did you observe Mr. Porter 
sign his copy? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did he say anything to you at that point? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. He and Veralynn apparently left if I'm understanding 
correctly. 
A. Yes. Before they left I indicated to them that I 
|would not sign it until Kerin was back. Kerin, my wife, and 
just a precursor why I wouldn't sign it without her there when 
|we bought up the third partner, he had failed to tell his wife 
anything about leaving the company and I still did business 
[with Bill for years after that and she was pretty ticked at him 
for a long, long time that he hadn't told her that he was 
leaving AMS and moving on so. 
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MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor. That's hearsay. 
(Move to strike. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: It's always (inaudible). 
THE WITNESS: It is. It absolutely is. I just, I 
[didn't want to sign it without Kerin there. 
|BY MR. SMAY: 
Q. You didn't say to the Porters you weren't going to 
sign it period? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. In point of fact, you had told them up to that point 
that it was all agreeable to you? 
A. Yes. I had. 
Q. Did you indicate when you thought Mrs. Cowley might 
|be back to do that? 
A. No. I don't believe she got back until the twenty-
seventh. I'm not positive of that but yes. I indicated that's 
Iwhen she'd be back. 
Q. What then became of your copy of the document? 
A. After they left, I called Kerin to talk to her. She 
|had indicated that she was nervous about a no non-compete 
clause because she felt like as soon it was done, the Porters 
[would go buy striping equipment and then we would also lose the 
7-Eleven striping account as well. They'd start picking that 
up. And she wanted that changes so they wouldn't go into the 
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striping business. And I wrote Vera a note and left it on the 
desk. 
Q. And the note says? 
A. Vera, call me. With my initials. That's my writing. 
Q. And did Vera call you? 
A. She did. 
Q. And did you express to her that you had some concern 
about the no non-compete? 
A. I did. And she basically said you can't have it both 
|ways. You're either going to compete or you're not going to 
compete. And at that point I told her you know what, leave it 
as a no non-compete clause then. 
Q. Did you have any further discussion on the subject of 
the document that night? 
A. No. 
Q. Let me be clear about that. When did Mrs. Porter call 
|you back? 
A. It was in the afternoon, that afternoon she had called 
|me. 
Q. Within a few hours of leaving? 
A. Yes. Within a few hours of leaving. 
Q. Was anybody else attendant on that phone call? 
A. There was no one around me when she called. My boys 
were gone to my grandma's and I was home alone. 
Q. At that point, Mr. Cowley, who had the written copies 
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of that document, the one (inaudible) Mrs. Porter and the one 
(inaudible)? 
A. Vera had both of them. I left both of them at the 
office. I'm not sure who had them in their possession. 
Q. And did you keep the handwritten copy? 
A. I did. Yes. 
Q. I may have asked you Mr. Cowley but just very quickly, 
las far as you recall did the meeting of the twenty-fourth was 
[also tape recorded? 
A. Yes. It was. I believe I said that in my testimony. 
Q. Thank you and I just let it slip. Did Mr. Porter ever 
tell you thereafter what he had done with his copy of the 
[document that he had signed? 
A. In our meeting on the twenty-seventh after his 
visiting with Johan and Ann in the office he specifically told 
[us that he had showed Ann and Johan that agreement. 
Q. Well, let's go forward then to that, to those 
[discussions. If you wouldn't mind Mr. Cowley, when did you 
learn that there was going to be that discussion with Mr. de 
iBesche? 
A. Monday afternoon when I spoke with Slone. 
Q. And what did he say (inaudible) do you recall? 
A. He said that we had a meeting on Thursday. Johan was 
coming to town to investigate the whole matter. 
Q. And did anyone at 7-Eleven call and tell you to be 
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Q. You asked Mr. de Besche for some sort of coy of that 
(you said. 
A. I wanted a transcript. By then I kind of wanted to 
|hear what other people were telling 7-Eleven about me. 
Q. Did you ever get one? 
A. Finally through this case we got one. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Where did you go then, Mr. Cowley, following 
the meeting with 7-Eleven on June twenty-second? 
A. I went home. 
Q. Did you have nay further contact then on the twenty-
seventh with the Porters? 
A. We did. Yes. 
Q. Tell me how that occurred. 
A. We met at the office to discuss what had happened, 
(where we were both at. Four of us met at the office. Vera, 
Slone, Kerin and myself. 
Q. Alright. About what time of day would that have been? 
A. I believe it was early evening. I'm not certain. 
Q. What, was there a particular purpose for having that 
|meeting? 
A. Just, an informational meeting to see, you know, where 
everybody was at following our meeting with Johan. 
Q. At any time during the course of that meeting, Mr. 
Cowley, did the Porters suggest to you that what had transpired 
Iwith 7-Eleven earlier in the day had any effect whatever upon 
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the arrangement you had made with them on the twenty-fourth? 
A. They did not . 
Q. Did they suggest to you that they were withdrawing any 
|of that? Altering any of that? 
A. No. They did not. 
Q. Did you receive any funds from the Porters on that 
occasion? 
A. You know, I don't recall when we received funds for 
certain. But I know we did get funds from AMS's accounts. 
Q. Presuming that Mrs. Porter's testimony was correct 
that that was on the twenty-seventh, do you recall how much you 
got? 
A. I believe it was twenty-five thousand dollars. 
Q. And do you recall what the purpose of that was? 
A. She has testified that it was to give us operating 
[money. That's what I probably ought to leave it at. 
Q. Well, did you have an assessment of what it was for at 
the time? Do you remember? 
A. Yes. I think they need money to relogo all the vans 
[and change the names and get new paperwork in hand and 
effectively make QMS open for business. 
Q. When, Mr. Cowley, in any of your visits to the AMS 
office as you've described, did you observe anything that 
indicated a change between, excuse me, AMS and QMS? 
A. I believe it was, I'm not sure which night it was, 
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the bidding process. 
MR. SMAY: As it eventually turned out, yes she was. 
|The question of whether there was anyone else who was likely to 
succeed in that. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection, 
(inaudible) 
IBY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Mr. Cowley, tell us which contracts you understood AMS 
jhad before it became QMS, the business it was doing for 7-
feleven? 
A. General maintenance contract, fast food contract, 
(gasoline contract for hanging hardware, those are the major 
ones. 
Q. Thereafter, after the contracts were renewed with QMS, 
did you become aware of any changes in (inaudible)? 
A. My understanding was they, they picked up an 
additional contract on beverage and Slurpee at that point. 
Q. So they are actually doing more business? 
A. It would appear so. 
Q. Going back to the discussions that you apparently had 
|with the Porters on the twenty-seventh of June, two thousand 
two, did the question of performing an inventory of , what we 
call, hard assets, I take it equipment and so on, supplies of 
|AMS enter into those discussions? 
A. Yes. It did. 
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Q. How did that occur? 
A. Slone and I were going to perform it together, get the 
[guys' equipment list off their trucks and figure out what we 
[actually had. 
Q. Why did you want to do that? 
A. Well, I knew we had stripers and we had stencils and 
stuff like that sitting at the shop and it was just, I was 
curious. 
Q. Stripers and stencils are things that would have been 
used in the striping business? 
A. Straightline Striping, yes. 
Q. But is there anything in the documents that Mr. Porter 
(had signed and you had initialed which you understand to 
indicate that an inventory of that type was going to be 
required? 
A. No. 
Q. There is a sentence at the bottom to which I'm 
referring which seems to say that you're going to split the 
[equipment between the two companies. That's my reading of it, 
|you (inaudible), do you find that sentence, Mr. Porter? 
MR. PRICE: Excuse me, which document? 
THE WITNESS: The partnership buy out. 
MR. SMAY: These, Your Honor, are the two document 
that are the agreement (inaudible). 
THE COURT: (inaudible) 
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THE WITNESS: I can read t h a t l a s t s e n t e n c e i f y o u ' d 
l i k e ? 
|BY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Go ahead. 
A. "All Articles of Incorporation will be changed to 
{reflect this agreement. All cash and hard assets, equipment, 
[vehicles, logos, telephone numbers will remain the property of 
said corporation." 
Q. Could you separate the property between the two 
corporations in that way without performing this inventory? 
A. I think it would be pretty tough to not go through the 
shop and know what was there so you knew if you got it all. 
Q. Did the Porters ever suggest to you on that occasion, 
|Mr. Cowley, that the purpose of performing this inventory was 
to make some determination of what they'd give you for your 
share of AMS? 
A. No sir. We believed we already had agreement. 
Q. Did you ever suggest to them that you would accept an 
inventory for that purpose? 
A. I did not. 
Q. When, in fact, did you move out of the AMS premises? 
A. You know, there is some discrepancy there because I 
[believe I moved, I believe that Computer Works Inc in Heber 
City took my computer out of the office on Monday the twenty-
fifth to install it at my home and I believe I took all my 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - HEBER COURT <-> 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH <% 
[TRACY COWLEY Et al, 
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Case No: 030500244 
vs Bench Trial 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
SLONE PORTER Et al, 
Defendant. 
PROCEEDINGS ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE TRIAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on second day of June, two thousand 
four, the bench trial in the matter of Tracy Cowley Et al vs 
Slone Porter Et al was electronically recorded before the 
Honorable Judge Donald J. Eyre of the above entitled court at 
the Fourth Judicial Court building, Heber, Utah. 
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Attorney at Law 
174 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
For the Defendant: Christopher C. Hill 
Jeffery R. Price 
Darrel J. Bostwick 
Attorneys at Law 
57 West South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
PROCEEDINGS ON THE SECOND DAY OF THE TRIAL 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
|BY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Alright. Mr. Cowley, we had gotten to the subject of 
|an inventory yesterday. Do you recall that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And you had told us when, in your recollection, you 
Jhad left the AMS offices, taking your property away. In the 
time between June twenty-second and your taking your property 
lout and leaving AMS, had anyone mentioned to you any other 
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[price for your interest in AMS except ten thousand dollars a 
(month for a total of six hundred thousand dollars? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Had anyone suggested to you in any of that time that 
those kind of terms were going to be withdrawn or changed in 
any way? 
A. They had not. 
Q. Once you had left AMS on that morning, can you think 
of anything besides yourself that AMS had had which was not now 
under the control of QMS? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you aware of anything that QMS had at that point 
Miich had not come from AMS? 
A. No. I was not. 
Q. With respect to that, Mr. Cowley, about what business 
|QMS was to be doing (inaudible) tell us what you knew about 
that. 
A. My understanding of the business was they were working 
on a time and materials basis with 7-11 to do the same work we 
[had always done previously. I know they were still working for 
Resort Retailers in the Park City- Heber area and the other 
(minor things that were going on. 
Q. Just briefly Mr. Cowley, what was Resort Retailers? 
A. That's a licensee for 7-11. The only licensee in the 
State. 
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Q. They bought the 7-11 stores in Park City? 
A, They did. It's not corporate 7-11. It's a licensee. 
Q. And what was your understanding about future 7-11 
(business with QMS? 
A. My understanding was that it would be time and 
(materials following an investigation was conducted and once the 
investigation was conducted and the contracts were then open 
for bid that QMS would be allowed to bid based on the findings 
lof the investigation and would have the opportunity to pick the 
(work back up again. 
Q. Did you ever learn that an investigation had been 
[completed by 7-11? 
A. I did not ever get any results of the investigation. 
Q. Let's move forward then if we can to a meeting 
(reportedly on the nineteenth day of July in two thousand two, 
[Mr. Cowley. Do you recall a meeting on that day? 
A. I'm not positive on the date but I do recall a meeting 
that part of the month. Yes. 
Q. Where was it? 
A. At the old AMS offices, then QMS offices. 
Q. And who attended? 
A. Slone and Vera, Kerin and myself. 
Q. And what was the purpose of the meeting as you 
[understood it? 
A. The purpose of the meeting as I understood it was to, 
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[was t o f i n i s h t h e d e a l and t i e e v e r y t h i n g up i n a n i c e n e a t 
(bow. 
Q. Were you t o d i s c u s s t h e i n v e n t o r y a t t h a t p o i n t ? 
A. Yes we were . 
Q. And is that what you mean by finishing the deal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What again Mr. Cowley was your understanding of the 
|need for the inventory? 
A. Just to make sure we had everything in the right 
categories and to get a feel for what we actually had. 
Q. How then did the discussion on that occasion begin? 
A. We sat around the table, started discussing the 
inventories, applying some dollar figures for the inventories 
so we can kind of get a feel for what was there. Went back and 
forth a lot on what we thought. I wasn't really clear on what 
the worth of parts and stuff were so there was a lot of 
discussion. 
Q. Were you, Mr. Cowley, attempting to fix a precise 
|value of any of that material? 
A. I don't think anything was precise. I think it was a 
(pulling off the top of your head number. 
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor. That's non-
responsive to the question. 
THE COURT: That's a yes or no question. 
THE WITNESS: Repeat the question. I'm sorry. 
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|BY MR. SMAY: 
Q. The q u e s t i o n was were you a t t e m p t i n g t o d e t e r m i n e a 
[[precise v a l u a t i o n o f any of t h a t equipment or m a t e r i a l s ? 
A. No. 
Q. Apparently there came a point at which Mrs. Porter 
suggested you take half of the value of two hundred eight 
thousand dollars. Do you recall that? 
A. I do recall that. 
Q. How did that come about? 
A. We were adding up the parts and stuff. I think if you 
look at the list, they're not completed. Certainly there were 
a couple of lists but I don't think you'd find them complete. 
They ran a total. And Vera said that'll be, you'll get half of 
that. I at that point, I believe I got kind of angry because I 
really didn't believe that that's what we were there to change 
the whole deal. And I think if you look at the sheet I wrote 
final on it with the numbers they gave me and had Slone sign it 
[because I was just really surprised that that was the, what 
they were, they were trying to change the deal from what had 
[been agreed to, to a new number. And I took a copy of that 
Iwith me. 
Q. Did, was there a discussion about debt at that point? 
A. There was. 
Q. How did the figure of debt come up? 
A. That, Vera arrived at the debt figure. I never really 
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[actually agreed with it. I thought it was less than what she 
had said. 
Q. And why did she suggest that you should take half the 
debt? 
A. Because I was half owner of AMS and that was AMS's 
debt. 
Q. What was the debt attached to at that point? 
A. Vehicles. 
Q. And who was going to keep the vehicles? 
A. I was keeping one vehicle that had debt on it. They 
(were keeping the other. 
Q. How did you and Mrs. Cowley then react to the 
suggestion that you ought to be satisfied with half of two 
(hundred eighty thousand less some debt? 
A. We disagreed with that completely. 
Q. Mrs. Porter had suggested that you were carrying with 
krou at the time the handwritten note that she had made 
expressing or outlining a transaction for ten thousand dollars. 
pid you have the note with you at the time? 
A. I don't recollect having that note with me. No sir. 
Q. How did the conversation then turn to, or if it did, 
turn to the company being able to pay four thousand dollars a 
Jmonth? 
A. Very much the way they discussed it, that they arrived 
at a figure that they thought the company could bear at that 
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Q. And why did they suggest that that was the figure that 
the company could bear at that point? 
A. I don't know how they arrived at that figure other 
than it, just it's a number that they pulled out of their head. 
(Much less than they were obligated to. 
Q. Based upon what AMS had made in the past, did the 
figure four thousand dollars seem to you a fair estimate of 
[what the company could afford to pay? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. Did you have any reason to believe at that point, Mr. 
Porter, Mr. Cowley, that four thousand dollars a month was all 
that QMS could afford to pay for the next five years? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did the Porters suggest to you any reason why they 
thought the four thousand dollars a month was all that QMS 
could afford for the next five years? 
A. They suggested it because they were on time and 
[materials and they did not have the contracts back, that that 
|was all they could muster until that was resolved. 
Q. Until they had the contracts back? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you suggest, did you discuss at that point, Mr. 
[Cowley, when that issue about having the contracts back might 
be resolved? 
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A. We did. 
Q. And when did you? 
A. They indicated that they felt the contracts would be 
(resolved in the fall. 
Q. And did you suggest then something to do about that in 
the fall? 
A. I did. I suggested we meet again in the fall. 
Q. I gather at that point or shortly after that point you 
and Mrs. Cowley left? 
A. We did. 
Q. But there is alleged to have been a phone call. 
A. There was a phone call. 
Q. Later on that evening? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And by a phone call, tell me what you mean, Mr. 
Cowley. 
A. I called Slone. 
Q. And what did you call him about? 
A. To tell him that we would take the four thousand 
[dollars a month to allow them to get on their feet until the 
fall. 
Q. Did you suggest to Mr. Porter at that point that you 
would be happy to take four thousand dollars a month for five 
|years for your entire interest in AMS? 
A. No sir. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



























for four thousand dollars and volunteer to sign such a thing? 
A. I did not. And had I asked her to write it down or 
type it up it would have been very similar to the meeting on 
the twenty-fourth of June. I'd of sat there till it was done 
and signed it. 
Q. Did anything transpire between the meeting on the 
nineteenth of July and a subsequent meeting in October as I 
understand by which you understood the Porters to withdraw or 
qualify the earlier arrangement, that six hundred thousand 
dollars? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Do you happen to recall what the date was of your next 
|meeting with the? 
A. I really don't recall the actual date. 
Q. How did you come to choose the time in October to go 
land see them? 
A. It was fall. I had actually, either I or Kerin, I 
jdon't recall who had called the office and spoke with Gale 
Stout, the secretary, to inquire as to whether or not the 
contracts had been renewed. 
Q. And what did you learn? 
A. Gale. 
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor. It calls for 
|hear say. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Sustained. 
fcY MR. SMAY: 
Q. What did you believe Mr. Cowley when you came away 
from the, the discussion with Mrs. Stout? 
MR. PRICE: Same objection, Your Honor. 
MR. SMAY: I'm simply asking (inaudible) for a 
(meeting, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, just ask, if you ask what he did in 
response to that. 
IBY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Okay. What did you do in response? 
A. In response to that I called Slone and asked for a 
(meeting. 
Q. Did you tell Slone what you wanted the meeting for? 
A. I told him we needed to meet about finishing up. 
Q. And Mr. Porter said fine, let's have a meeting, I take 
it. 
A. He did. 
Q. Tell me where this meeting took place. 
A. At the QMS office. 
Q. And who was there? 
A. Slone and Vera, Kerin and myself. 
Q. Did you take to that meeting, Mr. Cowley, the 
handwritten note about the ten thousand dollar agreement? 
A. Not that I recall. No. 
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Q. And tell me then Mr. Cowley what conversation 
transpired at your meeting in October. 
A. We told them at that point that we needed to get the 
(monies up to what the agreement was. At that point they, we 
also discussed some tax information, we pulled some, Vera had 
bulled some reports to, that we could turn into Gary Ward for 
our taxes and they said they would consider that and let us 
know. 
Q. I just asked Mrs. Porter yesterday that they didn't 
say to you sorry, we have a four thousand dollar deal? 
A. They did not. 
Q. And when you came away from that meeting, Mr. Cowley, 
r^tiat did you expect to happen next? 
A. I expected to get a phone call and have it resolved. 
Q. Did you get such a phone call? 
A. I did not. 
Q. What did you do about that? 
A. I called Vera myself. 
Q. And what did you find out? 
A. At that point Vera made me aware that they had sought 
legal counsel and that they felt they had a binding verbal 
agreement because they had made three payments in August, 
September and October. 
Q. Did she tell you whether they were going to then bring 
the payments up to the ten thousand dollars? 
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A. She said absolutely not. They were standing by a four 
thousand dollar verbal agreement. 
Q. At that point, Mr. Cowley, in addition to the 
(handwritten note that you had, did you have any written or 
signed documents respecting? 
A. No. As, as per my testimony yesterday as well as 
IVeralynn's testimony yesterday, those, those printed copies of 
|our original contract remained in their possession. 
Q. Didn't have any of the tapes? 
A. I did not. We never could get the copies of the 
tapes. 
Q. Did you have anything else with which you thought you 
|(might be able to prove existence of the ten thousand dollar 
contract? 
A. The only thing I had that, that was at least any proof 
to myself about our contract was the handwritten paper that 
[Vera had written. It's the only thing I had in my possession. 
Q. You then sought counsel I assume? 
A. It actually took me a week after that conversation to 
[get where I would go seek legal counsel. But yes, I did. 
Q. And you spoke first to Mr. Savage? 
A. I was, I was referred to Scott Savage by a friend in 
town that said he'd be good to go talk to. 
Q. And you're friend was right. Did you explain to Mr. 
Savage the series of events about which you testified here ir 
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A. I did. 
Q. Did you explain to him your absence of papers in your 
(possession? 
A. I. 
Q. In that conversation? 
A. I did. In fact I took the handwritten note with us 
[for our first meeting so that he could see the one piece of 
evidence I had for what my claim was. 
Q. And did Mr. Savage give you any advice about whether 
|you could at that point, given what you had, prove an 
agreement? 
A. He told me that that handwritten note would not stand 
[up in court. It had no signatures on it and that the case 
[would need to pursue, be pursued a different direction. 
Q. Mr. Savage then referred you to me? 
A. He did. 
Q. Did you have a similar conversation with me? 
A. I did. I had almost the identical conversation with 
[|you. 
Q. And received, I take it, the same advice? 
A. Yes. Received the same information. 
Q. You should have there on your desk, Mr. Cowley, a set 
of exhibits. I'm just going to ask you to turn over to number 
thirty-three. 
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Q. Do you find anything in Mr. Porter's affidavit that 
alerts The Court to that set of circumstances? 
A. No. Based on his affidavit you would think after that 
date they. 
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor. This is total 
speculation about what Mr. Porter knew or didn't know and 
(inaudible). 
MR. SMAY: This had nothing to do about what Mr. 
Porter knew, it's what he said. 
THE COURT: How is it helpful to The Court, Mr. 
Cowley? 
MR. SMAY: Well, it's. 
THE COURT: Interpretation. 
MR. SMAY: By way of showing what Mr. Cowley then 
(inaudible) taken , there's going to be lots of cross 
[examination because Mr. Cowley thereafter said we didn't have 
ian agreement. Well, obviously the fact that he couldn't prove 
it and couldn't make the Porters confess to it (inaudible) that 
seems to be as important to The Court to know that. 
THE COURT: Well, you have elicited that information 
[based upon his conversation with his attorneys. 
IBY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Mr. Cowley, let me refer you down to one further 
|question here, look at paragraph fourteen. 
A. Okay. 
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Q. "One June twenty-fifth my wife and I incorporated a 
new business under the name of Quality Maintenance Systems and 
[proceeded from that time to attempt to find work for Quality." 
A. Is that true in your understanding? 
A. That is not. It's true that, it's true they formed 
[Quality Maintenance on that date but they immediately went to 
[work doing the same work Advanced Maintenance Services had done 
in the past. 
Q. Come down then to the last of the paragraphs we were 
|discussing before, Mr. Cowley. "The Cowleys have no ownership 
interest in Quality nor are they entitled to any of the 
[business proceeds obtained by Quality." How did you understand 
the Porters had told you that you were going to be paid 
[whatever it was you were going to be paid? 
A. The payments that we received in August, September and 
October all came from Quality Maintenance. 
Q. And did, Mr. Cowley, the fact that you had thus been 
apprized of what the likely position of the Porters is going to 
|be in August affect your testimony for example in depositions 
later on in the year? 
A. It absolute did. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Cowley, as of today have you ever doubted that you 
[had an agreement with the Porters? 
A. No. I have not. 
Q. To pay you six hundred thousand dollars over five 
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|years for your interest in AMS? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Just out of curiosity, Mr. Cowley, do you think that's 
[a fair price for your interest in AMS? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. That's all I have for Mr. Cowley. 
THE COURT: Cross, Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: Thank you, Your Honor. We would move to 
|publish a deposition of both Mrs. Cowley and Mr. Cowley at this 
time. 
THE COURT: (inaudible) have published depositions 
(inaudible). 
MR. PRICE: As long as that's true. I'm sorry. We 
Iwill have it. 
THE COURT: You can use them though. 
MR. PRICE: (inaudible) 
UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible) 
MR. PRICE: May I approach Mr. Cowley? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. I ask you, if you would Mr. Cowley, to turn to Exhibit 
iNumber Twenty-six, in the black binder. 
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A. Yes s i r . 
Q. Take a look a t those documents contained i n Exhibi t 
Twenty-six and I ' l l ask you a couple of quest ions about tha t . 
A. Okay. 
Q. Have you seen those documents before today? 
A. I have. 
Q. These documents are a letter from me to your attorney, 
|your then attorney Mr. Savage. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And it contains the draft of the agreement that we 
|were turning over for you to sign which the Porters have 
asserted constitutes a summary of the agreement that was 
reached in July of two thousand two. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You had that document, did you not, prior to filing 
[your lawsuit? 
A. Yes. I did as a matter of fact. Yes. 
Q. Well, you had that document prior to going to see Mr. 
Smay. Isn't that correct? 
A. I believe Scott Savage sent it directly to Mr. Smay. 
Q. So it wasn't really correct when you said all you had 
lin hand when you filed your lawsuit regarding what was going to 
(proved and what was going to be asserted about this was merely 
the written documents of June that had been typed up by her. 
Isn't that correct? 
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MR. SMAY: Objection. It mis-characterizes the 
testimony. This obviously is not a proof of a contract. This 
is an unsigned document. 
THE COURT: Well, overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. I had this document in my 
[possession but did not feel it accurately, accurately reflected 
the contract that we had arranged. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. You didn't feel it accurately reflected, reflected the 
{contract? 
A. Reflected. Yes. 
Q. But you did believe you had a contract as of the time 
tyou got this letter? 
A. I did. 
Q. Okay. That's not what showed up in the pleadings. 
IWas it? 
A. No sir. 
Q. I'd like you to turn now to Exhibit Twenty-nine. 
A. Okay. 
MR. SMAY: I also object to Exhibit Twenty-nine, Your 
Honor. It's a (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Is it Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: It isn't, Your Honor. They just offered 
testimony about this letter and his conversation. In fact they 
Iwaived their attorney client privilege in talking about 
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conversations that he had with their attorney, Mr. Savage. 
MR. SMAY: Please let me know as soon as possible if 
(your clients have any interest in negotiating the settlement 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, what's your intention to use it for, 
(Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: My intent to use it is to establish what 
their position was in this case as of February fifth two 
thousand three and it has to do with the issues with respect to 
two hundred and forty thousand, a payment of four thousand 
dollars per month and what they knew that to be which was there 
|was no agreement reached. 
THE COURT: Well, the pleadings in this case I think 
speak for themselves. If it is discussions of potential 
settlement then it is. 
MR. PRICE: There were no discussions of potential 
settlement, Your Honor. They've already testified and used 
this letter for what they see to be their own benefit and now 
they want to preclude us from using it to put the entire record 
down. 
THE COURT: Well, if they asked a question about it. 
MR. SMAY: We've never mentioned the letter, Your 
Honor. It's clearly a (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, you did go into, you did go into 
[discussions that he had had with Mr. Savage. You did go into 
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[discussions that he had had with you so. 
MR. SMAY: Well, we could ask Mr. Cowley (inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Mr. Cowley, may I ask you to turn to the first page of 
that Exhibit Number Twenty-nine. 
A. I'm there. 
Q. And what (inaudible) the last full paragraph on page 
lone. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And as of that date, February fifth two thousand 
three, you denied that there was an agreement for two hundred 
and forty thousand, that there was any agreement paying four 
thousand a month. Correct? 
A. On the advice of legal counsel I did. 
MR. SMAY: We'll take a continuing objection, Your 
[Honor, to any use of the letter whatever. 
THE COURT: You may have a continuing objection. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Okay. Then on page two, the second full paragraph, it 
indicates that on July first two thousand two, our clients, 
that is the Porters, proposed that the business be divided 
[among other things six hundred thousand in monthly payments for 
ten thousand dollars and Straightline Striping at that time 
lenjoyed a seven thousand dollars a month contract with 
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S o u t h l i n e . Do you s e e t h a t ? 
A. I do . 
Q. Southline was then a 7-11 corporation. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And is the prior owners of 7-11 Corporation. Is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. It is. 
Q. It was only after the issues and then later there at 
the bottom you said, the last paragraph, your attorney tells 
|us, nevertheless, my clients, this is the last sentence of the 
last paragraph at the bottom of page two, it says, nevertheless 
|my clients, that would be the Cowleys. Correct? 
A. Yes. That would be correct. 
Q. Firmly believe that any fair evaluation of their fifty 
[percent interest in the business as of July first two thousand 
two is much greater than the sum proposed and would have no 
choice but to seek redress in court if we cannot negotiate a 
resolution. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. This letter is really a threat to sue. Wasn't it? 
A. No. I don't believe so. I believe it was a letter to 
ask them to reconsider their position. 
Q. But you didn't believe at that time six hundred 
thousand dollars was a fair amount. Did you? 
A. Actually, I believed I accepted an offer for six 
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[hundred thousand dollars on the twenty-fourth of June. 
Q. I understand that's what you believe but as of that 
boint in time the position you were taking is that you didn't 
[pelieve six hundred thousand dollars was a fair offer. 
MR. SMAY: Objection. Entirely mis-characterizes the 
letter. 
THE COURT: The letter speaks for itself. 
MR. PRICE: Your Honor, we'd offer Exhibit Twenty-
nine in evidence. 
MR. SMAY: We'd object again, Your Honor. It clearly 
says this is to negotiate a resolution. Please let me know if 
[you have any interest in negotiating. This is a settlement 
letter. 
THE COURT: Well, you brought up the issue of what his 
[understanding was with respect to his attorneys. Based there 
kipon, I think it is relative and you waived the privilege. I'm 
going to receive. 
MR. PRICE: And I'm not sure, Your Honor, but we'd 
also offer Twenty-six in evidence (inaudible) it wasn't 
|yesterday. 
THE COURT: Didn't we already receive Twenty-six? 
CLERK OF THE COURT: No. 
MR. PRICE: We did not. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to Twenty-six? 
MR. SMAY: I thought it was put in yesterday. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



























MR. PRICE: We talked about it. 
THE COURT: Now it's received. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Thank you, Your Honor. Okay, I'd like to return now 
to the discussion about the events of June two thousand two. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I would like you to explain to The Court if you could 
lyour understanding of what the terms of the offer that the 
Porters made on June the twenty-second. I believe you referred 
to that as an ultimatum? 
A. I did at the time. 
Q. What were the terms of the ultimatum as you described 
it? 
A. It was a take it or leave it. If you don't take the 
[offer then we'll line up all the trucks. We'll divide up all 
the assets. You'll take half. We'll take half and we'll go on 
about our merry way. 
Q. What were the terms of the ultimatum? What was the 
loffer? 
A. Six hundred thousand dollars, half of the current bank 
accounts, our life insurance policies, our retirement accounts, 
one of the two rental homes, my truck, Straightline Striping, I 
(believe that's pretty close to it. I'm not positive. 
Q. Those are the terms of what the Porters offered you on 
the twenty-second? 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Anything else you can think of? 
A. Through the discussions they had assured me that 
(inaudible) had, not on the twenty-second, sorry. On the 
twenty-second, that's my understanding. 
Q. Okay. What I would like you to do is turn now, if you 
[would, to Exhibits Five and Seven. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Five is actually in here. Seven is in Plaintiffs 
Exhibits. 
A. Thank you. 
Q. Well, let's just look at one, look at Five. Five 
should be a typed up version of the handwritten document. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. On the twenty-fourth. Right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Just so I'm clear, Mr. Cowley, in terms of 
those terms that are set out in Exhibit Number Five. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were those intended to be in addition to the offer, 
the items offered by the Porters on the twenty-second or were 
these to be instead of the offer of the twenty-second? 
A. The only thing that this does not list that was their 
[original offer was the cash on hand of the company and it's not 
in here so I'm not sure. I believe this was our total contract 
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so I think this is instead of what they had offered. 
Q. And that is what you claim in this case you agreed to 
|with the Porters . Correct? 
A. It is what I agreed to with the Porters. 
Q. And the one copy was signed by Slone Porter. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. We'll get to the other one in just a moment. Mr. 
(Cowley, I want to ask, with respect to the four thousand 
dollars you received payments consistently every month 
(inaudible) four thousand dollars. Correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that money has been cashed by you, your wife. Is 
that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And there has been no correspondence ever back to the 
Porters, the fact that we didn't have a deal, we're not taking 
this money, anything like that. 
A. There was never a deal that we wouldn't take the 
(money. Certainly we approached the Porters in October as per 
||my testimony about bringing that payment up to the agreement. 
Q. Okay. I'd like to take you back now to the meetings 
and discussions of June the twenty-fourth. Okay? 
A. Okay. As I understand your testimony you arrived 
sometime in the morning. 
A. I did. 
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Q. And that you took care of some business, some emails I 
think and then you met with Vera, began discussions with 
[IVeralynn Porter concerning what is now Exhibit Five. Is that 
correct? 
A. Veralynn and Slone. 
Q. And Slone came into the discussion. Is that correct? 
A. Slone was in the discussion when it started. He's the 
lone that turned on the tape recorder when we started that 
discussion. 
Q. Okay. Okay. And from that discussion you and 
|Veralynn came up with a handwritten note. Isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. Prior to ever typing the note, we sat there at 
the table. Slone, Vera looked at Slone and said I can agree to 
this set of terms if you'11 agree to engage in the company and 
|go to work. And Slone said I, I'll go to work. 
Q. Okay. With those terms that are on the handwritten 
[note that later got typed up, those aren't something Veralynn 
[wrote down. Are they? 
A. No. They are the terms we arrived at. 
Q. Okay. That was in a discussion with you. Now what I 
[want to do is move on to see what happened after the 
handwritten note was made? 
A. Vera went, well, we had the conversation about Slone's 
[engaging in the company and Vera went over to the computer and 
typed it up. 
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Q. Where were you when she v»as typing it up? 
A. I believe I was trying to communicate with my wife 
lover the phone. She was on her way to Jackson Hole and her 
[cellphone really sucked that day. We couldn't get through 
[hardly at all. I'd get about three words in before I'd lose 
Iher. 
Q. And then it got typed up. How long did it take to 
type them up? 
A. A couple of minutes. 
Q. Okay. It's true, isn't it, she printed out two 
copies? 
A. She did. 
Q. One to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And one to Slone? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I watched Slone sign his* 
Q. Okay. 
A. Stood there. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And at that point I told them I would be happy to sign 
it once Kerin got back and could actually read the agreement 
and understand what the terms were. Because we were having a 
[hard time getting through on the cell phone, I couldn't get it, 
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help her understand i t . 
Q. Okay. She a t some point came back. Didn't she? 
A. She d id . 
Q. You never did sign it. Did you? 
A. I never had the paper back in my possession to be able 
to sign it. 
Q. Did you ever ask for it back? 
A. I felt like they would provide it for me when we met 
(again. 
Q. So the answer is no, you never asked for it back. 
Correct? 
A. I don't recall asking for it back. 
Q. And that day you did not sign the document. Did you? 
A. No. I wrote Vera a note on the document and left it 
on the desk. 
Q. And you wrote your initials next to the note. Isn't 
that right? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. You still have some issues you wanted to discuss. 
Isn't that right? 
A. The only thing I wanted to discuss was the no non-
compete clause on striping, I believe. 
Q. Okay. Anything having to do with insurance? 
A. Yes. I think I had a concern about insurance. 
Q. That wasn't dealt with in the handwritten document 
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A. No. I don't believe so. 
Q. (inaudible) that was typed up and filed? 
A. Right. 
Q. Your initials on that document do not, are not there 
for the purposes of you accepting that document. Are they? 
A. I had already accepted the agreement. I didn't feel 
Jlike, at that point, it was on a tape recording that I had 
accepted it. I just wanted to clarify two issues. 
Q. Alright. Then what happened? 
A. I left. Vera called later that day. We discussed the 
two issues that I had. The insurance was carried through the 
[end of the year and we backed off of the no non-compete on 
striping. She wanted, she was adamant that it was either we 
[were going to have a no non-compete or we were not. And if I 
expected to be doing any maintenance work, we better have a no 
non-compete. 
Q. At that point in time, your wife still hadn't, she was 
|gone that day. Right? 
A. She was. 
Q. Your wife wouldn't have any knowledge about what 
[happened that day other than what you told her. Right? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Alright. Now, on that day did you call Ann Atkin? 
A. I did. 
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Q. And when did you call her in relationship to the 
telephone conversation you had with Veralynn Porter? 
A. I don't recall if it was before or after I talked to 
[Vera. I'm not sure. I know that I spoke with Slone after 
Ann's phone call but I don't recall where that was in 
relationship to my conversation with Vera. 
Q. Okay. Tell me what Ann wanted you to do. 
A. That I certainly would not be continuing to do any 
|work for 7-11. That Straightline Striping had been fired and 
that there was no way I would ever do business with them again 
or any company that I had anything to do with would do business 
[with them again. 
Q. That included AMS. Didn't it? 
A. She never did say AMS is fired. 
Q. I ask you, if you would, to turn to the deposition 
transcript of your wife, Kerin Cowley. 
A. Got it. Where do you want me to go? 
Q. I'd like you to turn to pages one-o-two to one-o-
three, if you would. 
MR. SMAY: Excuse me. Are we now using Mrs. Cowley's 
|deposition to impeach Mr. Cowley? 
MR. PRICE: Yes. We are. 
MR. SMAY: That's clearly improper. 
MR. PRICE: I don't believe it is. We will 
(inaudible) the testimony to show. 
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MR. SMAY: You may use the deposition of a witness to 
impeach that witness. 
THE COURT: Well, let's, he hasn't asked the question 
lyet. We'll deal with that issue. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Are you there? 
A. I'm there. 
Q. I want to take up the questioning on Line eighteen of 
|page one-o-two. And the way I'd like to proceed, Mr. Cowley, 
if we could, is that I'm going to read the question and I would 
|ask you to please read the answer. Okay? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Question. 
MR. SMAY: Same objection, Your Honor. 
MR. PRICE: Beginning of line eighteen. And on that 
jday, on Monday. 
THE COURT: How are you, how could you use the 
(deposition of someone else to impeach his testimony? 
MR. PRICE: Because she testifies that he told me, 
(meaning Tracy Cowley told her that he talked to Ann Atkin and 
what he told her about that, that discussion is different that 
[what he's just testified about. 
MR. SMAY: Well, he can get that from Mrs. Cowley if 
he wishes to do so. 
THE COURT: Well, go ahead. Overruled. Go ahead. 
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(BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Okay. Reading the beginning of line eighteen; "And on 
that day, on Monday, do you know whether or not your husband 
[had a conversation with Miss Atkin?" 
A. "He told me that he had called Ann. Yes." 
Q. "Do you know what the purpose of that call was?" 
A. "I think the purpose, I think the purpose of the call 
Iwas to kind of feel her out for conversation on Sunday that we 
|were not invited to or privy to. " 
Q. "And anything else?" 
A. "Possibly to see if he took over Straightline if we 
|would still be able to perform striping for them. At which 
time she told, she said no, absolutely not." 
Q. "Do you know why she said absolutely not?" 
A. "Yes. Because she said that he was scum and an 
[embezzler and all kinds of things. I think she was venting and 
she said as far as, I believe she said as far as that also that 
|AMS was done as well." 
MR. SMAY: At this point, Your Honor, (inaudible) 
renew the objection about Mrs. Cowley's. 
THE COURT: That's clearly not interested Mr. Price. 
(That's her impression and. 
MR. PRICE: Of what he told her. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PRICE: Okay. (inaudible) 
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THE COURT: I t ' s n o t h e l p f u l t o The Court . 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. W e ' l l t ake t h a t up wi th h e r , Your Honor. Okay. I ' d 
l i k e you t o t u r n , i f you would, t o E x h i b i t Number T h i r t y - n i n e . 
|Are you t h e r e ? 
A. I am. 
Q. Isn't it true at some point in time that the Porters 
attempted to change their proposal on the six hundred thousand 
[dollars? 
A. Yes. It is. 
Q. When did that happen? 
A. In October. 
Q. I'd like you to turn to page. 
A. Excuse me. The first time they tried to change it was 
in July. I'm sorry. I mis-spoke. 
Q. I'd like you to turn, if you would, to page number 
three of Exhibit Thirty-nine and we'11 talk about paragraph 
thirteen. First of all do you recognize this document, Exhibit 
Thirty-nine? 
A. I do. 
Q. And will you identify the document for The Court? 
A. It is labeled as Tracy Cowley's Response to Request 
for Admissions. 
Q. Have you seen that document before today? 
A. I have. 
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Q. Were you involved in any way ( inaudible)? 
A. I was. 
Q. What was your involvement? 
A. I sat with Craig Smay and completed it. 
Q. In fact, I ask you to turn to the second to the last 
[page of that document, if you would. 
UNKNOWN: Third to the last. 
fcY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Third to the last page. Excuse me. Right. The third 
to the last page. 
A. Okay. 
Q. You see that? That's your signature. Isn't it? 
A. Whoops. Sorry. That is correct. 
Q. In response to request admission number thirteen, 
(would you please read for The Court what, what you said? 
A. Number thirteen? 
Q. Yes. 
A. "Admit that on or about June twenty-seventh, you 
[attended a meeting with the Porters at which the dissolution of 
|AMS was discussed. 
Q. Okay. And the answer there of number thirteen? 
A. "Admit that on at least June twenty-second, twenty-
third, twenty-fourth, the Porters proposed acquisition of them, 
|by them of Plaintiffs interest in Advanced Maintenance Services 
and then on June twenty-seventh, Porters substantially altered 
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the terms previously proposed. Deny the remainder." 
Q. So that was June the twenty-seventh that they, they 
(proposed to alter the terms previously proposed. Correct? 
A. That is what this says. Yes. 
Q. So your testimony previously the first time you heard 
about a change was in July isn't correct. Isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is there a reason why? 
A. I, you know, I'm not, the dates are what's bizarre on 
this. I don't believe the dates are correct. 
Q. That's your signature and you signed it? 
A. It absolutely is. I may have mis-spoke. I don't, I. 
Q. I'd like you to turn also to paragraph number sixteen, 
if you would, of the admissions. 
A. Okay. I believe that's a typo. It should have said 
July twenty-seventh. But I'm not sure. 
Q. Which is a typo, Mr. Cowley? 
A. The date. Instead of June it should have been July. 
|And I did not catch it when I reviewed the document. 
Q. Is there any other reference at all on this page to 
July twenty-seventh anywhere, Mr. Cowley? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. There was no meetings that day. Was there? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Okay. Why would it say July the twenty-seventh then? 
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A. I don't know. Our meeting to discuss the changes was 
[when we discussed the inventory that was done. 
Q. I'd like you to look at request number sixteen, if you 
would. 
A. Certainly. 
Q. Okay. That day it says, Admit, this is the question, 
I'll read it. It says, "Admit that at this meeting on or about 
June twenty-seventh that you took possession of the striping 
equipment owned by AMS along with three vehicles previously 
owned by AMS and it identifies the vehicles and a third was 
thereafter." And would you please read your answer? 
A. "Admit that on or about June twenty-second Porters 
[proposed to acquire Plaintiffs share of Advanced Maintenance 
Service for among other things payment of half a million 
[dollars at ten thousand a month and transfer of control of 
Straightline and service agreement with 7-11 in place and that 
|on or about June twenty-seventh pursuant to proposal Porters 
insisted that Plaintiffs take possession of the equipment at 
Straightline including listed vehicles. Porters insisted they 
[would not take the two older vehicles which had previously been 
offered for sale unsuccessfully. Plaintiffs took possession of 
such equipment while reserving agreement to the proposed terms. 
(Deny remainder." 
Q. So you reserved agreement on the other proposed terms. 
Isn't that right? 
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A. That's what it says. 
Q. Okay. So you hadn't reached an agreement. 
MR. SMAY: No. That's not what it says. 
THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
MR. SMAY: (inaudible) the proposed terms about the 
two vehicles. 
MR. PRICE: It says what it says. 
THE WITNESS: If you, if you look at the agreement it 
said thirty thousand dollars for a new vehicle for Straightline 
Striping. Their point on the vehicles was that we're getting 
|you two vehicles you can work, use to work Straightline 
Striping. Instead of the thirty thousand. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Can you show me Exhibit Five where those terms show 
up? 
A. I can't. They're not there. 
Q. They don't. Do they? 
A. They are not there. 
Q. You were reserving terms, you were reserving agreement 
|on terms. Weren't you? Were you or were you not? 
MR. SMAY: The document speaks for itself, Mr. Price. 
THE COURT: Can you answer the question? 
THE WITNESS: I was reserving agreement to the 
|proposed terms on the vehicles. Yes. 
Q. Nothing else? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



























A. Not that, not that I recall. 
Q. Well, we still have issues on no non-compete 
(agreements. You still have issues on life insurance. 
A. Not, I think we had resolved the no non-compete issues 
when Vera and I spoke on the phone concerning the agreement. 
Q. Okay. I would like you. 
A. And the insurance issues. 
Q. I'd like you to turn, if you would, to your 
(deposition. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I believe it's going to be volume two. 
A. The thick one or the thin one? 
Q. Excuse me. May I approach, Your Honor? 
MR. SMAY: Volume two is the thicker one. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. Got it. 
MR. PRICE: 
Q. That would have been a longer day. I ask you if you 
Jwould also to turn, in conjunction with that, to Exhibit Number 
Twelve. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you recognize the documents in Exhibit Twelve? 
A. I do. 
Q. Turning now to your deposition at page two-o-nine, two 
ten, do you recall, do you recall having your deposition taken? 
A. I do. 
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Q. Do you r e c a l l i t occurred in two se s s ions? 
A. I do. 
Q. This would have been the second session on November 
eighteenth of two thousand three. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And I was asking you some questions about Ann Atkin 
botes from your, from the meeting with Johan de Besch. Do you 
recall that? 
A. I do recall that. 
Q. And those notes are found in Exhibit Twelve. Correct? 
A. They are correct. That is correct. 
Q. Alright. And I would like to pick up the questioning 
then at page twenty-five of line twenty-five of page two-o-
Inine. Again, I'll ask the question if you'll read the answer 
[again. Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Question; "What I would like you to do is go through 
those." Let's pick it back up for the reference, let's pick it 
|back up. 
UNKNOWN: Line eight. 
IBY MR. PRICE: 
Q. We'll pick it back up at line fourteen. Okay. 
|Question; "What I would like you to do is go through those 
notes and I believe that the order of the notes is the first 
note pertaining to the meeting that you had with Johan." 
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Q. "Is that correct?" 
A. "That is correct." 
Q. "And then later I think there are some notes 
[pertaining to the meeting that was held between Johan and the 
Porters. Is that correct?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "What I'd like you to do is go through those, if you 
jwould, and identify anything in those notes that you believe is 
incorrect, inaccurate, untrue, incomplete or with which you 
(don't agree. Could you do that for me?" 
A. "I could." 
MR. SMAY: (inaudible) I'm going to object, Your 
[Honor. It's an improper use of the deposition. He has the man 
on the stand. He has the notes on the stand. If he wants to 
ask those questions and the testimony is then different than 
this, then he can do that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Price, you haven't, you haven't listed 
any information about this to impeach. 
MR. PRICE: I'm getting to it, Your Honor, in just a 
(moment when he answers this question. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. You said you could and I'll pick it up at line sever 
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there. Okay? And you're answer? 
A. "My only, I think an area that I was wrong in was when 
jhe was asking about who chose to come forward, we had discussed 
that on Saturday and it was an amicable parting of the ways. 
[Parting by all four people I believe I put that in there to 
protect AMS, to help them continue to do work for 7-11. But I 
think it's accurate to say that it was not what I had 
[envisioned. I enjoyed the last year working." 
Q. "Okay." 
A. Keep going? 
Q. Yes sir. 
MR. SMAY: Same objection, Your Honor. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. This is it. 
A. "I believe it's accurate that I said I should know by 
the end of the month what our deal is going to be." 
Q. As of the twenty-seventh you didn't know what your 
[deal was going to be. Did you? 
MR. SMAY: Object. Nothing here to impeach. Sorry. 
THE COURT: There's no reference to a specific date. 
MR. PRICE: It is. These are notes of the twenty-
seventh meeting with Johan de Besch. As of the twenty-seventh 
[he had testified his deposition, "I believe it's accurate that 
I said I should know by the end of the month, in June of two 
thousand two, what our deal is going to be." 
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MR. SMAY: Same objection. (inaudible) 
THE WITNESS: Would you like me to answer or do I need 
to read the answer here? 
MR. SMAY: Is this could be impeachment to is plainly 
improper use of the deposition. 
THE COURT: Well, he's impeaching his prior testimony 
(inaudible) agreed to the deal on the twenty, twenty-fourth. 
MR. SMAY: (inaudible), Your Honor. 
THE WITNESS: What? 
MR. SMAY: He hasn't asked him that. 
THE COURT: Well, he's asking that earlier in his 
testimony today. What he's (inaudible) is that. 
MR. SMAY: That he's not asking that earlier in the 
testimony of the deposition. It's an entirely different 
context and it's improper. 
THE COURT: For whatever it's worth, it's in. 
THE WITNESS: When I met with Johan my goal at that 
(point was to make sure that AMS could continue to work. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. There's not a question pending, Mr. Cowley. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Mr. Cowley, did you ever reach an agreement on the 
[amount of payout that you were to receive (inaudible)? 
A. We did. 
Q. Could you read in your deposition at page two thirty-
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three if you would. 
A. I'm there. 
Q. Make sure I'm at the right place. Okay. I'd like to 
|pick it up at page two thirty-two, if we could. 
MR. SMAY: Same objection, Your Honor. It's an 
|entirely improper use of the deposition. 
MR. PRICE: It isn't, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Why are you, well, he hasn't asked the 
[question yet. 
MR. SMAY: He did. 
MR. PRICE: Yes. I did ask him a question. I asked 
him whether or not they ever agreed to the amount of the 
payout. 
Okay. 
For his interest. 
Okay. 






THE COURT: Go ahead. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. I want to pick it up at page thirty-two or two thirty, 
two thirty-three and let's pick it up, let me make sure I got 
the reference (inaudible). Okay. Back on page two thirty-one, 
I started asking questions about the meeting on July 
seventeenth (inaudible) and we're at line twenty-one. You see 
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A. I do. 
Q. Okay. "I think we're ta lk ing about a meeting that you 
fbelieved happened on July seventeenth. Correct?" 
A. "Correct." 
Q. "Was that a face to face meeting?" 
A. Yes. It was. I believe. It was. Sorry. I should 
[read. I forgot our context here. 
Q. Okay. And on page two thirty-two let's jump down to 
line ten. I said "Tell me what happened." 
A. "We met. We discussed the inventory. I got angry 
Iwhen Slone put a number on the paper and said okay. It's 
[worth, your worth of the company is a hundred and I don't 
recall the exact figure. And then we'll take half of, you 
know, your worth would be about a hundred and four and you'll 
pe, and you will pay us ninety-five hundred for Straightline 
Striping and we'll be done. And I said I didn't agree with 
that. That we had an arrangement for six hundred thousand and 
Ihe got a little heated. He sat there and said you know I 
haven't even talked to Vera about this but we are on time and 
materials and we could probably pay four thousand a month until 
[we see where the business is. And Vera said okay, I believe 
that, at that point we said then we need to get together in the 
fall when we know where the contracts are and finish this and I 
think that was our last conversation until I called him in 
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Q. Okay. I want you jump down now to l i n e n ineteen on 
||page two t h i r t y - t h r e e . See that? 
A. I do . 
Q. Question, "Well, there had been some items agreed to." 
A. "Absolutely." 
Q. "Isn't that true?" 
A. "The only things that were not agreed were for, were 
[not agreed to were the payout for Advanced Maintenance 
Services. Everything else we had done." 
Q. So as of June, June nineteenth or seventeenth meeting, 
there hadn't been an agreement on the payout. Had there? 
A. On advice from my counsel, my legal counsel, based on 
the fact we did not have the signed writings or the typed 
agreements, that's what the answer was. Yes. 
Q. You testified today about the inventory. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And I'm not sure I understood what you think the 
[purpose or what you told us the purpose of an inventory was. 
A. To see what we had. To get a feel for what we had and 
{what it's worth was. So we could make sure that Advanced 
[Maintenance Services got the stuff that was its and I needed to 
go through the shop and make sure I got all the striping 
equipment and stencils and stuff that went with that company. 
Q. Okay. I'd like you to turn your deposition to pages 
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two s e v e n t e e n through two n i n e t e e n , i f you would p l e a s e . 
A. Okay. 
Q. In that deposition, do you recall me asking you 
questions about the inventory? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. Okay. I want to pick it up at page two eighteen at 
line six. Okay? And the question, "When you were talking 
about the meeting you were talking about the meeting on the 
seventeenth. Correct?" 
A. "I believe so. Yes." 
Q. "So what was the purpose of this inventory being put 
together if it wasn't being used to evaluate the assets of 
[Advanced Maintenance Systems?" 
A. "Realistically we wanted to take a look at what we 
|had. I don't think either one of us knew." 
Q. "But that was the only purpose was to know what you 
Hiad? " 
A. "Yeah. If it had been the value you would see values 
|on every line. They're aren't." 
Q. "I don't know what they represent so I'm asking you 
|questions." 
A. "Okay." 
Q. "So you're telling me in connection with your 
[discussion with the Porters again that the document in Exhibit 
One, which is the inventory. Correct, Mr. Cowley?" 
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A. "I d o n ' t have E x h i b i t One." 
Q. "Do you r e c a l l t h a t ? " 
A. "Here." 
Q. "So you're telling me in connection with your 
[discussion with the Porters again, did the document in Exhibit 
[One have anything to do with your discussion with the Porters?" 
A. "It did." 
Q. "What did it have to do with the discussion?" 
Q. "It had to do with the amount they finally wanted to 
jpay, they finally wanted to pay for Advanced Maintenance 
Services. Initially in our discussions, they, Slone circled 
and said okay, you're payout is a hundred and four and then 
(you'11 pay us ninety-five hundred for Straightline and we'11 
split it right down the middle." 
Q. And the next question was "Okay. And that discussion 
{happened in the meeting on the seventeenth?" 
A. "On what you believed it on the seventeenth? Yes 
.r." 
Q. Okay. 
MR. SMAY: I'm going to renew my objection. Now we've 
Igot the part that don't even impeach anything. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. "The purpose of the inventory was to determine what 
they wanted to pay. Isn't that right?" 
A. "The purpose of the inventory was to find out what we 
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|had. I don't believe either one of us knew what we had." 
Q. The meeting on July the nineteenth, did either you or 
[lyour wife say to the Porters that you were kicking yourselves 
for not having accepted the six hundred thousand dollar deal? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Is it possible? 
A. It's not that I recall. 
Q. All of the terms of your agreement were not finalized 
|on the twenty-fourth of June. Were they? 
A. I don't believe I had anything else left to perform 
from my end of the agreement. 
Q. What about the, what about their end of the deal? 
A. Yes. There was still payments to be made. 
MR. SMAY: Excuse me. I didn't hear the question. 
THE COURT: How about their end of the deal? 
MR. SMAY: I'm going to object. That asks for a legal 
conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He's answered it already. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. All of the terms had not been agreed to as of June 
twenty-fourth. Had they? 
MR. SMAY: Again, same objection. It calls for a 
legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: (inaudible) legal terms. 
BY MR. PRICE: 
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Q. No. All the terms of the agreement had not been 
reached on June the twenty-fourth. Had they? 
A. They had not been fulfilled. No. 
Q. But what about issues on insurance? 
A. We discussed them and put them to bed. Vera had said 
she'd do what we did. 
Q. Which was what? 
A. The insurance was extended through the end of the year 
and we didn't change the no non-compete clause. 
Q. The insurance being extended through the end of the 
jyear didn't happen until your meeting in July. Did it? 
A. I think that's when I filled out the paperwork. 
Q. And so. 
A. At that time she assured me we'd do what we needed to 
[do to take care of the insurance issues. 
Q. And isn't it true there were discussions about trying 
to have insurance longer than that? 
A. There were. Absolutely. 
Q. It just wasn't possible to keep you on the program. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Under the terms of the plan. Correct? 
A. We had discussions about our making the payments to 
stay on the plan. 
Q. And ultimately who made the payments? 
A. Quality Maintenance. 
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Q. ( i n a u d i b l e ) I f I can have j u s t a minute , Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
IBY MR. PRICE: 
Q. I ' d l i k e t o t a l k t o you about t h e four thousand d o l l a r 
[a month payments . 
A. Okay. 
Q. What was the, what are the purpose as you understand 
it with the four thousand dollar a month payment? 
A. Initially, the four thousand dollar a month payment 
Iwas a short payment to help them not have to pay ten thousand 
dollars and use the other money to get Quality on it's feet and 
[operational. 
Q. So you agreed that they could pay four thousand dollar 
[payments and you just understood it was a temporary payment? 
A. It was a temporary agreement until the contracts were 
renewed. 
Q. When did that discussion come up? 
A. When they first brought up four thousand dollars a 
(month. 
Q. It would have been in July. Isn't that right? 
A. That would correct. 
Q. Okay. And so that four thousand dollar temporary 
|payment arrangement doesn' t show up in Exhibit Five which is 
the, what you claim is the agreement of June (inaudible). 
A. No. It does not. We accepted four thousand dollars a 
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[month in an effort to help them get on their feet. We didn't 
want the guys to be out of work any more than they did. I 
didn't. 
Q. In this case, Mr. Cowley, do you know whether or not 
the Porters would be entitled to a credit for what they paid to 
[you, (inaudible) four thousand dollars against what you claim 
is the six hundred thousand dollar contract? 
A. Do you know we discussed this, I believe, in my 
deposition. I don't know if they should receive a credit or 
not. I believe that's what I said in my deposition. 
Q. What about as you sit here today? 
A. As I sit here today I certainly would be able, I would 
[be willing to take that into consideration. Absolutely. 
Q. All you'd do is take it into consideration. You don't 
[have a position? 
A. I do have a position. I would certainly credit that 
four thousand dollars against the ten thousand dollar payment. 
Q. Different from what you said in your deposition? 
A. It is. 
Q. Okay. Now, you received cash, did you not, on or 
about starting on or about the twenty-seventh of June? 
A. We received some checks based on the payout on what 
|was in the account. 
Q. What was the purpose of those, the cash distributions 
to you? 
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A. That was what we had always talked about. Part of AMS 
changing to QMS is that the accounts would be split in half, 
[everything prior to that split-up would be split in half as far 
|as the cash on hand and the accounts receivable. 
Q. As part of splitting up AMS. Isn't that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. So you didn't ever believe that you owned a 
bart of Quality Maintenance. Did you? 
A. You know, on the about, on the advice of my counsel 
brior to having the writings of the agreement AMS was not 
[dissolved properly and so certainly it could be construed that 
|we should have part of Quality Maintenance. 
Q. Is that still your contention today? 
A. That is not. 
Q. Okay. Your contention today is you did reach an 
agreement which included the dissolution of AMS. Correct? 
A. That is. 
Q. Would you turn to Exhibit Thirty-nine, I just want to 
clarify something. (inaudible) request that you answer 
(inaudible) numbers twenty-three and twenty-four. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I'd like you to take a minute if you would and read 
those. I'll read the question if you would read your response. 
A. Okay. The response was based on. 
Q. Let me, let me go through this please. Had a chance 
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to review those? 
A. I have. Absolutely. 
Q. Reading number twenty-three, "Admit that you receive 
additional cash payout pursuant to dissolution on or about July 
twenty-ninth in the amount of sixteen thousand five hundred 
idollars." 
A. "(inaudible) dissolution occurred July twenty-ninth, 
two thousand two, both Porters and Plaintiffs then received 
[distribution from funds of AMS in the sum of sixteen five." 
Q. Okay. "Is that your testimony of how dissolution 
occurred at this point in time?" 
MR. SMAY: That's everyone's testimony. No one claims 
it occurred on July twenty-ninth. 
THE COURT: What's your question Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: My question is is that still his position 
that as of July twenty-ninth, no dissolution occurred and they 
just simply got a distribution of sixteen thousand dollars. 
MR. SMAY: No. That's not his answer. 
IBY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Let's go on to twenty-four. 
A. "Both Porters and Plaintiffs received a distribution 
from funds of AMS in the sum of sixteen five." 
Q. What was the purpose of those distributions? 
A. To split the cash on hand. 
Q. Okay. To split up AMS. Correct? 
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A. The cash on hand in the account. 
Q. Now on to twenty-four. It says "Admit that you 
[received an additional cash payout pursuant to dissolution on 
or about July thirty-first, two thousand two in the amount of 
eleven thousand eight hundred dollars." You see that in your 
[answer? 
A. Yes. "The payment also received by the Porters was 
[not pursuant to a dissolution but an ordinary ownership 
Idistribution." 
Q. Now my question is to you today as you sit here was 
that an ordinary shareholder distribution or was that money to 
split up AMS pursuant to a dissolution agreement? 
A. That was based on the advice of my counsel. 
Q. Okay. What I want to understand is your answer 
different today to that question? Based on your advice, advice 
|of your counsel or otherwise. 
A. We are not denying that AMS split up at this point. 
So it would be the distribution of funds from the AMS accounts. 
Q. Remember in your deposition I asked you questions 
about whether you understood the oath you took? 
A. I do. 
Q. Turn to page forty in your deposition please? It 
should be the small version. 
A. Okay. Okay. 
Q. Alright. Now if I can put my hands on the right 
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transcript. I had asked you, beginning at line eleven. Do you 
see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. I said question, "Can you describe for me your 
[understanding of the oath today?" You see that? 
A. Yes. My answer is "To tell the truth as I see it." 
Q. That's what you've done today as well in your 
testimony of this case, you told the truth as you see it. 
[Correct? Is that right? 
A. No. My testimony is that I'm telling the truth as it 
is. 
Q. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's take our morning break. 
Let's be in recess until ten after. 
(WHEREUPON THE TRIAL WAS RECESSED.) 
THE COURT: Okay. You may be seated. Mr. Smay, do 
(you have some redirect for this witness? 
MR. SMAY: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Return the witness to the chair. 
iMr. Cowley? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
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IBY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Mr. Cowley, just some clarifications if I may, you 
|have Exhibit Five there. Do you not? 
A. I do. 
Q. That's the copy of the written document signed by Mr. 
Porter. 
A. It is. 
Q. There's a question about whether the terms on that 
document were all the same as what had previously been 
submitted by the Porters to you on the twenty-second. Do you 
recall that? 
A. I do. 
Q. And I think you said that they were. Take a look dcwn 
at the bottom of eight, there's a couple there. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Parties have agreed to no non-compete. Parties have 
agreed to no confidentiality. Those were new, in fact, were 
they not? 
A. Yes. They were. 
Q. Need to make that correction? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you notice any others? Those are the ones I 
Inoticed. 
A. The agreement didn't have anything about the cash pay-
louts done by the company because that just had been a given. 
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(We had talked about it all the way through the thing and they 
(needed funds to start up Quality Maintenance and we didn't, I 
[didn't foresee that as an issue. 
Q. Okay. With respect to accepting the four thousand 
(dollars per month at the time, Mr. Porter, Mr. Porter, Mr. 
Cowley. 
A. (inaudible) 
Q. Could you have lived without taking the money? 
A. No. 
Q. Can I have you turn over to Exhibit Thirty-nine? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Lets see here. (inaudible) looking at (inaudible). 
(inaudible) number thirteen, Mr. Cowley, on page three. 
A. Yes. I'm there. 
Q. You suggested that there had been a meeting on the 
twenty-seventh of June, two thousand two at which the terms 
|were altered. And I understand you now that that was mistake 
and what you were actually talking about the meeting in July. 
A. Yes. I believe I said on or about June twenty-
seventh. It should have been the July meeting. It's my 
tadstake and I didn't catch it when I reviewed the document 
(prior to signing it. 
Q. Well, who drafted the answers for you, Mr. Cowley? 
A. Your secretary, I believe. 
Q. Look over at sixteen. 
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A. Okay. S i x t e e n on the document we've been l o o k i n g a t 
[or s i x t e e n t h a t the? 
Q. Oh. Excuse me. I meant paragraph s i x t e e n . 
A. Paragraph s i x t e e n . Thank you . T h a t ' s j u s t . 
Q. ( i n a u d i b l e ) 
A. I was just checking. 
Q. I'm looking at the last part of page three on or about 
June twenty-seventh, pursuant to the proposal, that being the 
broposal of June twenty-second, the Porters insisted the 
Plaintiffs take possession of equipment of Straightline 
Striping including listed vehicles, here the day of the twenty-
seventh is being supplied by Mr. Price but is this again June, 
July nineteenth? 
A. Yes. 
Q. "The Porters insisted that they would not take the two 
[older vehicles which had previously been offered for sale 
unsuccessfully. Plaintiffs took possession of such equipment 
|while reserving agreement to the proposed terms." Do you mean 
any other than the terms proposed with respect to the vehicles 
|on July nineteenth? 
A. No. Sorry. What was the question again? I'm sorry. 
I was reading. 
Q. My question is your, your answer there that you took 
[possession of such equipment while reserving agreement to the 
proposed terms, that is the statement that you reserved 
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agreement to the proposed terms, (inaudible) then set up 
[proposed terms respecting the equipment that you had just 
taken. Does it not? 
A. No. 
Q. Let me have you then take a look at your deposition, 
if you would, Mr. Cowley. 
A. Okay. 
Q. (inaudible) talking about. Over at page ten, two ten. 
lExcuse me. 
A. Two ten. The thick one. 
Q. It would be the second part. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Roughly the middle of that page there is a line 
seventeen. You see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. Mr. Cowley, "I believe it's accurate that I said I 
should know by the end of the month what our deal is going to 
[be." After the agreement you made with the Porters on the 
twenty-fourth, Mr. Cowley, there were matters yet to be sorted 
out. For example, the check given to you on June twenty-
seventh . 
A. That's correct. 
Q. There was the inventory yet to be done. 
A. It was more in line with the accounts receivable, 
clearing out the accounts payable, finalizing the actual cash 
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a t hand I b e l i e v e . 
Q. A l l o f t h a t i n Mrs. P o r t e r ' s i n i t i a l i n s i s t e n c e was t o 
[be done by t h e end o f t h e month o f June? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And is that what you had reference to in your 
statement of line seventeen? 
A. Yes. I believe so. 
Q. Turn over to page two thirty-two and two thirty-three. 
I'd like you to turn to two thirty-one, if you would please. 
Look at line twenty-one and tell us what the subject of these 
(questions was, Mr. Cowley. Read that answer for us. 
A. My answer on, the question on twenty-one? 
Q. (inaudible) answer (inaudible). 
A. "I think we were talking about the meeting that you 
(believed happened on July seventeenth." My answer was 
"Correct." 
Q. Can we now conclude Mr. Porter that where you were 
sitting July seventeenth at the time that's the meeting that 
jyou've so described as occurring on July nineteenth? 
A. Pardon? 
Q. (inaudible) 
A. I believe it is. Yes. 
Q. Now flip over to page two thirty-two. At line eleven 
begins your testimony regarding what transpired at the meeting. 
Would you read that for us, please? 
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A. Line e l e v e n ? 
Q. Yes . 
A. Yes . 
Q. Line eleven of two thirty-two and it runs over onto 
two thirty-three. 
A. Okay. "We met. We discussed the inventory. I got 
[angry when Slone put a number on paper and said okay. Your 
worth of the company is a hundred, and I don't recall the exact 
figure, then we went, we'll take half of, you know, your worth 
[would be a hundred and four and you' 11 pay us ninety-five 
(hundred for Straightline Striping and we'll be done. And I 
said I didn't agree with that, that we had an arrangement for 
six hundred thousand. And he got a little heated. He sat 
there and said you know, I haven't even talked to Vera about 
this but we're, but we're on time and materials and we could 
[probably pay four thousand a month until we see where the 
[business is. And Vera said okay. And I believe that at that 
point we said then we need to get together in the fall when we 
know where the contracts are and finish this. And I think that 
^as our last conversation until I called him in October, until 
I called him in October." 
Q. Your testimony at that time was that you specifically 
told the Porters our agreement is six hundred thousand dollars? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The Porters took issue with that apparently? 
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Q. Look down to l i n e twenty-two on page two t h i r t y - t h r e e . 
A. Okay. 
Q. "The only thing that was not agreed to was the payort 
[of Advanced Maintenance Services. That's because the Porters 
[would not agree to (inaudible) payment." 
A. "Absolutely. Yes." 
Q. "Everything else we had done." 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "In point of f a c t on the nineteenth the r e s t of the 
[agreement had been performed. " 
A. "Yes. I t had." 
Q. "All that happened on that occasion was the Porters 
disputed that they owed the ten thousand dollars." 
A. Yes." 
Q. And that's the point of your testimony at that time. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. I think that's all I have for Mr. Cowley. 
THE COURT: Anything else Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: Just one question, Your Honor. There is 
[one, one item, maybe a couple of questions. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
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Q. You testified that, on redirect examination, Mr. 
Cowley that you couldn't live on four thousand dollar a month 
[payments. Do you recall that? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Those are the four thousand dollar a month payments 
that you said were the temporary agreement that you had with 
the Porters. Is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What was to be the agreement of the parties, Mr. 
Cowley, if the work didn't come back to Quality Maintenance 
from 7-11? 
A. We had no other agreement. 
Q. Okay. So you didn't have any agreement of contingency 
in there if in fact the work went away completely from 7-11? 
A. I don't believe there's a mention of any other 
agreement anywhere in this case. 
Q. So if Quality Maintenance didn't make any money at all 
|you were still entitled to get something? 
A. I believe that if you review Slone's comments on our 
conversation on that Saturday night, his concern was, you know, 
you're not going to be able to pay me and if you don't have the 
business he didn't care whether I had the business or not, I 
was still expected to compensate him. That would be my 
[expectation whether the business is there or not, it's his 
responsibility to pay the obligation. 
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Q. At least four thousand a month. Right? 
A. That was the temporary agreement. 
Q. Okay. And if the business didn't come back as you 
anticipated, what was the agreement? 
MR. SMAY: Object. He's asked and answered twice now. 
MR. PRICE: I don't think he answered it (inaudible). 
THE WITNESS: Our agreement was ten thousand dollars a 
Imonth. 
THE COURT: (inaudible) your answer. 
THE WITNESS: Our agreement was ten thousand dollars a 
jmonth for five years. 
MR. PRICE: Okay. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Smay? 
MR. SMAY: No. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. PRICE: We would reserve our right to recall him, 
[Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Next witness, Mr. Smay. 
MR. SMAY: Slone Porter, please. 
THE COURT: Mr. Porter? 
MR. PRICE: Just quick housekeeping matter, Your 
[Honor. To the extent it's not in the record we would offer 
Exhibit Thirty-nine be admitted. That's the questions, the 
answers to admissions. 
THE COURT: Any objections? 
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MR. SMAY: Well, they're in the record, Your Honor, 
(inaudible) answers to admissions. 
THE COURT: They're received. 
SLONE D. PORTER 
Called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff having 
peen sworn by the clerk of the court was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
|BY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Mr. Porter, would you give The Court your full and 
correct name please? 
A. Slone D. Porter. 
Q. Where do you live, Mr. Porter? 
A. I live at 1010 Magpie Circle, Midway Utah. 
Q. What is your current business please? 
A. My current business? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I work for True Green. 
Q. In fact, you own the local True Green franchise. Do 
lyou not? 
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DEFENSE COUNSEL: Excuse me, Your Honor. I've just 
observed Mr. Cowley signaling the witness. We've noticed that 
|before. I can't let it go any longer. I object to that 
tactic. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cowley, I can't see you so I don't 
[know if you are or not but if you are making any signals or 
piouthing anything, that would be inappropriate. 
MR. COWLEY: Okay. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Do you recall testifying in a deposition of this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall testimony in this case that you believed 
that the six hundred thousand dollars offered by the Porters 
|was ludicrous? 
A. At the time, I did believe that. Yes. 
Q. At what time? 
A. At the time of the original offer. 
Q. And why was it ludicrous in your words? 
A. Because I understood how much we were taking out of 
the company every month, each family. I understood what the 
[potential earning ability of AMS was. I knew the kind of 
business that we had been doing. And I didn't feel like that 
was a fair offer. 
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Q. And in fact, you didn't agree to the six hundred 
thousand dollar offer ever. Did you? 
A. I told Tracy. 
Q. Yes or no ma'am. 
A. Yes. I did. 
Q. When is it you agreed to the six hundred thousand? 
A. On Monday the twenty-fourth. 
Q. You weren't there on Monday the twenty-fourth. 
A. I was on the phone with Tracy. 
Q. I want to refer you to your deposition transcript on 
[page one ninety-two and one ninety-three. 
A. (inaudible) 
THE COURT: (inaudible) 
THE WITNESS: One ninety-two? 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. 
Q. We're going to start, I'm going to do the same and ask 
lyou to do the same. I'm going to read the question and ask if 
jyou'll give the answer. Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. I believe if you go up to one ninety-nine I was asking 
lyou questions, you see at line twenty-one on page one ninety-
lone, I was asking you questions about July nineteenth 
(inaudible). 
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Q. And what I would like to do now is go down to page one 
ninety-two, pick it up at line twenty-three. Question: "At 
that meeting on the twenty-seventh, isn't it true at the 
|meeting you said words to the effect to the Porters." 
MR. SMAY: Objection. You need to read it accurately. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I don't know where you are. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. I did, Counselor. I apologize. 
A. Where are you? I'm sorry. 
Q. I am on page one ninety-two at line twenty-three. 
A. Okay. 
Q. On that line it says question, "At the meeting on the 
twenty-seventh, isn't it true at that meeting you said words to 
the effect to the Porters that you and your husband were 
kicking yourselves for not taking the six hundred thousand 
[dollar offer?" Answer? 
A. "On the twenty-seventh?" 
Q. "Yes." 
A. "I don't remember saying those words." 
Q. "How about on the nineteenth of July?" 
A. "Yeah. On the nineteenth of July we might have said 
something like that after they are trying to offer us some 
[pittance for their own doing." 
Q. Okay. Reading further down now on page one ninety-
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three I ask you questions starting at line seventeen, "And 
there was also an agreement that you would get paid four 
thousand a month for five years. Is that correct." 
A. "No. That was not the agreement." 
Q. "There was no agreement?" 
A. "No. That was not the agreement. See what you're 
doing, you fail to recognize is that Slone and Vera were 
directing this whole thing. Slone and Vera were telling us 
what they were going to do. Okay. Tell me who in the room is 
going to give somebody a loan for six hundred thousand." Which 
I meant to be the two forty because we were talking about a 
four thousand dollar a month payment. 
Q. If you had an opportunity to review and change this 
[document. 
A. I did and I missed that. But we were just obviously 
Ion line seventeen discussing four thousand a month so that was 
a, I mis-spoke which figure. 
Q. Would you read, would you refer now to Exhibit Five? 
A. Yes. In which book? 
Q. That would be the (inaudible). 
A. The big book? 
Q. Plaintiffs exhibits. Excuse me. (inaudible) 
A. In this one? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Okay. 
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Q. Do you recognize that document? 
A. I have seen it before. 
Q. Wasn't that the document you're claiming is the 
agreement you reached with the Porters? That you accepted on 
the twenty-fourth of June? 
A. That's the agreement that Tracy agreed to, he read to, 
(he was trying to read to me over the phone. I was in Jackson 
Hole and we were having very poor reception. 
Q. Can you see in that document whether there is anything 
[with respect to the payment of interest? 
A. Payment of interest, yes. 
Q. Okay. What does it say? 
A. It says no interest. 
Q. But you were complaining that you wouldn't have agreed 
to a two hundred and forty thousand dollar zero interest but 
(you would agree to a six hundred thousand dollar deal with no 
interest? 
A. Well, I guess that's what it says. 
Q. That's part of why you thought it was ludicrous 
because you would never allow them to finance, keep (inaudible) 
(without (inaudible) right? 
A. I was never happy with the agreement. I didn't say I 
|was happy with it. 
Q. I would like you to turn to page one fourteen of the 
[exhibit, if you would. 
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A. Of my deposition? 
Q. Of your deposition. 
MR. SMAY: What page? 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. One fourteen. Okay. On page one fourteen I was 
asking you questions relative to the inventory. You see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I asked you a question beginning on line sixteen, I 
said "Okay. How many trucks were there total?" And the 
answer? 









The question was, "What list?" 
"The list of the inventory." 
Question, "Did somebody do one?" 
"Slone and Tracy." 
And I asked you, "When did they do that?" 
"During the time period when we were trying to." 
Trying to what? 
Yes. Then you asked a question, "Do you know what A. 
that was?" 
Q. Okay. And when did they do that? 
A. "It would have been after the twenty-second and 
Jprobably before the nineteenth of July." 
Q. (inaudible) reading at line twenty-four. Excuse me. 
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A. Where are you? 
Q. Page one fourteen. 
A. Right. I was at the bottom, "During the time period 
when we were trying to negotiate." 
Q. You were trying to negotiate. Do you know when that 
inventory was being done? 
A. Do I know when it was being done? 
Q. Yes. 
A. It was being done sometime in July. 
Q. It's being done between the meeting of the twenty-
seventh of June and the nineteenth of July. Correct? 
A. I think so. 
Q. So it was during the time when they were still, you 
were still negotiating with the Porters over an agreement. 
Isn' t that right? 
A. I don't know. I don't know if negotiate is the right 
Iword. 
Q. That is your word. Is it not? 
A. It is my word. 
Q. Have you ever seen any document anywhere that Tracy 
Cowley has signed as an agreement with the Porters regarding 
JAMS or QMS for any of the assets or money that's been discussed 
in this case? 
A. He, there's one that says Vera, call me with his 
initials on it. 
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Q. Is it your testimony that's his signature on an 
{agreement? 
A. Those are his initials on the agreement. 
Q. Okay. Is that his signature for purposes of accepting 
the agreement? 
MR. SMAY: I object. That calls for a legal 
conclusion certainly. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll find so that we don't have to 
|go into this again that was not his signature affirming 
(inaudible). It was on a sticky note attached to the, to it. 
MR. SMAY: (inaudible) written (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, whatever. There is testimony both 
Iways. 
|BY MR. PRICE: 
Q. I ask you to turn if you would to page one seventy-
seven and one seventy-eight of your deposition. Are you there? 
A. I am there. Sorry. 
Q. Lets start reading questions and answers at line 
fifteen of page one seventy-seven, if I can. 
A. Okay. 
Q. "Do you agree that you were going to get half the cash 
[out of AMS. Didn't you?" 
A. "Yes. We had made some agreements. Yes." 
Q. "So which agreements?" 
A. "Some agreements were reached but never finalized." 
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Q. "What agreements? What do you mean never finalized?" 
A. "Probably the biggest part of the whole deal was the 
cash, the total buyout cash price was never agreed upon." 
Q. I have nothing further, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Cross, Mr. Smay? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMAY: 
Q. Look back in your deposition if you would Mr. Cowley, 
at page one fourteen. 
A. Okay. 
Q. At the bottom of page one fourteen, your answer there 
[was "During the time period when we were trying to negotiate." 
(Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That time period was the twenty-second of June through 
the nineteenth of July in the next paragraph on page one 
fifteen. 
A. Correct. 
Q. And what you were trying to negotiate with the Porters 
on the nineteenth of July was whether they would comply with 
^our ten thousand dollar agreement reached back in June. Was 
it not? 
MR. PRICE: Objection, Your Honor. That's leading and 
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receive those assets with respect to the agreement they talked 
(about. I can tell you based upon the evidence that I've heard 
that I would make that valuation date though as of June the 
twenty-second, prior to 7-11 knowing anything about the 
[problems with Mr. Cowley. There are weaknesses as I see it in 
(both sides. With respect to the Porters side, I believe that 
there's an obligation of good faith and fair dealing between 
[partners in a business. And to go, you know, you might have, 
this is between partners. Clearly you both had an obligation 
to 7-11 and I'm not going to comment about the dishonesty that 
[was committed by both sides with respect to 7-11's involvement 
[but this particular lawsuit involves, doesn't involve 7-11. It 
involves these two parties. And to have gone to 7-11 behind 
the Cowleys back and told them of that, I think it violates the 
obligation that one partner has to another of good faith and 
fair dealing. And that's why the value, clearly this business 
is, the value of it was the contracts it had with 7-11. Other, 
if they didn't have those contracts, if I was to come here and 
|we could easily value what the assets were and just divide it. 
But a business has more value as an ongoing business with 
(employees, with contracts in place, with business 
relationships, goodwill and those type of things. I just make 
those comments. On the other side with respect to the Cowleys, 
they have a hard time, I'm not going to tell you how I would 
rule, have a hard time establishing that there was an agreement 
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for six hundred thousand dollars. If he had accepted it and 
signed that agreement on that date, that would have been 
(inaudible). (inaudible) enforce that agreement. That did not 
[occur. So with those comments, I'd ask you Mr. Smay, for your 
closing argument in writing. I would, I (inaudible), this is 
an entire case that should have been settled. There is still 
time to do that. You're all here. But I just make those 
comments. I (inaudible) all the evidence. 
MR. PRICE: Appreciate it, Your Honor. 
MR. SMAY: (inaudible) exists (inaudible) you say the 
Cowleys should prove the written agreement if they can and the 
Porters if they can. It's also a possibility it seems to me if 
they don't prove the agreement they have the same claim under 
the Statute of Frauds to partial performance as do the Porters 
do and that ought to be considered as well. 
THE COURT: Yes. Ultimately. I would agree. 
MR. SMAY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. PRICE: Your Honor, we need a deadline for 
submittal. 
THE COURT: Is ten days sufficient? 
MR. PRICE: I believe so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Simultaneously in ten days? 
MR. SMAY: Ten days, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. Thank you, Counsel. Appreciate your 
courtesy. 
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